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In my dissertation, I examine the connection between aesthetic experience and morality. I 
specifically focus on the work of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch, who all share the thesis that 
aesthetic experience has an ineluctable moral component, which enables it to play various roles 
in moral education and development. In chapter 1, I give an analysis of Plato’s discussion of 
experiences of beauty via art in the Republic, and his arguments that art can be used in moral 
training. I also examine Plato’s discussion of erotic experiences of beautiful people in the 
Symposium and Phaedrus and his arguments that these sorts of experiences provide an insight 
into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision: they lead to the knowledge of true 
Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. In Chapter 2, I give an 
analysis of Kant’s discussion of beauty in nature and art, and his discussion of sublimity. I argue 
that, as a result of the different symbolic relationships that the beautiful and the sublime have 
with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a different way, are morally instructive.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine Iris Murdoch’s view regarding the connection between 
moral progress and aesthetic experience. Drawing Plato’s and Kant’s theories together, Murdoch 
argues for her own theory of moral progress, which involves a pilgrimage that one must make 
from the self-focused fantasy life into which one is born to the apprehension of reality, 
particularly in its moral dimensions. I examine the way in which aesthetic experience is involved 
in the Murdochain moral pilgrimage and the connection between aesthetic experience and what 
Murdoch refers to as ‘unselfing.’ 
 In Chapter 5, I address the theoretical underpinnings of the relation between morality 
and aesthetics that I argue for. I present three interrelated theses, one in moral psychology, one in 
iv 
 
normative value theory, and one in the intersection between them. The first thesis is motivational 
internalism about the good, and the second thesis is the substantive claim that the moral is, in 
fact, good. Therefore, when one understands the moral as good she has motivation towards it. 
However, humans do not necessarily have such an understanding. A person may believe that 
something is morally required without believing it to be good. Thus, the third thesis is that art 
may help us to see the moral as good by giving us a new kind of perspective: a new point of view 
from which one understands that there is a higher self.  
I end the dissertation with a Coda, wherein I review the way in which aesthetic 
experience functions in Plato, Kant, and Murdoch. Then, I consider the main philosophical 
objections that arise against the thesis that aesthetic experience gives rise to moral 
transformation. Finally, I sketch a view of aesthetics in which I make some relevant distinctions 
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The relationship between aesthetics and morality is rich and manifold, and so are the 
works that are dedicated to discussing it. The main themes in this discussion include the question 
as to whether aesthetic experience may give rise to moral progress, questions about whether 
aesthetic experience can be used in moral education, the recent debate concerning whether or not 
aesthetic and ethical evaluations “go their separate ways,”
1
 questions about whether the moral 
content of a work is relevant to its aesthetic value, and the question as to whether beauty is 
intrinsically connected with moral value. 
In this dissertation, I examine these questions through an analysis of the view that 
aesthetic experience cannot, and should not be, divorced from morality. I specifically focus on 
the work of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch. These three philosophies are individual and 
distinctive, and these philosophers’ views of aesthetics, in particular, are importantly divergent 
from one another in certain respects. However, they all recognize important connections between 
aesthetics and morality, and their theories overlap in certain ways. More specifically, these 
philosophers share the thesis that aesthetic experience has an ineluctable moral component, 
which enables it to play various roles in moral education and development.  
My project comprises five chapters, followed by a Coda. In chapter 1, I argue that beauty 
plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) Some experiences of beauty via 
art can be used in moral training; that is, these experiences can be used to promote the kind of 
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 Marcia Muelder Eaton. Merit, Aesthetic, and Ethical (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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training that Plato suggests should take place during the beginning stages of education in the 
Republic. This is an affective kind of training, whereby a person learns to feel appropriately 
toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty via art have the capacity to influence a person’s 
character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to appropriate behavior. (2) An erotic experience 
of a beautiful person, as it is described in the Symposium and Phaedrus, is a more profound sort 
of experience. This kind of experience can be distinguished from (1) in that it adds a higher kind 
of cognitive component which is lacking in (1). In (1), cognition is involved (cognition is 
involved in all affection), but only as perception-based thought, which merely has access to 
appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful people, on the other hand, provide an insight 
into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision. They lead to the knowledge of true 
Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. Therefore, erotic 
experiences of beautiful people promote increased moral understanding as opposed to affective 
training.  
In Chapter 2, I give an analysis of Kant’s discussion of beauty in nature and art, and his 
discussion of sublimity, which, I suggest, is surprisingly under-appreciated. I argue that, as a 
result of the different symbolic relationships that the beautiful and the sublime have with the 
moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a different way, are instructive: The beautiful is 
especially capable of teaching us to love something without interest, and it cultivates a certain 
kind of freedom from the merely personal inclinations on which we tend to focus. The sublime, 
on the other hand, best captures what Kant calls ‘moral feeling,’ and it teaches us moral dignity. 
Sublimity not only makes us aware of reason’s power, but it teaches us that, in our practical 
lives, that power should be given due respect, and that it should never be defeated by our 
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inclinations. In this way, an experience of sublimity gives us, as it were, a revelation about 
reason, and we are carried to apply it to the practical.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine Iris Murdoch’s view regarding the connection between 
moral progress and aesthetic experience. Drawing Plato’s and Kant’s theories together, Murdoch 
argues for her own theory of moral progress, which involves a pilgrimage that one must make 
from the self-focused fantasy life into which one is born to the apprehension of reality, 
particularly in its moral dimensions. This pilgrimage is possible only via the practice of what 
Murdoch calls ‘unselfing.’ In her view, certain kinds of aesthetic experiences facilitate unselfing; 
they train us to exercise what Murdoch refers to as ‘loving attention,’ which involves respecting 
something other than oneself. Aesthetic experiences, through the attitude that they command us 
to acquire, train us to respond and attend to things in the morally ideal way. The practice of 
attention, which aesthetic experience trains us to do, leads to the defeat of the ego and a moral 
transformation. That is to say, since moral training brings about the transformation of a person 
that is the aim of the Murdochian moral pilgrimage, moral training is the key to the moral 
pilgrimage, and aesthetic experience is the key to moral training. 
Murdoch recognizes and discusses all of the following kinds of aesthetic experiences as 
experiences that may promote moral transformation: beauty in nature and art, erotic experiences 
of beautiful people, and sublimity in art (especially tragedy) and nature. She maintains that moral 
training, and the sort of reformation that results from Plato’s erotic experiences of beautiful 
people, as well as the triumph over the ego, may all result from all or any of those kinds of 
experiences. Some of these experiences might be more apt than others to teach us about certain 
aspects of moral reformation. For example, an erotic experience of beauty might be especially 
capable of teaching us love for other people, insofar as it teaches us to appreciate the subjectivity 
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of another individual. Tragedy is, perhaps, especially capable of showing us the idea of death, 
which has a particularly powerful impact against the ego.  
 Like Plato, Murdoch distinguishes between good and bad art, and she argues that while 
bad art may lead to immoral action, good art may be used as an instrument in a person’s moral 
development. Unlike Plato, however, Murdoch finds a place for erotic experiences of beauty, as 
well as sublimity, in art. Like Kant, Murdoch argues that there is a symbolic relationship 
between beauty and morality. However, while Kant and Murdoch both have specific theories of 
sublimity, Murdoch argues that an experience of sublimity does not give rise to the recognition 
of one’s own faculty of reason, as Kant suggests, but rather to the recognition of other 
individuals, and the realization of human conflict.  
In Chapter 5, I address the theoretical underpinnings of the relation between morality and 
aesthetics that I argue for. I present three interrelated theses, one in moral psychology, one in 
normative value theory, and one in the intersection between them. The first thesis is motivational 
internalism about the good, and the second thesis is the substantive claim that the moral is, in 
fact, good. Therefore, when one understands the moral as good she has motivation towards it. 
However, humans do not necessarily have such an understanding. A person may believe that 
something is morally required without believing it to be good. Thus, the third thesis is that art 
may help us to see the moral as good by giving us a new kind of perspective – a new point of 
view from which one understands that there is a higher self. First, I make some initial remarks 
about the nature of internalism and moral realism, and summarize Plato’s, Kant’s, and 
Murdoch’s views of moral motivation in terms of contemporary views. Then, I sketch my own 
view that motivational judgment internalism can and does coexist with an objective Good, where 
goodness is not a function of one’s desires. In the process of doing so, I clarify exactly what is 
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compelling about an account of moral motivation that draws on (as well as expands) the views of 
Plato, Kant, and Murdoch. In addition, I suggest some amendments to Murdoch’s view.  
I end the dissertation with a Coda, wherein I review the way in which aesthetic 
experience functions in Plato, Kant, and Murdoch. Then, I consider the main philosophical 
objections that arise against the thesis that aesthetic experience gives rise to moral 
transformation. Finally, I sketch a view of aesthetics in which I make some relevant distinctions 
that help clear up these difficulties. 
 
CHAPTER 1  
EXPERIENCES OF BEAUTY VIA ART AND EROTIC EXPERIENCES OF 
BEAUTIFUL PEOPLE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AESTHETICS 
AND ETHICS IN PLATO 
 
I. PLATO AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS REGARDING MOTIVATION 
My goal in this chapter is to consider Plato’s aesthetic theory and his conception of the 
role that aesthetic experience plays in moral reformation. First, however, it will be necessary to 
discuss Plato’s moral psychology and, in particular, Plato’s view of the way in which a person 
becomes motivated toward goodness. This will initially involve a discussion of the following 
famous passage at Republic, 505d-e: 
In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what 
are believed to be so, even if they aren’t really so, and they act, acquire, and 
form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things 
that are merely believed to be good, however, but everyone wants the things 
that really are good and disdains mere belief here…Every soul pursues the 
good and does whatever it does for its sake. It divines that the good is 
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something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or 
acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses 
the benefit, if any that even those other things may give. 
 
  “Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake” suggests that Plato 
holds at least a version of the Socratic thesis regarding motivation
2
 – the thesis that agents are 
always motivated by what they believe to be most good. More specifically, in earlier dialogues, 
Socrates argues that people always do what they most desire, and they most desire what they 
believe is most good. Thus, they perform acts that they believe are most good. The crucial point 
is that all desires are for what a person believes to be most good, i.e. that all desires are for things 
qua good. Thus, for Socrates, akrasia is not possible – that is to say, it follows from his argument 
that a person will never do what she thinks will secure her less good than some other action she 
believes open to her. 
However, in the Republic, Plato seems to describe cases in which agents act this way, and 
these cases seem to suggest that Plato accepts the possibility of akrasia. For example, though he 
recognizes the action as shameful and inappropriate, Leontius strongly desires to look at corpses 
(439e). His desire overcomes him and he engages in the action that he has determined is wrong 
(440a). Furthermore, according to Socrates, “we often see elsewhere, when his appetites are 
forcing a man to act contrary to reason, and he rails at himself with that within himself which is 
compelling him to do so” (440b). 
Thus, making sense of the passage at 505d-e and its relationship with the examples of 
akrasia that Plato describes in the Republic has been a central topic in recent scholarship.
3
 In the 
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 See Protagoras 355b-d, Gorgias 467c-468d, and Meno 77c-78b 
3 G. Lesses, “Weakness, Reason, and the Divided Soul in Plato’s Republic,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4 
(1987), G.R. Carone, “Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?” Oxford Studies in Ancient 
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Republic, unlike other dialogues, Plato introduces distinct parts of the soul, and this is what 
seems to make akrasia a possibility. Some commentators have insisted that Plato’s argument for 
the tripartition of the soul entails that only the rational part of the soul desires the good. Scholars 
who argue in favor of this reading claim that the desires of the non-rational parts of the soul are 
‘good-independent.’ Such desires in no way depend on apprehension of their objects as good. 
The idea is that these desires, since they have no concern for good, may come into conflict with 
our rational desires, which are directed toward the good. Akrasia takes place in instances in 
which desires come into conflict, when a person acts in accordance with non-rational desires 
instead of rational desires. On this reading, “every soul pursues the good and does whatever it 
does for its sake” is interpreted to mean that the rational part of the soul pursues the good and 
does whatever it does for its sake, but the other two parts are not concerned with the good.
4
 The 
appetite and spirit are thought to pursue objects not for the sake of the good, but for the sake of 
those objects themselves regardless of whether goodness is present in them or can be reached by 
obtaining them. Good-independence is, thus, inconsistent with the Socratic idea that all desires 
are for things qua good, so some good-independence theorists have argued that, at least in the 
Republic, Plato simply does not hold the Socratic thesis regarding motivation.  
The argument at 437e that ‘thirst itself’ is for ‘drink itself’ is the passage to which good-
independence theorists usually refer. Importantly, though, this seems to be the only passage that 
has been taken to support the key point that this view advances
5
 – that, on Plato’s view, at least 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Philosophy, 20 (2001) and Jessica Moss, “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 72, pgs. 503-535 
4
 See M. Woods, “Plato’s Division of the Soul,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 73 (1987) and C. Kahn, 
“Plato’s Theory of Desire,’ Reviews of Metaphysics, 41 (1987). Furthermore, T. Irwin’s Plato’s Moral Theory 
(Oxford, 1977), and Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995) give an account of good-independence, but he does allow for the 
spirit to be good-dependent, in part. 
5
 See Jessica Moss, “Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of The Soul,” Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 34 (2008).  
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some non-rational desires are not for things qua good. At 437e, Socrates explains that “each 
appetite itself is only for its natural object, while the appetite for something of a certain sort 
depends on additions.” Socrates explains that merely because “everyone has an appetite for good 
things,” this does not mean that a person has an appetite for a certain sort of drink, such as a hot 
or cold drink, or even good drink. Thus, this passage is thought to mean that the appetitive part 
of the soul, though it desires drink, does not desire drink qua good. The good-independence 
theorist argues that since Socrates says “thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it 
is in its nature to be for, namely, drink itself” (437e), Plato means to suggest that when the 
appetite desires drink its desire is independent of any recognition of drink as good.  
Yet, this does not follow from a close reading of the text. The point that Socrates is 
making is that one’s desire for drink does not entail that it is a desire for ‘good drink’ or ‘hot 
drink’ or some other kind of drink. Having an appetite for a certain kind of drink “depends on 
additions.” That I am thirsty doesn’t require that I be thirsty for something hot or cold or, e.g., a 
good quality wine. It simply follows from “I’m thirsty” that I need a drink. In other words the 
adjectives only follow when “additions” are present, e.g. “I’m hot and I’m thirsty, so I need a 
cold drink.” Crucially though, we have no reason to believe that Socrates’ point here is 
incompatible with the claim that being thirsty – desiring a drink – involves regarding drink as a 
good thing. The very phenomenon of wanting to drink can naturally be construed as finding 
drinking good, in some sense of finding.  
This shows at least one way in which good-independence produces an insufficient 
interpretation of a central passage in the text.
6
 Other scholars have recently argued that Plato 
does indeed consistently maintain in pre-Republic and post-Republic dialogues as well as in the 
                                                             
6 For another account of this, see Hendrick Lorenze,“The Argument for Tripartition,” The Brute Within pg. 30 
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Republic that all desire is for things qua good. This reading (which entails good-dependence, 
since it shows that the desires of lower parts of the soul as well as those of the rational part 
involve and depend on apprehensions of their objects as good) suggests that Republic 505d-e 
should be interpreted to mean that each part of the soul desires what it takes to be good and that 
everyone pursues things under the guise of the good, no matter which part of her soul rules her. 
Proponents of good-dependence argue, however, that only a rational-part-ruling soul can 
understand what goodness consists in, and that souls that are ruled by the lower parts err on 
account of confused notions of the good. According to the good-dependence theorist, it is this 
kind of confused notion of the good that gives rise to (and accounts for) the sorts of akratic 
actions that Plato describes in the Republic.
7
 In what follows, I shall argue in favor of good-
dependence. Since my argument will entail the claim that Plato consistently holds that all desires 
are for things qua good – that every soul (and the whole soul) always pursues the good – I must 
begin with a discussion of Plato’s division of the soul.  
Plato’s first description of the three parts of the soul – reason (to logistikon), spirit (to 
thumoeides), and appetite (epithumetikon) – comes in Republic, Book IV. As the famous 
motivational conflict argument for tripartition of the soul in Book IV unfolds, we learn that there 
are three activities of the soul: one part desires physical gratification, one part gets angry and 
loves honor, and one part desires actively learning.
8
 The crucial question quickly becomes 
whether the whole soul is always responsible for motivating a person to act, or whether some 
part of the soul is responsible for each respective motivation:  
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 See Glen Lesses, “Weakness, Reason, and The Divided Soul in Plato’s Republic,” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, no. 2, 1987 for more discussion of the view that, in the Republic, Plato tries to reconcile his 
acceptance of the possibility of akrasia with a Socratic account of motivation. Also, see Jessica Moss, “Appearances 
and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the Soul,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, pp 35. 
8 These classes of motivation are explained thoroughly by Hendrik Lorenze in The Brute Within.  
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Do we do each of these things with the same part of ourselves, or do we do 
them with three different parts? Do we learn with one part, get angry with 
another, and with some third part desire the pleasures of food, drink, sex, 
and the others that are closely akin to them? Or do we act with the whole of 
our soul in each of these cases, when we set out after something? (436a) 
Some evidence in support of the claim that each part of the soul involves a different sort 
of desire and is motivated by a different object comes at 581b: The rational part is motivated by 
its love for wisdom and learning, the spirited part is motivated by its love for honor (kalon) and 
victory (581b), and the appetite is said to desire money and profit (581a). “As there are three 
parts, there are also, it seems to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each part, and so 
with desires” (580d). 
At 439a, Socrates explains that since conflicting desires occur within the soul, such 
desires do not belong to the whole soul, but rather, to distinctive parts of it, which come into 
motivational conflict: It is “not to speak well” to say that the same thing desires something while 
being at the same time averse to that very thing. Here, the conflict between desire and aversion is 
analyzed through the ‘principle of opposites:’ The same thing will not be willing to do or 
undergo opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing, and at the same time (436b). 
Using the example of the archer, Socrates argues that it must be one thing in the soul that desires 
something and yet a different thing that is averse to it. (“To say of the archer that his hands at the 
same time push the bow away and draw it towards him is not to speak well. Rather, we ought to 
say that the one hand pushes it away and the other draws it towards him.”) Just as the archer’s 
arms pushing and pulling the bow should be interpreted as one arm pushing while the other arm 
is pulling, the analysis of desire and aversion in the soul should be interpreted as one part 
desiring and pulling, while a different part is averse and pulls the other way (439b). Thus, the 
point is that if some part of the soul is the bearer of some desire, it follows that, while that desire 
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can be attributed to the soul in a certain way (namely, it can be attributed to a respective part of 
it), it is not the whole soul that is the bearer of that particular desire (438b). 
Certainly, we are told that the result of the differing motivations in the soul is a “civil war 
within the soul” (tes psuches stasis, 440e). Furthermore, one part of the soul is set apart from the 
others insofar as it has the capacity for calculation (logismos). This rational part of the soul’s 
desires arise from calculation (439d, 603, and 604d). The appetite is unreasoning, and non-
rational (439d) and the spirited part gets angry without calculation (441c). Plato does describe 
the appetitive and spirited parts as having certain beliefs and as being able to be persuaded by 
argument (554d) and as having the ability to recognize a means to certain ends. This ability is 
characteristic of the appetite – the lover of money or profit.  
Plato’s different descriptions of the object of appetite raise a problem. In reference to the 
object of appetite, scholars have used a variety of terms such as profit, gratification, pleasure, 
food, drink, or sex. The problem with calling pleasure the object of the appetitive part is that we 
are told that each part of the soul has a particular kind of pleasure – that is to say, pleasure is a 
motivation for the rational and spirited parts as well (580d). Thus, what is it that is specifically 
the object of appetite? I suggest that while appetite seeks food, drink, sex, and such sorts of 
physical gratification (these are its ultimate objects), it is also motivated by a sort of second-
order desire (profit), which is a means to acquiring physical gratification, the end it ultimately 
seeks (580e). However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the ultimate object of one’s 
appetitive desire might, over time, become primarily money. It is not unusual for a person – after 
she becomes accustomed to seeking money – to begin to desire the accumulation of wealth more 
strongly than she desires the objects of physical gratification that it can provide.  
12 
 
In any case, it seems that Plato assigns paradigmatic rational capacities to the lower parts 
of the soul when he describes them as having certain kinds of beliefs, having the capacity to be 
persuaded by arguments, and having the capacity to recognize means to certain ends. Therefore, 
some philosophers have argued that this contradicts his argument that the rational part is 
distinguished from the other two insofar as it has a capacity that they lack.
9
 However, this 
alleged contradiction can be explained away by a closer examination of the text.  
We have seen above that the famous motivational conflict argument in Book IV shows 
that the parts of the soul are responsible for different motivations because they are the subjects of 
psychological states (e.g. desire and aversion), and thus, the soul comprises distinct parts which 
bear motivation in various forms. In Book X, we encounter two other arguments for the 
tripartition of the soul. At 602c Socrates uses what is commonly called the ‘optical illusion 
argument’ to show that cognitive dissonance occurs within the soul: While the rational part uses 
calculation to determine the way things are and believes in accordance with it, the lower part 
believes things to be just as they appear.  
The optical illusion argument thus relies on a distinction between the way things really 
are and the way they appear. The non-rational parts of the soul accept appearances, but the 
rational part – since it can calculate and reflect on the way things appear – can resist appearances 
when necessary. Socrates uses his description of an optical illusion in order to explain that visual 
images as well as imitative poetry “consort with” a lower part of the soul. This leads on to a 
further argument that is based on emotional conflict, where we are told that reason wants to 
follow calculation, but the unreasoning part leads a person toward “lamentation” (604d), “pity” 
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(60b), lusts, and “appetitive pleasures and pains” (606d). This lower part is “thoughtless” (605b) 
and is “nurtured by tragedy” (606d).  
I maintain that Socrates uses the optical illusion argument to illuminate what is going on 
in cases of emotional conflict. Specifically, the part of the soul that unreflectively accepts 
appearances and the part that leads us toward desires for emotion and appetitive desires is the 
same: It is the lower part of the soul, which includes appetite and spirit.
10
 The passage at 603e 
(the emotional conflict argument in Book X) seems to correspond with the discussions in Book 
VI insofar as we still see a division – one that is made on the basis of the different motivations 
that drive each part – between the rational part of the soul and the lower, emotion and appetite-
driven parts. However, the argument at 602c is a different kind of argument that is based on the 
cognitive conflict that occurs during the experience of optical illusions. Here, Socrates re-
describes the parts of the soul with an emphasis not on their motivational but, rather, on their 
cognitive aspects. The emphasis on the cognitive aspects of the lower parts of the soul is crucial 
here because it shows that these parts of the soul are capable of performing not only affective 
roles but cognitive ones. These cognitive roles, however, are confined to perception-based 
thought, and perception has access merely to appearances.
11
  
At 602d-603a Socrates uses the principle of opposites to show that one part of the soul 
believes in accordance with calculation and another inferior part of the soul believe in 
accordance with appearance (phainomenon). This illusion-believing part is the non-rational part, 
                                                             
10 Some philosophers maintain that the ‘optical illusion’ argument should not be read in connection with the 
‘emotional conflict argument,’ and that these arguments are “embarrassments to be explained away.” However, a 
genuine reading of the text shows that – when considered in connection – these arguments are a key to Plato’s 
Division of the soul.  See Jessica Moss’s “Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the Soul,” pg. 36, in 
particular. 




the appetite and spirit: At 605b-c, he connects the optical illusion argument with the imitative 
poet, who appeals to the part of the soul that believes a person at a distance is smaller than when 
he is closer. The idea is that images, visual or poetic, appeal to the same part of the soul: 
The imitative poet…by making images far removed from the truth, gratifies 
the part of the soul that is thoughtless and doesn’t distinguish greater things 
from less, but thinks that the same things are at one time large and another 
time small (605bc). 
Here, Socrates uses the point that “the same magnitude viewed from nearby and from 
afar does not appear equal to us” (602c) to shed light on which part of the soul grasps the 
appearance that is given by imitative poetry. The imitative poet appeals to the same part of the 
soul that believes that a person who is standing at a distance is in fact smaller than he was when 
he was standing nearby (605b). Indeed, the imitative poet produces appearances that are 
perceived in a way that is analogous to the perception of an optical illusion.  
Furthermore, it is the non-rational (lower) part of the soul (appetite and spirit)
12
 that is the 
part of the soul that engages in perception – in fact, it is confined to perceptual appearances. We 
see evidence of this in the lowest section of the Divided Line, where the perceptible world is 
only a shadow and image of the Forms. On this level, one is confined to perception, and thus 
images. Perception never captures the truth in a full sense because reality/being/truth is 
imperceptible. Everything that we perceive, for Plato, is an appearance of reality – a shadow of a 
Form. The opinable is to the knowable as the perceptible is to the intelligible, and what we 
perceive and believe to be real is merely a shadow of the truth. Perception, following this same 
line of thought, takes place in the cave, whereas calculating (reason) is the key to getting out of 
the cave, as it were. Of course, not all perception is illusory in the same sense in which the 
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submerged stick appears bent, but no perception gets beyond appearances to the point of 
grasping being or reality, which is imperceptible – the truth transcends perception. So, for Plato, 
perception takes place in the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul, which are motivated by 
alogiston whose motivations are never formed through calculation.  The rational part of the soul, 
on the other hand, transcends perception through calculation (logismos). (At 523a, Socrates uses 
the famous finger passage to show that when contradictions bring the limits of perception to our 
attention, the soul summons logismos and understanding (524b) and searches for truth on the 
intelligible realm.) 
There is a third argument for parts of the soul in Book X, which makes clear why Plato 
uses alogiston in reference to both inferior cognition and inferior passions/emotions. The third 
argument entails that the lower parts of the soul not only accept ordinary sensory appearances, 
but they accept unreflective/uncalculating appearances of good/bad. They perceive (and accept) 
evaluative appearances. In the case of imitative poetry, tragedy reinforces the acceptance of 
value by presenting images of it. It produces copies of things that “appear to be fine to the many” 
(602b). Something that appears to have value in this way is analogous to the way in which the 
stick at 602c appears bent. This is the “seeming good condition” at 464a which is something that 
develops early on in a person. The logistikon develops later, and takes appearances into account 
only insofar as they are material for calculating the truth.  
A close examination of these arguments shows that the very same susceptibility to 
appearances explains both our perception of optical illusions and our appetites for pleasure: We 
see merely an appearance of the good (but accept it as a true appearance even if it is not true, and 
hence desire it) when we grasp it through the appetitive part of the soul, and this is analogous to 
seeing the optical illusion and thinking it is real. Jessica Moss explains this point well: 
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On Plato’s view, in matters of value as in general, what genuinely is does 
not appear (is not manifest, obvious, accessible without abstruse 
calculation), while what appears to most people is not what is real and true. 
Apparent value is an inferior, deficient, shadowy copy of true value, just as 
(for example) perceptible equality is an inferior, deficient, shadowy copy of 
the Equal itself (Phaedo 74de).
13
 
The insight here is that if the passions of the lower parts of the soul are appearance-based, 
they are incapable of reaching the truth about the good just as sight is incapable of reaching the 
truth about the form of the Equal. So, thinking that “the stick is bent” or that “drinking ‘more 
than four pints’ of wine is good” are both false appearances that the lower part of the soul 
accepts as true. The difference is just that in the latter case the appearance is evaluative. Not all 
sense perception involves illusions, and analogously, not all passions of the lower parts of the 
soul are vicious. While not all of them lead people astray, the point is that none of them can get 
past appearances of the truth. Only reason can do this. Thus, the lower parts of the soul grasp 
mere images/appearances, whereas the rational part can calculate, and so it desires what is best 
overall. 
So the difference between the rational vs. non-rational parts of the soul is that the non-
rational part accepts appearances unreflectively and the rational part – in its ability to calculate 
and reflect on appearances – transcends them. That is to say, the rational part transcends 
perception through calculation. When contradictions bring the limits of perception to our 
attention, the soul summons calculation and understanding (523a, 524b) and searches for truth. 
The consequence of the appetite and spirited parts being cognitively limited to perception is that 
the appearances they accept (whether evaluative or visual) will be false at worse and reflective of 
– but removed from – the truth, at best. This makes them cognitively and ethically handicapped. 
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As a result they pursue the worthless or the bad in the worst case scenario, or in the best case, 
while they cannot perceive it, they can be trained to track the higher value that reason calculates 
as good. 
Therefore, we have reason to believe that, for Plato, evaluative illusions are grasped in 
the same way that optical illusions are, by the same parts of the soul. This means that while the 
objects of the lower parts of the soul may not always be good things, this does not necessarily 
mean that the motivations are independent of the good. Seeking the good but reaching only an 
appearance of it gives rise to desires for things that only appear but are not good. Hence, it is 
possible to pursue the good and, at the same, time be motivated toward bad things.  
It is, therefore, unreasonable to suggest that Plato is inconsistent or has changed his mind 
at a certain point in his philosophy simply because he argues at one point in the Republic that all 
parts of the soul pursue the good and at other times in the Republic that the lower parts of the 
soul sometimes pursue vicious things. The above interpretation shows that this is sometimes the 
case because the lower parts of the soul are merely pursuing what appears to them to be good. 
While all three parts of the soul always pursue the good, only the rational part of the soul can 
grasp what is truly good as opposed to that which merely appears to be good.  
This reading of the motivational characters of the three parts of the soul gives us reason 
to believe that all three parts are motivated toward the good in different ways, but the lower parts 
– since they are confined to perception and can potentially be confused about the good – may fail 
to pursue the real good. It is not inconsistent with this to suggest that all parts of the soul desire 
the good; the lower parts sometimes act on confused notions of it. When the lower parts 
dominate the rational part (when they are strong enough to overcome one’s reasoned view of 
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what is good overall) they prompt a person to act against what reason has calculated as good. It 
is not that these parts of the soul do not desire the good or are not concerned with it. Rather, it is 
that they desire it but they sometimes mistake false appearances of good for true ones and, hence, 
pursue the wrong objects. It is this point that reconciles Plato’s acceptance of the possibility of 
akrasia with a Socratic account of motivation. 
Each part of the soul has a way of grasping the good, and all are versions of motivations 
toward it: the appetite grasps objects of physical gratification insofar as they are appearances of 
goodness, the spirited part grasps honorable things insofar as they are appearances of goodness, 
and the rational part grasps the good itself. Since the whole soul always seeks things qua good, 
but the lower parts can be mistaken about the good, and hence, mistakenly pursue bad things, it 
would make sense for education, on Plato’s view, to be aimed at training the soul to avoid 
mistaking appearances of goodness for the real good.  
The three parts of the soul play different roles, grasp different things, and are developed 
at different times (441a). It is important to present the lower parts of the soul with goodness that 
they can grasp early on so that they do not, by merely experiencing appearances of goodness and 
becoming devoted to them due to the immediate gratification that they give, miss out on the 
potential to grasp a higher good. Thus, the beginning stages of recognition of the good will occur 
within the lower parts of the soul, and if one wants to appeal to these parts of the soul, it must be 
done through an appropriate medium – one that is perception-based. 
This, I shall argue, is the thought behind the conversation that takes place in Books II and 
III of the Republic, where proper education of the guardians is discussed. If the guardians are full 
of spirit right from birth, but reason comes later, their education must first involve things that 
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appeal to the spirited part of the soul. Pleasant things appeal to the appetite and beautiful things 
appeal to the spirited part of the soul – they are kalon, and they motivate the attraction to noble 
and honorable things (442). Thus, education will begin with music and poetry, and indeed, “the 
start of someone’s education determines what follows” (425c). I undertake this argument in the 
next section. 
 
II. EXPERIENCES OF BEAUTY VIA ART IN THE REPUBLIC 
I have argued that, for Plato, grasping goodness is something that begins in the lower 
parts of the soul; that is, it begins in the parts of the soul that are limited to perception. As the 
discussion of appropriate education unfolds in Books II and III of the Republic, we see that it 
begins with proper exposure to media that is perception-based, e.g. music or poetry. As was 
evidenced by my arguments in the last section, moral education can only come to full fruition if 
an agent becomes able to distinguish what she has grasped through appetite and spirit from a 
higher good that is only understood by reason. Since, in terms of being motivated toward the 
good, the best case scenario for the lower parts of the soul is that they should be trained to track 
the higher value that reason calculates as good, it would seem that this training is the goal of the 
aesthetic education that is described in Books II and III of the Republic. In this section, I shall 
argue that this is, in fact, Plato’s view. In particular, I shall argue that it is the perception-based 
nature of music and poetry that gives them an important role in training the soul to become good. 
This section will involve a discussion of both, Republic, Books II and III and Republic, Book X. 
Book X has seemed to pose a prima facie problem for the theory of poetry that is given in Books 
II and III. However, I shall argue that the discussions in Books II and III are consistent with the 
discussion in Book X. In other words, I shall argue that the conflict is only apparent. 
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At Republic 401d, Socrates explains that all artists must represent good characters in their 
work. They must pursue “what is fine and graceful” so that something of their works will strike 
the eyes and ears of the young people “like a breeze that brings health from a good place, leading 
them unwittingly, from childhood on, to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty 
of reason” (401d). Socrates explains that education in music and poetry is most important 
because “rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, 
affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly educated in music 
and poetry, it makes him graceful, but if not, then the opposite” (402). A person who is properly 
equipped with an education in music and poetry will be trained to detect and accurately respond 
to discipline and order, and that person must acquire the right tastes so that he will learn to like 
and dislike what he ought – to “praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive them into his soul, 
and, being nurtured by them become fine and good” (402). I am specifically interested in these 
passages, and I shall analyze them in what follows. I begin with an examination of Plato’s 
critique of poetry in Republic, Books II and III. 
It is important to note that poetry was known by the sophists as something that puts its 
listener “in the power of another” where “the speaker controls the listener not by any insights 
that he has, but by the language that bears his message.”
14
 The sophists thought of language not 
as an instrument of learning, but as one of persuasion. They criticized poetry as something which 
incites excessive affections, fear, and pity in those who experience it, and instead turned to the 
use of prose in a version of the dialectical method. Yet, they attempted to capture the persuasive 
and emotive power of poetry in their prose. 
                                                             
14
 Elizabeth Asmis, “Plato and Poetic Creativity,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato, pg. 341 
21 
 
In response to the sophists’ use of poetry, Plato made it an instrument of moral education. 
In Plato’s view, poetry is “especially effective because it can make a person assume the identity 
of another.”
15
  This imitative aspect of poetry, however, is something that may be used to either 
benefit or harm the soul. In Book II of the Republic, we see that the “city of pigs” is less than 
ideal, due to the influence of image-makers or imitators, and thus, Socrates purges this city. In 
the same way, poetry, which also involves imitation, will need to be purged.  
In Plato’s view, poetry is something that both expresses and shapes character: Socrates 
explains that a person’s character is expressed through his words and actions; words, harmony, 
grace, and rhythm follow from character (400e), and a person’s nature gives rise to his style of 
speaking and acting (397c, 398b). Thus, if a person’s soul has good character, it will be 
expressed in his speech and action. The words we choose when we are speaking for ourselves 
express the character that we already have (400d). Seemingly, then, there is progression from 
character to the content of the speech to the words that are recited. The character is expressed by 
the content and the content is expressed by the words. Furthermore, confrontation with, or 
enacting (which involves imitation) the words of other characters can have the effect of re-
shaping the actor’s already existing character (393c, 395d).  
When a person imitates the words and actions of other characters while performing 
poetry, her soul is re-shaped as a result of the tendency that she has to embrace the nature of the 
character that she imitates. While one is speaking as if she were the speaking character, a person 
tends to form in her own soul the character that she is imitating. In this case, the aforementioned 
progression seems to work backwards: The words a person uses in imitating the character give 
rise to her taking in the content that the words express, and then – as a result – forming the 
character that is expressed by that content.  
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Some poetry misrepresents what is ethically appropriate, and when a person performs this 
kind of poetry, since imitation has the capacity to move and change a person, it can cause her to 
embrace the wrong kind of behavior. Thus, according to Plato, poetry has ethical implications. 
This is the reason that Plato argues in favor of the censorship of poetry: If poetry comprises bad 
content and expresses bad characters, since the listeners and actors tend to develop in their own 
souls the characters in the poem, exposing the guardians to bad poetry is a recipe for the 
development of bad guardians.
16
 So, during the education of the guardians, they “are to perform 
poetry…[but] only that of good characters” (396c-e & 397d).
17
  
In addition, those who experience poetry as listeners tend to imitate the characters in the 
poems. Poetry plays to the emotions of the listener and the listener is thus attracted to becoming 
like the characters expressed in the poems. We imitate because it is impossible to “consort with 
things [we] admire without imitating them” (500c). We imitate that which brings about a state of 
wonder or admiration in us. It is important, then, to be sure that those whom one is educating are 
able to experience things that allow them to feel wonder at (and thus imitate) “what is ordered 
and divine” so that they will become “as divine and ordered as a human being can” (500d). In 
this way, when poetry expresses good characters, the way in which it appeals to the lower parts 
of the soul can be used in education. Since poetry is a perception-based medium through which 
the lower parts of the soul can grasp good character, it can be used as a means to introducing 
good things to a person who is in the beginning stages of moral education.  
Socrates also emphasizes the role of music in moral education. It has the capacity to 
familiarize a person with good character by expressing a kind of content of good character that 
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the emotions can grasp. During the discussion concerning appropriate styles of songs and music 
(398c), Socrates draws attention to two kinds of harmonic modes – the modes of a self-
disciplined (or temperate) and courageous life. He explains that these two modes are the ones 
which will “best imitate the voices of those who are moderate and courageous, whether in good 
fortune or bad” (399c).
18
 First, there is the mode which “would suitably imitate the tone and 
rhythm of a courageous person” who, in all circumstances, “is fighting off his fate steadily and 
with self-control” (399b). Second, there is the mode of “someone engaged in a peaceful, 
unforced, voluntary action, persuading someone or asking a favor of a god in prayer or of a 
human being through teaching”…or “of someone submitting to the supplications of another who 
is teaching him and trying to get him to change his mind, and who, in all these circumstances, is 
acting with moderation and self-control, not with arrogance but with understanding, and is 
content with the outcome” (399bc).  
An individual who experiences the modes of music that most fittingly imitate the 
temperate or courageous person will perceive temperance and courage through a medium that 
reaches the lower parts of the soul. Since temperance and courage are part of a good character, it 
follows that music of this sort expresses a kind of content of good character. Music, then, 
presents this good content in a way that reaches lower parts of the soul insofar as they are 
perception-based. That is to say, the imitative character of music presents an appearance of 
goodness that the lower parts of the soul can perceive. 
In Plato’s discussions of music, it seems that a progression (analogous to the one that we 
have seen in the case of poetry) takes place starting with the character (e.g. temperate or 
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courageous) that is presented in the content of the work. The content is expressed by words and, 
as Socrates explains, rhythm and mode must conform to those words (398d and 400d). It is in 
this way that experiencing music allows good content to manifests itself in a person’s response to 
audible beauty: When a person experiences good content in music and poetry, she desires to 
imitate such content in her own soul. If a person is properly acquainted with the discipline in 
music, she will desire to mimic such order and discipline within herself. Thus, we have seen that, 
on Plato’s view, aesthetic experience can have a positive transforming effect.  
However, in Book X, we have evidence that these experiences can also push the 
undisciplined person in a bestial direction; some of Plato’s remarks suggest that the emotional 
charge that is given by poetry can incite the surrender of reason to the appetites. Naturally, I need 
to deal with some issues that arise out of Plato’s arguments concerning poetry in Book X.  
At 605d, Socrates makes the famous statement that poetry’s ability to corrupt people is 
“surely a disgrace.” We know that Plato dislikes the “very serious errors about mankind” (605c) 
that are made by writers of poetry, and he makes it clear that bad poets – those who lack 
knowledge and depict falsehoods – have no place in the good city. Indeed, “a bad poet puts a bad 
constitution in the soul of each individual by making images that are far removed from the truth 
and by gratifying the irrational part” (605c).  
Furthermore, at the beginning of Book X, Socrates expands on the worry regarding 
imitation in poetry, and he goes so far as to state that it has become clear that imitative poetry 
“should be altogether excluded from the good city” (595a). Furthermore, at 602, he explains that 
artists are imitators of the truth and that “an imitator has neither knowledge nor right opinion 
about whether the things he makes are fine or bad…he’ll go on imitating even though he doesn’t 
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know the good or bad qualities of anything, but what he’ll imitate, it seems, is what appears fine 
or beautiful to the majority of people who know nothing.” It is decided that painting and 
imitation as a whole produce work that is far from the truth and that imitation “consorts with a 
part of us that is far from reason” (603). The imitative poet “produces work that is inferior with 
respect to truth and that appeals to a part of the soul that is similarly inferior rather than to the 
best part...he arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this part of the soul and so destroys the rational 
one” (605b). However, later Socrates makes the following statement: 
We had reason to banish [poetry] from the city earlier, for our argument 
compelled us to do so. But in case we are charged with a certain harshness 
and lack of sophistication let us also tell poetry that there is an ancient 
quarrel between it and philosophy…Nonetheless, if the poetry that aims at 
pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward that proves it 
ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to 
admit it…Isn’t it just that such poetry should return from exile when it has 
successfully defended itself, whether in lyric or any other meter? (607d) 
 
Since “we’d certainly profit if poetry were shown to be not only pleasant but beneficial,” 
(607e) Socrates maintains that “we are well disposed to any proof that it [poetry] is the best and 
truest thing.” Socrates’ statement at 607d suggests that imitative poetry that proves that it is 
beneficial to a well-governed city is thought eligible to return from exile.
19
 This has (reasonably) 
given rise to the question as to whether there is an inconsistency in Plato’s analysis, since 
Socrates has made the earlier statement that no poetry that is mimetic will be admitted into the 
city (595ab). However, Elizabeth Asmis sheds considerable light on the matter: 
‘Mimetic’ can mean not only ‘imitating,’ but also ‘imitative’ in the strong 
sense of ‘given to imitation,’ with the connotation of ‘indiscriminately 
imitative’ or ‘all mimetic’…’mimetic’ poetry is not just poetry that imitates, 
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it is poetry that imitates anything at all. In Book III Socrates expelled the 
poet who is indiscriminately mimetic – in short, the ‘mimetic’ poet; and in 




In book X, as Asmis explains, Plato keeps with his use of “mimetic” to imply 
“indiscriminately imitative,” and he uses “imitation” and “imitator” in the sense of 
“indiscriminate imitation” and “indiscriminate imitator.” She argues that Plato adds a new 
meaning to these terms, using “mimetic” poetry as something that is not only indiscriminately 
imitative, but also thoroughly imitative. It is “two removes from genuine creation,” and is “at the 
farthest distance from the creation of genuine goodness.”
21
 Yet, this definition does not apply to 
all poetry, for Plato restricts this analysis to the poetry that he banished in Book III – the “poetry 
of pleasure and mimesis” (607c). Poetry that celebrates divine and human goodness will be 




The “true falsehood” – that which leads to ignorance in a person and “the thing everyone 
wants above all to avoid” (382c) – is found in mimesis that is thoroughly imitative. However, we 
have textual evidence for the fact that “a kind of imitation,” a “verbal falsehood” (382c) or noble 
lie, “an image, not a wholly unmixed falsehood” is useful in stopping “madness or ignorance” 
(283c). When “we make falsehood as much like the truth as possible,” we can make a kind of 
falsehood useful (382d). As Socrates explains, mimesis is essential to certain kinds of poetry 
(394c), and mimetic poetry is acceptable when it expresses things as they are. So, there is a sort 
of imitation that is acceptable and there is a sort of imitation that will be banished from the city. 
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 That is, not “thoroughly imitative” 
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The latter is the sort of imitation that involves ignorance – it involves the imitation of things as 
they appear and not as they are. 
The arguments that I made in the first section shed further light on this point: Since the 
appetitive and spirited parts of the soul are cognitively limited to perception (and they accept 
evaluative appearances), and since the pleasure involved in poetry appeals to the lower parts of 
the soul (606d, 607), these parts of the soul will likely accept the appearances/images that are 
presented in poetry. These appearances will be false at worst and reflective of (but removed 
from) the truth, at best. Therefore, these lower parts of the soul will accept (and pursue)
23
 the 
worthless or the bad if it is imitated in poetry. This, then, is the reason why Plato maintains that 
“if you admit the pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be 
kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always believed to be best, 
namely, reason” (607). Dangerous poetry is pleasure-giving and the appetite is pleasure-seeking. 
This is the concern involved here: “If you let in the pleasurable muse in lyric or epic poetry, 
pleasure and pain will be kings in your city” (607a).  
As Jessica Moss argues, “Book 10’s complaint that imitative poetry strengthens and 
nurtures an inferior part of the soul to the point that it will take over the rational part is, then, a 
reiteration of Books 2 and 3’s complaint that this kind of poetry fosters vice by encouraging 
unruly appetites and leading spirit astray.” Indeed, though my above analysis of Plato’s 
discussion of poetry in Books II and III showed that poetry can have a positive transforming 
effect, it is also clear that Books II and III advocate the censorship of poetry: If poetry comprises 
bad content and expresses bad characters, since the listeners and actors tend to develop in their 
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own souls the characters in the poem, guardians who are exposed to bad poetry are likely to 
develop bad characters. When poetry misrepresents what is ethically appropriate, and when a 
person performs this kind of poetry, since imitation has the capacity to move and change a 
person, it can cause her to embrace the wrong kind of behavior. As Socrates explains, poetry 
does in fact have the power – in the case of buffoonery, sex, anger, and desires, pleasures, and 
pains – to “nurture and water” the lower parts of the soul and establish “them as rulers in us 
when they ought to wither and be ruled” (606d). 
However, by being exposed to poetry that captures the nature of something true – while 
they cannot perceive it – the appetite and spirit can be trained to track the higher value that such 
poetry presents. Poetry that imitates appearances and involves ignorance will corrupt those who 
experience or perform it, but poetry that imitates things as they are can be used in moral 
education.  
When we distinguish good poetry from bad poetry we must know what it is supposed to 
imitate so that we can determine whether or not it has, in fact, imitated the thing of which it 
claims to be an image. Nevertheless, poetry aims to capture that which is more difficult to 
understand than that which visual art aims to capture – an appreciation of the way things look. 
The standards that poetry must meet are, as G.R.F. Ferrari argues, “constraints of truth and 
understanding imported from the kind of serious discourse in which Socrates wished to be 
engaged. Imitation is parasitic on what is imitated…poetic image-making aims to capture not just 
how people look, but how they feel and act.”
24
 Ferrari sheds light on this point in the following 
passage: 
The poet has a skill all on his own: not understanding, but capturing the 
appearance, the look and feel of human life. But just as an image is, or rather 
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should be (in Plato’s view), for the sake of its original, the art of image-
making is destined to be the helpmate of that art that seeks truth. Poetry 
cannot, so to speak, be trusted on its own but as the ward of a philosophic 
guardian can put its talent to good use.
25
 
The poetry that can be used in moral education is the poetry that involves the narrow sort 
of mimesis – the imitation of things as they are. This is the sort of poetry that can have the 
positive transforming effect that I explained in the second part of this section. Poetry is able to 
communicate emotions, but it is also able to convey the meaning or content that underlies those 
emotions. For this reason – because imitation has the capacity to express a certain kind of good 
content – and because performing or experiencing certain imitations aids one in developing a 
good character, the narrow sort of mimesis is appropriate in the good city. 
This line of reasoning also explains why Plato suggests that certain music is appropriate 
in the good city, while other music is not. In addition to drawing attention to the modes of music 
that imitate good character that I discussed above, Socrates draws attention to modes of music 
that are inappropriate for the guardians; e.g., he makes clear that the mode of music that is 
“suitable for drinking parties" is inappropriate because it imitates “drunkenness” and “idleness.” 
With an eye to Asmis’ view, I suggest that this music involves an inappropriate mix between a 
thoroughly imitative mode and the lyrics (content) or, perhaps, if the music has no lyrics, 
between two kinds of modes and/or the rhythm. At 398d, Socrates states that “the mode and 
rhythm must fit the words.” In the case of the music that Plato rejects, the mix between the mode 
and the words is inappropriate. On the other hand, the kind of music that expresses good content 
via the narrow sort of imitation (the kind that captures something true) is good music. 
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 Ferrari, pg. 108 
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 I am arguing that, for Plato, the kind of poetry and music that expresses good content 
through “appropriate imitation” – is good art. Good poetry and music is, as Asmis puts it, 
“carefully designed to confer a maximum of moral benefit by providing an experience that 
simulates that of a good person as closely as possible.” This is the sort of poetry and music that 
can aid one in the recognition of reason – by training a person to develop a good character, 
something akin to reason, it allows for a person to see the kinship between reason and herself 
(402). Thus, since reason is essential to the art that seeks truth, good poetry and music is the 
“helpmate of that art that seeks truth.” I argue, then, that the ignorant sort of artist is the one who 
is banished from the city, while the artist who implants “the image of good moral habit” in his 
poetry or music creates the art that potentially returns from exile.  
Though Plato is quite critical of image-making in art, we have reason to believe that there 
are cases in which mimesis is appropriate.
26
 We have sufficient reason to believe that appropriate 
imitation (the narrow sort of mimesis distinguished by Amis) is the sort of imitation does not 
lead to ignorance in a person. Rather, it is the sort of imitation by which the talent of music and 
poetry can be put to good use. 
Therefore, at this point I have shown that, in Plato’s view, there are indeed experiences of 
beauty via art that produce good character; a person is able to absorb the good character 
expressed by certain art and act accordingly. In this way, an experience of beauty via art is a 
species of moral training. Notably, however, this kind of experience is not an immediate source 
of insight into knowledge of the Good itself. In other words, one does not have an experience of 
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 Gabriel Richardson Lear explains that “poetic image-making has a function, according to Socrates: It allows the 
rulers and others in authority to say something, for civic benefit, about the truth of the past…beautiful and good 
poetry is truthful in its pattern because it is an image of reality, and this is what it is for.” See Lear “Plato on 
Learning to Love Beauty,” The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic, pg. 115 
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beautiful art and then immediately become morally reformed. Instead experiences of beautiful art 
are a part of a gradual process of education. 
Plato argues that good education – education that improves people morally – should 
create in a person a love (eros) of beauty no matter where he apprehends it, whether it be in 
buildings or orderly movements of heavenly bodies, people, poetry or paintings (Republic 401a-
d, 529c-530b). All of these kinds of art can affect one’s character and lead them to harmony and 
friendship “with the beauty of reason” (401cd). Interestingly, not only do these passages support 
the claim that experiences of beautiful art, in various forms, shape one’s character, but they also 
illuminate a further element in Plato’s theory of beauty in the Republic: It becomes apparent that 
experiences of beautiful art not only produce good character in a person, but they also create eros 
for beauty. As Socrates puts it, “The right kind of love is by nature the love of order and beauty 
that has been moderated by education in music and poetry” (403a). Hence, someone who has 
been educated via experiences of beautiful art will learn to love (eros) beauty. We are told that a 
musical person – presumably, someone who has had experiences of beautiful music (beautiful 
art) – will love people who have beautiful souls and bodies most of all. Socrates states: 
If someone’s soul has a fine and beautiful character and his body matches it 
in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, so that both share in the same 
pattern, wouldn’t that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes 
to see it? (401d) 
This passage is intended to support Socrates’ claim at 401d that what is beautiful is most 
loveable. The point is that the person who has developed a love (eros) of beauty in art will see 
the order and harmony in a beautiful person, and he will come to properly appreciate and love 
this person. Hence, the right kind of love – the love of beauty – is the love that is taught via 
experiences of beautiful art.  
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However, it is especially interesting that here, in the Republic (as opposed to the 
Symposium and Phaedrus, which also consider eros and its relationship with beauty) the focus is 
strictly on a nonsexual kind of eros. For instance, in the Republic, the discussion of eros does not 
at all involve the kind of madness that eros occasions in the Phaedrus. In the Republic, madness 
is actually dangerous to eros, and the sexual part of eros is something that can cause a person to 
be “reproached as untrained in music and poetry and lacking in appreciation for what is fine and 
beautiful” (403c).
27
 If people are to “love in the right way,” on the other hand, sexual pleasure 
must not be involved (403ab). A lover should only treat his boy “as a father would a son, for the 
sake of what is fine and beautiful,” but it must not go any further than this (403bc). The sexual 
part of eros is, as it were, downplayed when Plato refers to the “right kind of love” in the 
Republic. 
On the other hand, in the Symposium and Phaedrus, the sexual part of eros is involved in 
moral reformation. This is, in part, what distinguishes the experiences of beauty that Plato 
discusses in the Symposium and Phaedrus from the experiences of beauty that he describes in the 
Republic. Furthermore, in the Symposium and Phaedrus, Plato specifically discusses erotic 
experiences of beautiful people, and these experiences involve more emotion than the 
experiences of beautiful art that we have seen in the Republic. In fact, one might suggest that 
Plato describes an erotic experience of a beautiful person in a way that is quite similar to certain 
descriptions and definitions of experiences of the ‘sublime’ in modern aesthetic terminology. 
Rather than making a person familiar with good character and reason, and gradually training him 
to have good moral habits, an erotic experience of a beautiful person provides direct insight into 
                                                             
27 If the sexual part of eros is something that can cause a person to be “reproached as untrained in music and 
poetry,” this suggests that the love of beauty that is taught via poetry and music is a nonsexual love.  
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apprehending the Form of Beauty itself. I turn now to an examination of eros and experiences of 
beauty in the Symposium and Phaedrus. 
 
III. EROTIC EXPERIENCES OF BEAUTIFUL PEOPLE IN THE SYMPOSIUM AND PHAEDRUS 
In the previous section of this chapter I argued that the kind of aesthetic experience that is 
described in the Republic (an experience of beauty via art) is one that has the capacity to produce 
actions; that is to say, a person is able to absorb the good character that is potentially expressed 
through music and poetry, and act accordingly. Thus, this kind of experience potentially gives 
rise to moral training. On the other hand, the erotic experiences of beauty that are described in 
the Symposium and Phaedrus emphasize love (eros), and while these experiences potentially 
facilitate moral improvement, it is a good question as to whether they facilitate a different sort of 
moral improvement than that which results from the experiences of art in the Republic. 
Accordingly, one might wonder whether the accounts of aesthetic experience that Plato gives in 
the Symposium and Phaedrus are consistent with the account that he gives in the Republic. These 
are the questions that I shall address in this section.  
I shall argue that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) 
Some experiences of beauty via art can be used in moral training; that is, these experiences can 
be used to promote the kind of training that Plato suggests should take place during the 
beginning stages of education in the Republic. This is an affective kind of training, whereby a 
person learns to feel appropriately toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty via art have 
the capacity to influence a person’s character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to appropriate 
behavior. (2) An erotic experience of a beautiful person, as it is described in the Symposium and 
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Phaedrus, is a more profound sort of experience. This kind of experience can be distinguished 
from (1) in that it adds a higher kind of cognitive component which is lacking in (1). In (1), 
cognition is involved (cognition is involved in all affection), but only as perception-based 
thought, which merely has access to appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful people, 
on the other hand, provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision. 
They lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover 
of wisdom. Therefore, erotic experiences of beautiful people promote increased moral 
understanding as opposed to affective training.  
Furthermore, I shall argue that Plato’s accounts of aesthetic experience in the Symposium, 
Phaedrus, and Republic are, in no way, inconsistent. Though these dialogues do, indeed, 
describe different kinds of experiences, both the experience of beauty through art and the erotic 
experience of beauty give rise to moral reformation. Specifically, people who are exposed to the 
experience of beauty through art will potentially have their desires trained to track the Good, and 
people who are exposed to erotic experiences of beauty will potentially derive insight into the 
nature of the Good. Since the Symposium and Phaedrus emphasize erotic experiences of beauty, 
whereas the Republic does not, I shall begin by examining the specific role that eros plays in 
Plato’s account of aesthetics in the Symposium and Phaedrus, in turn.  
In the Symposium, eros is honored as being the best ‘collaborator’ (synergon) for the task 
of acquiring the ultimate possession (212b) – the vision of the Beautiful itself. Eros is described 
as a potentially uplifting force that is particularly suited for facilitating an understanding of the 
Form of Beauty. I want to examine this point more closely in what follows. 
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 Beginning at Symposium 209e, Plato describes a sequence of “rising stairs” on a ladder 
of love, which culminates in the apprehension of Beauty itself. On this ladder of love, Plato 
distinguishes four general levels of ascension: A lover begins with interest in bodily beauty, and 
then becomes interested in the beauty of institutions and practices. From there, he becomes 
interested in the beauty of the sciences (knowledge), and finally he ascends to the level on which 
he is able to apprehend the Form of Beauty. An account of the full process of ascent will involve 
an analysis that goes beyond these four general levels; as I argue below, eros, reason and 
creation all play key roles in the climb.  
At the first rung of the ladder, as the lover has an erotic experience of beauty, he initially 
devotes himself to one beautiful body. Then, because he has loved one body and begotten 
beautiful discourse with his beloved, he should realize that “the beauty of any one body is 
brother to the beauty of any other” (210b). At this level, eros is the love of one beautiful body, 
creation is the engendering of beautiful ideas, and reason is involved in the realization that the 
beauty of one body is akin to the beauty of all others – the realization that the beauty of all 
bodies is one and the same (210b). Next, the lover develops a love for beauty in the soul, and he 
seeks to bring into being the discourse that improves his beloved (210c) in order that he may 
gaze “at the beauty of activities and laws.” He will then see that all of these belong to the same 
kind – he will realize that they are species of beauty (210cd). Here, eros is the love for a 
beautiful soul, creation is the bringing into being of a certain kind of discourse, and reason is 
involved in the realization that all beautiful activities and laws are species of beauty. Then, the 
lover will see the beauty in the sciences (the beauty of knowledge), turning to “the great sea of 
beauty” and giving birth to “many beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom” 
(210e). Here, reason allows the lover to see the beauty in knowledge, and creates the kind of 
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noble discourse that is involved in philosophy (210d). It is the creation of philosophy that finally 
leads to the lover’s apprehension of the Form (210d-e).  
At each level of the ladder, the lover is stimulated by the object of eros to “realize” and 
“grasp” something about what makes it beautiful. Logos, thus, guides eros and helps the soul 
transcend previous aspirations by directing eros toward new, superior objects of beauty. 
Furthermore, at each level the lover is motivated to think that “wild gaping” after the initial 
object of one’s eros is a despicable and small pursuit (210b).
28
 Eros inspires the lover to bring 
forth logos, which shows that each new object of beauty is superior to the last. Logos then 
reorients eros to its new object, and finally, in the best case scenario, the lover aspires to 
knowledge of that one Form that “all the other beautiful things share in” (211b). Hence, finally, 
the ascent of the ladder of love culminates with a vision of beauty itself (211a-d) – the “final and 
highest Mystery.”  
This Mystery is distinguished from lesser Mysteries of Love, and this distinction is a 
crucial aspect of understanding Plato’s conception of the relationship between beauty and eros. 
The lesser Mysteries can be understood as follows: While everyone possesses love (eros) for the 
good (205a),
29
 lovers come in different varieties. In particular, there is a distinction between 
generic love and specific love. Generic love is the love that everyone possesses for the good. 
When this general love of the good takes certain forms – that is to say, when desire for the good 
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 This is to say that the lover must transcend certain objects as objects that are worthy of being overall-goals of his 
love.  
29
 The relationship between the beautiful and the good is problematic in the Symposium as well as in other dialogues, 
and I do not intend to provide an exhaustive explanation of that here. However, with an eye to the arguments of 
G.R.F. Ferrari in “Platonic Love,” let us say that “The beautiful is thought of as the quality by which the Good 
shines and shows itself to us. We can then claim that the ascent to the Beautiful itself is indeed also an ascent to the 
Good itself, but described so as to bring out at every turn what it is about the Good that captivates us.” See Ferrari, 
pg. 260  
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is focused on the beautiful – generic love becomes specific love (205a-d). Indeed, specific love is 
love of “begetting and giving birth in the beautiful,” whereby beauty plays the role of “midwife 
to generation” (206d-e). Among those who beget and give birth in beauty, there are those who 
are only “pregnant in body” (those who will create biological offspring) and there are those who 
are “more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies,” (those who will create psychological 
offspring) (209). The latter kind of lover will create “immortal children,” which are honored 
more than human offspring (209e).Those who create laws and speeches, and those who engage 
in philosophy, most importantly, but also in poetry, exemplify such lovers (209e). Indeed, poetry 
is presented more favorably in the Symposium than in the Republic. Poetic activity, like 
philosophical activity,
30
 is presented as something that begets “wisdom and the rest of virtue” 
(209a), and is motivated by love (eros).
31
   
The greater Mysteries of love, on the other hand, are the Mysteries that not everyone will 
come to understand. Only those lovers who follow a structured pathway to the Good will 
understand the final and highest Mystery (210a). It is here, at the level of the greater Mysteries, 
that a lover is able to reach the highest goal – the vision of the Beautiful itself, which will be 
disclosed to only those who respond to beauty appropriately (210a). In order to reach 
understanding of the greater Mysteries of love, the lover must achieve a more advanced 
aspiration than the person who only understands the lower Mysteries. As he gets a fuller grasp of 
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 Though I draw similarities between philosophy and poetry here, it is important to remember that Plato argues that 
there is a sort of understanding that is possessed by the philosopher alone, and this is the level to which one ideally 
ascends. See Richard Patterson, “The Ascent in Plato’s Symposium,” pg. 212 -214 for a thorough treatment of this 
point. 
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 See Elizabeth Asmis, “Plato on Poetic Creativity,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato. She argues that 
“Although Diotima does not assign a place to the poets in this ascent, there are sufficient similarities in her account 
to suggest that their endeavors may be mapped onto it. By valuing psychic beauty jointly with bodily beauty and 
concerning themselves with correct practices, the poets appear to be ascending from the first to the second main 




the beauty that issues from his love at each stage of the ladder, he must become more deeply 
fascinated by such beauty than by its object. In other words, the lover must be concerned with 
the beauty that his beloved embodies rather than with the beloved himself.  
As is apparent from the above examination of the ascent, the levels of the ladder are akin 
to one another insofar as they are species of beauty (bodily, psychic, intellectual). In order to 
respond to beauty appropriately, the lover must apprehend the way in which these species of 
beauty are related – he must see that bodily, psychic, and intellectual kinds of beauty are all 
related to their instances or objects, and they are all related to the Form itself. Apprehending this 
– that these different kinds of beauty all share in Beauty itself – is that which eventually yields 
knowledge of the Form and allows for the lover’s complete understanding of Beauty. This 
explains why the lover must ascend always for the sake of Beauty, “starting out from beautiful 
things and using them like rising stairs” (211c). When the lover “rises by these stages,” he is able 
to “go aright, or be led by another into the Mystery of love” (211c). Thus, the lover’s 
development results from a shaping and improving of his responses to the beauty of his beloved.  
However, the ascension of the ladder of love does not happen to everyone; some people 
will not ever begin the ascent, let alone come to understand the greater Mysteries. As I noted 
earlier, at 209 Plato argues that psychological offspring is more valuable than biological 
offspring, or that which is created via sexual union. This means that, for Plato – even though we 
have no reason to believe that he does not value the sexual part of eros – reaching a level of love 
that involves a union of souls is more valuable than a level of love than only involves a union of 
bodies. Furthermore, the whole point of the ladder of love consists in aspiration toward that 
which is worthy of having its attainment become one’s ultimate goal, and on Plato’s view, the 
ultimate goal is much more than sexual union. Thus, the ascent of the ladder cannot occur as a 
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result of mere sexual interest. This means that the ascent will not be made by those who purely 
follow their sexual desires – those who seek bodies as mere sex objects. Rather it will be found 
by those who love beauty. Indeed the vision of the Beautiful requires a love of beauty, not 
merely a desire for sex.
32
 Therefore, to even begin the ladder, a lover must have eros for beauty.  
While Plato’s arguments in the Symposium show that one should not focus only on sex, 
sexual desire is in fact acknowledged as a form of eros that is acceptably involved in one’s 
ascent. Thus, the Symposium regards the sexual part of eros as acceptable, while the Republic 
seems to guard against it all together. However, the Symposium does maintain that focusing only 
on sexual desire and failing to graduate to higher kinds of love will result in a failure to climb the 
ladder, and hence, a lack of moral reformation. 
Moreover, among those who do begin the climb (those who are more than people of mere 
sexual appetite, and are instead lovers of beauty), there will be those who reach the greater 
Mysteries, but there will also be some lovers who will not. There is a danger in eros, a 
temptation during the ascent that potentially halts one’s progression to the top: It is possible for 
the lover to mistakenly praise eros as itself being something beautiful.
33
 This will result in a 
failure to recognize eros as a desire for the beauty it lacks.
34
 The problem is that if eros is 
thought to already possess beauty, then this eliminates the possibility for it to seek beauty.
35
 This, 
                                                             
32 With respect to this point, J.M.E. Moravcsik argues that while the start of the ladder does, indeed, involve eros, 
eros should not be equated with sexual desire. If we assumed this to be the case, then we would also be committed 
to the claim that when Plato states that the lover must move from eros for one body to eros for all bodies, he means 
that one must move from having a sexual desire for one body to a sexual desire for all bodies! See “Reason and Eros 
in the ‘Ascent’ – Passage of the Symposium,” Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (1970). 
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 See Leo Strauss, On Plato’s Symposium, “Chapter 9,” pg. 196. He argues that we love beauty, in part, because it 
is something that we lack – eros is not beautiful, rather, it seeks to possess beauty. Thus, the lover who conflates 
eros and beauty will miss the point that love’s desire has not really been satisfied by the beauty of the beloved alone 
– love continues to seek greater possessions: Love can also be for ideas, practices, and wisdom itself.  
34
 See Richard Patterson, “The Ascent in Plato’s Symposium,” pg. 212  
35
 Socrates clarifies, after Agathon’s speech, that eros (love) requires an object (love is always of something, 199d), 
and that object is something that one lacks. Thus, love is a sort of desire (epithumia). Since we love the beautiful and 
40 
 
in turn, eliminates its potential to aid the lover in ascending correctly: Failing to recognize that 
eros in fact desires and lacks beauty will result in a failure to see that, beyond the level of the 
initial object that incites one’s eros, there are other things that are beautiful in a superior way, 
which will draw the lover aloft. It is possible that a lover might allow his desire for a beautiful 
object at the primary stages of the ladder to overtake his ability to turn onward and upward. 
Though this lover may begin the ascent by loving a beautiful body upon an erotic experience of 
beauty, this sort of lover will not discover the higher objects of love. This lover has in common 
with the person who never even begins the ascent that he will not develop a love of wisdom 
itself; his desire for understanding will be either absent or it will lie dormant.
 36
   
Yet, the higher kind of lover resists this danger, and hence is a candidate for reaching the 
level of the greater Mysteries. He is the lover who is “led aright”
37
 (210a), and he will stand out, 
due to his reaction to beauty, as one who pursues philosophy, which is the “preserve of the few” 
(209e-210a). Thus, only those who are able to subsume the lower forms of love into higher forms 
in their process of ascent, transitioning their attention to a new and higher form of beauty at each 
stage, will have the opportunity to derive insight into the nature of the Good via an erotic 
experience of beauty.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the good, we desire the beautiful and the good. Thus, it cannot be the case that love, as Agathon argued, is 
something that already possesses beauty and goodness (201b). Furthermore, Diotima tells us that “love is never 
completely without resources, nor is he ever rich” – he is in-between (203e). 
36
 See Patterson, pg. 213. He argues that “In lovers attracted simply by the pleasurable bodily aspects of the beloved, 
or needing but lacking proper guidance, the desire for understanding may be entirely absent or lie forever dormant.” 
But, he argues that this will not be the case regarding the sort of lover capable of initiation into the higher mysteries 
– he will come to understand the object of eros as well as praise it. 
37 Some translators claim that Plato refers to ‘love’ (eros) as the leader here (Nehamas and Woodruff). I would argue 
that by the leader, Plato means an educator – one’s beloved, perhaps. If it is, in fact, the case that the lover is led by 
an educator, eros certainly still plays a key role in facilitating the lover’s progression. For it is love that incites the 
attraction to beauty and the creation that is hence made, even if the educator has to teach the lover how to go about 
love correctly (to subsume the lower forms of love into higher ones at each stage). Indeed, it seems reasonable to say 
that this is what Patterson is referring to when he argues that the lover who does not develop a love for wisdom 
might be “lacking proper guidance.” See my previous note. 
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With this in mind, then, we have seen that the “great collaborator,” eros, brings together 
logos and beauty, facilitating a long process of upward ascent. Eros begins and also makes 
possible the path that leads to “the highest possession;” it elicits a path that, when followed by 
the right kind of lover, leads to the knowledge of what it is to be beautiful (211d). Therefore, an 
erotic experience of beauty can awaken aspiration to the virtuous life. Yet, the fulfillment of this 
aspiration and, hence, eventually understanding Beauty itself, is only possible after an extensive 
struggle up the ladder of love. The ascent involves moral reformation as it unveils, through a 
long process, the superior value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom (the life lived by those 
who are able to contemplate Beauty itself).
38
 Thus, an erotic experience of a beautiful person is 
something that potentially gives rise to a transformation of the soul and a development of 
character, which results from an insight into the nature of true value. This kind of reformation 
necessarily involves the relationship between eros and wisdom during an erotic experience of a 
beautiful person. Thus, we have seen that an erotic experience of beauty, as it is described in the 
Symposium, is something that potentially transforms the soul through a long, difficult ascent. 
Like the Symposium, the Phaedrus gives a description of the way in which eros begins 
the soul’s quest for truth, and influences it all along the way. The Phaedrus makes use of the 
theory of a divided soul, using the famous metaphor of the charioteer. In this metaphor, the soul 
is represented by a winged chariot, which is drawn by two horses. The part of the soul that, 
ideally, dominates the others (reason) is represented as the charioteer. The white horse represents 
                                                             
38 Geoffrey Hinchliffe argues that there is a development in the progression of knowledge that takes place during the 
ascent: At the lowest level is ignorance. Then, there is the level of opinion or belief. Between this realm and the 
realm of the Forms is knowledge, which is something that can be generated through ‘discourses and ideas.’ The 
initial prompting of eros is transformed into a love of beauty, as such. This transformation results from a growth of 
the soul, and it ends in a love of wisdom. For more information on this analogy between the ascent in the Symposium 
and the ascent out of the cave in the Republic, see Hinchliffe’s “Plato and The Love of Learning.”  
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the love of honor (253d),
39
 and the black horse represents the need to indulge in one’s sexual 
desires and to selfishly get one’s way. The charioteer and white horse oppose the black horse, 
and the resulting struggle inhibits the chariot’s (soul’s) ascent to the Forms. Socrates explains: 
Let us liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their 
charioteer. The gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good and 
come from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture. To begin with, 
our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is beautiful and 
good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the 
opposite sort of bloodline. This means that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably 
a painfully difficult business (246a). 
From this passage, it is apparent that the souls of mortals are in a less-than-ideal state. 
Mortal souls are contrasted with the souls of the Gods, which comprise only “good stock.”
40
 
These chariots “move easily, since they are well-balanced and under control, but the other 
chariots barely make it” (247b).
41
 Their drivers are faced with a “painfully difficult business,” 
since one of their horses is a deaf, shaggy, “crooked jumble of limbs” that is hardly in control 
and inherently disposed to indecency (253e).  
For my purposes in this project, I am particularly interested in this metaphor, since one of 
Socrates’ aims in the metaphor is to make a point about the effect that an erotic experience of a 
beautiful person has on one’s soul. He explains that when the mortal soul encounters its beloved 
– when the charioteer looks in his eyes – the soul “fills with the goading of desire” (254a). The 
charioteer remains controlled, but the black horse “leaps violently forward” and tries to 
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 This horse may also represent the level of aspiration attained in the lesser Mysteries of the Symposium. See 
Ferrari, Platonic Love, pg. 264 for more information on this point. 
40
 This is important because later Plato describes the relationship between the lover and beloved such that the older 
one of the two makes the younger one like a God. Hence, since the “horses” and “charioteers” of the Gods willingly 
play their own hierarchical roles, one might suggest that this evidences the fact that the kind of love that is involved 
in the sort of philosophical friendship that Plato describes is something that occasions the well-ordered soul. I say 
more about this kind of relationship below. 
41
 However, even the horses of the Gods must be nourished by their charioteers. (247e) Yet, unlike humans, the 
Gods are wise enough to know what to feed the horses. See Charles Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, 
“The Palinode,” pg. 93 
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aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer (254a) in order to sway the chariot toward the beloved 
and “suggest to him the pleasures of sex”(254b). Yet, as they approach the boy, they are “struck 
by his face as if by a bolt of lightning” (254b). The charioteer then sees a vision of beauty, and, 
as a result of this vision, he is able to rein the horses in. I shall examine this phenomenon more 
closely in what follows.  
First of all, the two horses have “opposite sorts of bloodlines,” and the black horse is 
naturally indisposed to serve the charioteer. Hence, the dissension between the horses results in 
an increased potentiality for discord in the whole soul. This, in turn, presents a serious problem, 
since (ideally) the parts of the soul will find harmony in hierarchical order. The charioteer must 
guide the soul; that is, he must become a proficient steersman, and the direction of the chariot 
must be given by him, not by the horses.
42
 That is to say, reason must control the desires of the 
lower parts of the soul. 
Moreover, the charioteer is dependent on the horses in order to move forward and 
upward.
43
 The horses and charioteer are naturally inseparable, but not naturally harmonious. 
Harmony in the soul requires a functioning hierarchy between the three parts of the soul, and this 
precludes satisfying all of the desires of the lower parts of the soul. If each part followed its own 
desire, the whole chariot would fall apart. Thus, the charioteer must steer the horses in a 
direction that they (particularly the black horse) do not necessarily want to go (upward), even 
though – since they have wings – they are capable of the task. The wings represent the possibility 
                                                             
42
 The charioteer is the appropriate director and “steersman” of the chariot (247d). 
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 I just mean that the horses play a key role in making possible the motion of the whole soul. See 247bc  
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of growth and fulfillment and the possibility of a kind of ascent, akin to that of the Symposium, at 
least in its end goal (246c-e).
44
 
Interestingly, the wings seem to have a function that is particularly suited to humans, or 
fallen souls (246d-e, 248c). The Gods are in control of their desires, as opposed to mortals. 
While the Gods’ chariots are winged (247a), their wings are (and continue to be) nourished by 
beauty, wisdom, and goodness (246de). The Gods, therefore, do not need assistance – they are 
already elevated. However, the wings of mortals must be properly cultivated by their souls 
(248c). Importantly, it is an erotic experience of a beautiful person that begins this process. Thus, 
the mortal soul is particularly suited for the erotic experience of a beautiful person, whereas the 
souls of the gods – the ones that are already in proper hierarchical order – are already nourished 
by beauty. In the case of a mortal, it is an erotic experience of a beautiful person that potentially 
leads the soul to become more like the souls of the gods. Indeed, Socrates explains that “Beauty 
enters through [our] eyes, which are its natural route to the soul; there it waters the passages for 
the wings, and starts the wings growing.” The wings “have the power to raise [things] aloft 
where all the gods dwell” (246e), and it is beauty that initiates the growth of the wings: 
When [a lover] sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured Beauty 
well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the 
earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due to a god, and if he 
weren’t afraid people would think he’d gone completely mad, he’d even 
sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god. Once he has looked at 
him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of 
beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him up and waters the 
growth of his wings (251b). 
This, Socrates explains, is love (252b). Beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most 
clearly visible and the most loved (250d).
45
 This passage shows that an erotic experience of 
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beauty nourishes that which draws the lover aloft – the wings – and that love (eros) makes the 
flight of the chariot (which is dependent in part on the wings) possible. This means that if the 
chariot is analogous to the soul, and the wings are analogous to that which draws the soul toward 
knowledge of the Forms, then the metaphor shows that an erotic experience of a beautiful person 
potentially occasions the lover’s grasp of the Forms. 
However, if eros facilitates this ascent, how is it that an erotic experience motivates the 
black horse to run violently toward the beloved and, thus, leads to a struggle between the 
charioteer and his horses? Notably, upon the erotic experience of beauty, it is the black horse’s 
response to the erotic experience that leads him off track. The black horse responds by directing 
eros merely toward the satisfaction sexual desires. On the other hand, the charioteer, who has 
looked “into the eye of love” (253e), also clearly possesses eros, but he (reason) does not share 
the black horse’s desire. In fact, he thinks that the black horse desires something that is 
“dreadfully wrong” (254b). It is something contrary to that which is sought by reason that leads 
the black horse off track. Thus, eros can be directed toward whatever is desired, and the black 
horse, since it has an unreasonable desire, can direct eros off track. It would seem, then, that both 
the charioteer and the black horse express eros, but they direct their eros toward different objects 
of desire. This means that eros can be directed toward reasonable objects of desire or it can be 
falsely directed; it will be reasonable only as long as reasonable desires are followed rather than 
unreasonable ones. Hence, this particularly illuminates the importance of the charioteer’s 
command of the horses.  
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 Notably, Griswold suggests that the wings, which represent a certain kind of eros (eros that is incited by worldly 
images, yet allows for the recollection of Forms), facilitate the flight upward to the Forms. For further 
argumentation for this point, see “The Palinode,” pg. 95. On the other hand, Graeme Nicholson argues that “Eros 
himself is winged, and Eros awakens the wings within our soul. But those wings themselves are not Eros…Eros is 
not a part of our soul, but a god, a power that awakens this part or this power of our soul.” See Plato’s Phaedrus, 
“Love and Beauty,” pp. 201 
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However, it is a good question as to how exactly the charioteer is to master the horses, 
especially the black horse. Socrates does indicate that the black horse can be trained: (The black 
horse will impede the chariot’s ascent if the charioteer “has failed to train it well.” 247b)
46
 This 
is interesting because, undoubtedly, the vision of the Beautiful that takes the black horse “back 
on his haunches” is not an act of training, and it is not an intentional attempt to control the horse 
on behalf of the charioteer. It is an experience that gives rise to a sort of awakening and insight, 
which forces the horses under control. Thus, the reformation that results from the erotic 
experience of a beautiful person is particularly applicable to the soul whose charioteer has not 
trained his black horse well. Since my main focus in this section is to consider the way in which 
an erotic experience of beauty potentially gives rise to moral reformation in one’s soul, I shall 
concentrate on the kind of case in which the black horse remains untrained and is, thus, 
potentially forced under control as the result of an erotic experience of beauty. 
 It is noteworthy that when the charioteer “looks in the eye of love,” (253e) he is able to 
pull the disobedient black horse back on its haunches, though it is quite unwilling. The charioteer 
finally falls violently on the reins, due to his vision of the Forms – this is not a deliberate act of 
control or leadership over the other two parts. Both before the vision of Beauty and after it the 
charioteer seeks control. However, after the vision, the charioteer has seen Beauty “where it 
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stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control” (254b). It is this that makes the charioteer 
capable of mastering the black horse. 
Since the charioteer is the only one who has the potential to see the forms (247d, 248a), 
while all of the parts of the soul glimpse the boy, only the charioteer recalls the Form of Beauty 
itself. This vision is a memory
47
 that is a potential impetus to insight (254b, 256a). It is a 
recognition and recollection, since at one time (before being embodied) the soul had a primordial 
vision of beauty in advance of its empirical experiences of it. The vision of beauty, then, lives on 
in the form of an unconscious memory. The memory, if it is clear, allows the lover to turn away 
from indulging his unreasonable, bodily desire (250e).  
In fact, the “startling” experience of seeing “an image of what [the soul] saw up there” 
can prompt a particular kind of madness – philosophical madness – as Socrates describes it 
(250a). This madness is “that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here 
and is reminded of true beauty” (249d), and when someone is “touched” by it, “he is called a 
lover” (249e). As this person recalls true Beauty, it will pour into him through his eyes, and 
“water the growth of [his] wings” (251b). The wings, as we have seen, draw the soul upward, 
and it is beauty that cultivates the growth of the wings and awakens and inspires love (eros).
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This initiates his pursuit of wisdom and the Forms: We are told that this kind of lover “gazes 
aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below – and that is what brings on him the 
charge that he has gone mad”(249d).  
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Beauty there is also Justice, Goodness, the vista as a whole.” See Plato’s Phaedrus, “The Human Soul,” pp. 174 
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This kind of madness occasions the development of a special, philosophical relationship 
between the lover and his beloved. The lover who has been “driven mad by love” will morally 
improve “the one he has befriended” if he follows his desire in a specific manner (252e-253c). 
The philosophical relationship takes place if the lovers respond to the erotic experiences of each 
other properly: At 255a-e Plato describes the interaction between lovers and their beloveds in a 
way that particularly brings out the ethical meaning of their relationship. Ideally, the teacher in 
the relationship will come to feel a genuine concern and affection for the younger lover, and the 
younger man will come to see the goodness of his lover and teacher who has achieved the 
control of his passions. The teacher is “touched with a God by memory” and adopts the God’s 
customs and practices, “so far as a human being can share in a God’s life” (253a). He will pour 
his inspiration into the soul of his beloved and will “help him take on as much of their own god’s 
qualities as possible” (253b). The goal is that the two lovers will “live a happy life, bound 
together by love and persevering in friendship” (253c). 
Plato focuses especially on the lover of philosophy – the sort of lover who is able to lead 
his beloved in this sort of philosophical friendship – as the sort of person who has had “a view of 
Reality” (248a, 249cd). When he sees beauty down here, he will be “moved abruptly from here 
to a vision of Beauty itself” (250e). Indeed, he has seen a clearer vision, and who is best able to 
remember it (249cd).
49 
However, not everyone has a clear memory of a primordial vision, and, 
                                                             
49 The vision of Beauty is limited to those who have had a vision of the Forms previously (250e), but it is not 
exclusive to philosophers. I recognize that the lover, though his rational part experiences the vision of Beauty and 
rises above the temptation to indulge, may end up leading a merely honorable rather than philosophical life. 
However, Gary Scott and William Welton argue that, upon an erotic experience of beauty, “the philosopher, lying 
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confusedly and implicitly of the Forms reflected in it; in the philosopher, possessed of the philosophical eros for 
wisdom, the messages of eros speak more clearly of the higher realm of Being at which the physical world only 
hints.” See Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato’s Symposium, pg 220. 
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hence, not everyone will gain insight upon an erotic experience of beauty. Not everyone will 
experience the kind of relationship that I have described above, and not everyone will be 
thunderstruck (254b), as it were, by beauty. Therefore, I am arguing that the kind of erotic 
experience of beauty that is portrayed in the metaphor only potentially has the effects on the soul 
that are described there. Although such an experience is indeed powerful, it will not necessarily 
deliver all lovers to a state in which they are able to succeed in controlling their unreasonable 
desires. Socrates explains: 
Not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here – 
not souls that got a brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such 
bad luck when they fell down here that they were twisted by bad company 
into the lives of injustice so they forgot the sacred objects they had seen 
before. Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are 
startled when they see an image of what they saw up there (250ab). 
As in the Symposium, then, it is evident in the Phaedrus that an erotic experience of 
beauty will not affect everyone in the same manner. Some people will not be moved from an 
image of beauty to “a vision of Beauty itself.” Furthermore, there are some people who will 
focus on the mere image, surrendering to pleasure and setting out “in the manner of a four-footed 
beast…wallowing in vice…without a trace of fear or shame” (251). Plato clearly distinguishes 
this “fallen prisoner of love” from the person “who has seen much in heaven” and who will be 
able to bear the burden of this “feathered force” of the erotic experience of beauty with dignity 
(252d). Hence, the erotic experience that beauty evokes gives rise to options; that is, one might 
be “raised aloft” or one might simply be a “fallen prisoner of love.” Indeed, eros does not at all 
guarantee transcendence, and importantly, the wings – which elevate the soul – will not work 
properly if the horses are not guided by the charioteer. Eros cannot aid in transcendence when 
the black horse succeeds in directing the chariot toward its unreasonable desire. That means that 
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either the black horse must be trained to obey the charioteer, or the charioteer must have the 
capacity to recall a vision of Beauty such that the horse is forced to comply, as described at 254e. 
The metaphor of the charioteer shows that the potential glimpse of the Forms which 
occurs during an erotic experience of beauty can prompt a person to master her baser desires. 
The general mastery of these baser desires allows lovers to be able to conduct a way of life 
appropriate for those who have experienced the edifying effects of eros: Those who have 
mastered their lower desires will be in full possession of eros, and eros will be able to function as 
a principle of unity in their souls.
50
 Thus, moral progress results from the erotic experience of 
beauty that prompted the charioteer to master his horses. 
Hence, the Phaedrus, like the Symposium, suggests that while some people will reach the 
level of the most blessed Mystery (250c) and a vision of Beauty itself, some will not reach the 
level of such a vision. This distinction is reminiscent of the Symposium’s claim that not all lovers 
will go about the “rites of love” correctly. In the Phaedrus, we have seen that one can become a 
“fallen prisoner of love,” and in the Symposium, we have seen that lovers who are attracted 
simply to bodily aspects of the beloved or who lack proper guidance, will not cultivate a desire to 
ascend to the level of understanding. Indeed, the vision of the beautiful itself will not be 
disclosed to everyone (Symposium, 210a).  
Furthermore, while Plato argues in the Symposium that all love is for the good, we have 
seen that there are inferior and superior kinds of eternal good that each of our souls desire. Some 
people will reach only the lower Mysteries, but some people will come to understand the greater 
Mysteries. Similarly in the Phaedrus, when some people see “what we call beauty” down here, 
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human soul (Ph. 250b-253c). This, Nicholson suggests, is what explains our response to beauty. See Plato’s 
Phaedrus, “Love and Beauty.”  
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they will “surrender to pleasure, eager to make babies” (250e). However, other people will be 
lovers of wisdom, cultivating their talents in philosophy. Additionally, in the Phaedrus, as in the 
Symposium, Socrates speaks of a greater Mystery, “the Mystery that we may rightly call the most 
blessed of all” (250c).
51
 This Mystery can be grasped only by the person who properly and 
appropriately “uses the reminders” of the things of the soul during its primordial vision (249c). 
He is the person who has been led correctly (252e).
52
 He “is always at the highest, most perfect 
level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be,” drawing closest to the 
divine (249d).  
Hence, here, we see the way in which the Phaedrus, like the Symposium, honors the role 
of eros in the flourishing of the soul. Both dialogues involve a kind of ascent to the forms that is 
inspired by an erotic experience of beauty. The lover in the Symposium potentially comes to see 
the Beautiful in itself, and he comes to know that there is such a thing as beauty independent of 
the objects that we find beautiful. The lover in the Phaedrus is potentially taken by beauty, 
through having gone from the bodily beauty of a boy to the memory of the Beautiful itself, to see 
that there is such a thing as Beauty itself.  In each case, moral reformation involves knowledge of 
the superior value of the life lived by those who are able to contemplate Beauty itself. In both the 
Symposium and Phaedrus, an erotic experience of a beautiful person potentially gives rise to a 
transformation of the soul and a development of character, which results from an insight into the 
nature of true value. This kind of reformation involves the relationship between eros and wisdom 
during an erotic experience of beauty. In the Symposium, the love of wisdom potentially leads to 
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 “Beauty was radiant to see at the time when the souls…saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered 
into the Mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all” (250cd). 
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 This is relevant to the point that I made in an earlier note, regarding what or whom exactly it is that leads the soul 
upward. As I noted, some people think that ‘love’ is supposed to be the leader in the context of the Symposium, and 
others think that the leader is quite obviously an educator. Here, in the context of Phaedrus, we have reason to 
believe the leader is indeed the latter (252e). It would make sense, then, to argue that Plato is consistently referring 
to an educator as the leader in both dialogues. 
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an understanding of the greater Mysteries of love, and then the Forms. In the Phaedrus, an erotic 
experience of a beautiful person motivates a “philosophical madness” which can cause the soul 
to turn away from “the things which we now call real” and lift “up its head to what is truly real 
instead” (249c).  
Thus, the moral training that results from an experience of beautiful art (described in the 
Republic), and the kind of moral transformation that results from an erotic experience of beauty 
(described in the Symposium and Phaedrus) are two different phenomena. I am arguing that 
beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) Some experiences of 
beauty via art can be used in moral training; that is, these experiences can be used to promote the 
kind of training that Plato suggests should take place during the beginning stages of education in 
the Republic. This is an affective kind of training, whereby a person learns to feel appropriately 
toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty via art have the capacity to influence a person’s 
character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to appropriate behavior. (2) An erotic experience 
of a beautiful person, as it is described in the Symposium and Phaedrus, is a more profound sort 
of experience. This kind of experience can be distinguished from (1) in that it adds a higher kind 
of cognitive component which is lacking in (1). In (1), cognition is involved (cognition is 
involved in all affection), but only as perception-based thought, which merely has access to 
appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful people, on the other hand, provide an insight 
into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision. They lead to the knowledge of true 
Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. Therefore, erotic 




I have shown that while aesthetic experience in the Republic plays a different role than 
aesthetic experience in the Symposium and Phaedrus, these two roles are not inconsistent: People 
who are exposed to the experience of beauty through art will potentially have their desires 
trained to track the good, and people who are exposed to erotic experiences of beautiful people 
will potentially derive insight into the nature of the Good. Both the experience of beauty through 
art and the erotic experience of a beautiful person may give rise to moral reformation.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My goal in this chapter has been to consider Plato’s aesthetic theory and his conception 
of the role that experiences of beauty play in moral reformation. In Section I, I discussed Plato’s 
moral psychology and, in particular, his view of the way in which a person becomes motivated 
toward goodness. I argued that Plato consistently maintains the Socratic thesis that all desires are 
for things qua good, and that every soul (and the whole soul) always pursues the good. 
Furthermore, I argued that, for Plato, evaluative illusions are grasped in the same way that 
optical illusions are, by the lower parts of the soul. This means that while the objects toward 
which the lower parts of the soul are motivated may not always be good things, these 
motivations will not be independent of the good itself. Seeking the good but reaching only an 
appearance of it gives rise to desires for things that appear to be good, but are, in fact, not good. 
Hence, I argued that, on Plato’s view, it is possible to pursue the good and, at the same time, be 
motivated toward bad things. 
I have shown that the difference between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul is 
that the non-rational part accepts appearances unreflectively, whereas the rational part – in its 
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ability to calculate and reflect on appearances – transcends them (it transcends perception 
through calculation). The appetitive and spirited parts, on the other hand, are cognitively limited 
to perception, and thus, the appearances they accept (whether evaluative or visual) will be false 
at worst and reflective of, but removed from, the truth, at best. This makes them cognitively and 
ethically handicapped. As a result, they pursue the worthless or the bad in the worst case 
scenario, or in the best case, while they cannot perceive it, they can be trained to track the higher 
value that reason calculates as good.  
For Plato, grasping goodness is something that begins in the lower parts of the soul – 
those parts of the soul that are limited to perception. In Books II and III of the Republic, Plato 
argues that appropriate education begins with proper exposure to media that is perception-based, 
e.g. music or poetry. As was evidenced by my arguments in Section I, moral education can only 
come to full fruition if an agent becomes able to distinguish what she has grasped through 
appetite and spirit from a higher good that is only understood by reason. Since, in terms of being 
motivated toward the good, the best case scenario for the lower parts of the soul is that they 
should be trained to track the higher value that reason calculates as good, in the second section of 
this chapter, I argued that this training is the goal of the aesthetic education that is described in 
Books II and III of the Republic. In particular, I showed that it is the perception-based nature of 
music and poetry that gives them an important role in training the soul to become good.  
Plato maintains that a person must acquire the right tastes – the right sensitivity to the 
presence of beauty – so that she will learn to like and dislike what she ought. I argued that, for 
Plato, poetry and music have an emotive kind of power, so they serve as an affective component 
of a person’s education, but experiences of beauty via art also have the power to train a person to 
properly respond to order, discipline, and justice: A person who has had experiences of beauty 
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that have led him to “friendship and harmony with the beauty of reason” will welcome the reason 
for his praise of good things and his distaste of bad things, and “recognize it easily because of its 
kinship with himself” (Republic, 402). I argued that, for Plato, experiencing music or poetry 
potentially allows good content to manifest itself in a person’s response to beauty. When a 
person experiences good content in music and poetry, she desires to imitate such content in her 
own soul. If a person is properly acquainted with the discipline in music, she will desire to mimic 
such order and discipline within herself. Thus, I argued that, in Plato’s view, an experience of 
beauty via art can have a positive transforming effect. In particular, an experience of beauty via 
art is one that has the capacity to produce actions – that is to say, a person is able to absorb the 
good character that is potentially expressed through music and poetry, and act accordingly. Thus, 
this kind of experience potentially gives rise to moral training. 
Furthermore, in Section II, I discussed the prima facie problem that Book X seems to 
pose for the theory of poetry that is given in Books II and III. In Book X, Socrates emphasizes a 
worry regarding imitation in poetry, and he goes so far as to state that it has become clear that 
imitative poetry “should be altogether excluded from the good city”(Republic, 595a). 
Nevertheless, I argued that the discussions in Books II and III are consistent with the discussion 
in Book X. In other words, I argued that the conflict is only apparent.  
Since the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul are cognitively limited to perception 
(and they accept evaluative appearances), and since the pleasure involved in music and poetry 
appeals to the lower parts of the soul (Republic, 606d, 607), these parts of the soul will likely 
accept the appearances/images that are presented in poetry or music. These appearances will be 
false at worst and reflective of – but removed from – the truth, at best. Therefore, these lower 
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parts of the soul will accept (and pursue) the worthless or the bad if it is imitated in these forms 
of art.  
However, in the case that poetry (or music) captures the nature of something true, the 
lower parts of the soul can be trained to track the higher value that such poetry presents. Thus, 
poetry that imitates appearances and involves ignorance will corrupt those who experience or 
perform it, but poetry that imitates things as they are can be used in moral education. With an eye 
to Elizabeth Asmis’ analysis of mimesis, I argued that the kind of music or poetry that expresses 
good content through “appropriate imitation” – is good music or poetry. Though Plato is quite 
critical of image-making in art, we have reason to believe that there are cases in which he thinks 
that mimesis is appropriate. For example, good poetry involves mimesis, but it must be created to 
facilitate moral improvement by providing an experience that represents good character as 
closely as possible. This is the sort of poetry that can aid one in the recognition of reason: By 
training a person to develop a good character, something akin to reason, it allows for a person to 
see the kinship between reason and herself (Republic, 402). Thus, since reason is essential to the 
art that seeks truth, the experience of good poetry (or music) brings to light for a person the 
possibility of mastering the art of reason. Thus, my arguments showed that the ignorant sort of 
poet is the one who is banished from the city, while the poet who implants “the image of good 
moral habit” in his poems creates the poetry that will be allowed to return from exile.  
In the third section of this chapter, I examined the erotic experiences of beautiful people 
that are described in the Symposium and Phaedrus, and considered the difference between those 
kinds of experiences and the experiences of beauty via art that are described in the Republic. In 
the Republic, beautiful art must represent beautiful character, harmony, grace, and order. Eros 
for beauty is produced by the moral training to which experiences of beautiful art give rise. The 
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kind of eros that is a product of moral training must be nonsexual (403a). The Symposium and 
Phaedrus, on the other hand, take up the sexual part of eros as something that can be useful. In 
particular, the erotic experience of a beautiful person will involve sexual desire, and sexual 
desire – in its proper place – plays a role in the experience that facilitates moral progress in both 
the Symposium and Phaedrus.  
Furthermore, I argued that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral 
progress: (1) Some experiences of beauty via art can be used in moral training; that is, these 
experiences can be used to promote the kind of training that Plato suggests should take place 
during the beginning stages of education in the Republic. This is an affective kind of training, 
whereby a person learns to feel appropriately toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty 
via art have the capacity to influence a person’s character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to 
appropriate behavior. (2) An erotic experience of a beautiful person, as it is described in the 
Symposium and Phaedrus, is a more profound sort of experience. This kind of experience can be 
distinguished from (1) in that it adds a higher kind of cognitive component which is lacking in 
(1). In (1), cognition is involved (cognition is involved in all affection), but only as perception-
based thought, which merely has access to appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful 
people, on the other hand, provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of 
vision. They lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by 
the lover of wisdom. Therefore, erotic experiences of beautiful people promote increased moral 
understanding as opposed to affective training. 
My arguments showed that Plato’s accounts of aesthetic experience in the Symposium, 
Phaedrus, and Republic are, in no way, inconsistent. Though these dialogues do, indeed, 
describe different kinds of experiences, both the experience of beauty through art and the erotic 
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experience of beauty give rise to moral reformation. Therefore, in this chapter we have seen that, 
in Plato’s view, there are at least two ways in which experiences of beauty may improve people 
morally; that is, there are at least two ways in which experiences of beauty may promote moral 
character.  
 
CHAPTER 2  
BEAUTY, ART, AND SUBLIMITY, AND THE SYMBOLIC 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND MORAL 
JUDGMENT IN KANT 
 
I. A TRANSITION TO KANTIAN AESTHETICS 
As I leave the chapter on Plato and begin the chapter on Kant, it will be helpful to note 
some of the ways in which there are suggestive links between these two views. I recognize that 
there are essential distinctions between Plato’s and Kant’s philosophies, but my main aim in this 
section is to note and briefly highlight nine particularly important points of connection between 
them.   
(1) Plato and Kant share the general view that experiences of beauty cannot and should 
not be divorced from morality. We have seen that, for Plato, beauty is indeed “capable of 
reorienting one’s life through one’s engagement with it.”
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 (2) Specifically, I have shown that 
Plato distinguishes between two kinds of experiences of beauty, experiences of beauty via art 
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and erotic experiences of beautiful people. Accordingly, there are at least two ways in which 
experiences of beauty may improve people morally; that is, there are at least two ways in which 
they may promote moral character. As I argued in the previous chapter, Plato relegates the 
experience of ordinary art objects to (at best) ways to achieve moral training. On the other hand, 
an erotic experience of a beautiful person, as it is described in the Symposium and Phaedrus, is a 
more profound sort of experience. This kind of experience can be distinguished from an 
experience of beauty via art in that it adds a different kind of cognitive component. In an 
experience of beauty via art, the cognition involved is only perception-based thought, which 
merely has access to appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful people, on the other 
hand, provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision. They entail 
knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. 
Therefore, these kinds of experiences promote increased moral understanding as opposed to 
affective training.  
Kant also distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic experience. He wants to show that 
the experience of beauty is especially capable of preparing us for loving something without 
interest (29:267). On the other hand, an experience of the sublime best captures what Kant calls 
‘moral feeling,’ and hence, it is the sublime that teaches us to “esteem something even against 
our interest” (29:267). As I shall argue in Section V, the sublime is what genuinely characterizes 
moral dignity through a presentation of reason’s dominance over sensibility (29:269). This kind 
of moral context is more akin to what I have called ‘moral growth’ in my analysis of Plato’s 
discussion of the erotic experience of beauty than to the kind of moral training that Plato 
describes in the Republic or the kind of moral improvement that Kant alludes to in his discussion 
of an experience of beauty in nature. Thus, the work that I do in these first two chapters sheds 
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light on interesting connections between the moral training that occurs as a result of an 
experience of beauty in art in Plato’s Republic and Kant’s discussion of experiences of beauty, 
and the moral growth that occurs as a result of erotic experiences of beauty in Plato’s Symposium 
and Phaedrus and Kant’s discussion of experiences of the sublime. Hence, Plato’s and Kant’s 
shared thesis that aesthetic experience cannot and should not be divorced from morality, and the 
parallel between the two sorts of aesthetic experience that Plato and Kant each describe, mark the 
first two points of connection that I want to emphasize. 
Now that I have pointed out the general parallel between the two kinds of aesthetic 
experience that Plato discusses and the two kinds of aesthetic experience that Kant discusses, I 
shall consider some more specific connections between Plato’s and Kant’s aesthetics. (3) I want 
to draw attention to a particularly important point of connection between Kant’s 
phenomenological explanation of aesthetic experience and Plato’s view as to how music 
communicates goodness and rational orderliness in general. For Kant, in order for a theoretical 
cognition to occur – as we know from the first Critique – the empirical manifold must be 
synthesized by imagination in conformity with the concepts of the understanding; the 
imagination is the mediator which enables us to bring an experienced particular under the 
appropriate concept. This relationship between the imagination and understanding is the 
subjective condition for objective cognition. However, aesthetic experience leads to certain 
alterations in the usual process; the process of subsumption no longer takes place, and instead, a 
harmonious interplay of the faculties occurs. This is because, in the aesthetic case, the faculties 
fulfill the required relations for cognition, but no determinate concept is present. When beauty is 
experienced, the imagination is confronted with something felt to be purposively just right, but 
the understanding has no concept of any sort of entity of which this particular now being 
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experienced may be considered an exemplar. The imagination is free in the sense that it is not 
constrained by any prior conceptual boundaries. Here, the faculties are able to harmonize without 
the application of a determinate concept. Thus, there is a kind of alteration in the process that the 
cognitive faculties usually undergo, and because of not only the alteration in the experience but 
also the existence of the prior subjective condition for objective cognition, something else – 
acquaintance with the moral attitude – is reached.
54
  
Similarly, according to Plato, aesthetic phenomena (music, speech, poetry) express 
something that we experience and then alterations can be made with respect to our character.
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Plato claims that we have within us a prior kind of longing for the good – a prior idea of the 
Good that is at work within us. We perceive aesthetic objects in such a way that they arouse that 
prior idea of the good. So when we are given a glimpse of goodness through aesthetic experience 
– via the alteration (in character and eventually in our choices) that takes place – we will 
eventually reach something else, something higher, the Good itself. The analogy that I am 
drawing, then, is that both Plato and Kant suggest that there is a certain kind of alteration that 
comes about through aesthetic experience, and this, along with an a priori condition – the prior 
longing for the Good in Plato’s case, and the subjective condition for objective cognition in 
Kant’s case – acquaints a person with the moral.  
 The alteration that Plato describes is a more permanent one than the alteration that Kant 
describes; for Plato, one’s character may be permanently altered through aesthetic experience, 
whereas for Kant aesthetic experience temporarily alters a certain cognitive process. 
Furthermore, the good with which we may be acquainted through aesthetic experience – either 
                                                             
54
 My point here is to draw the connection between Kant and Plato, not to give an analysis or full exegesis of 
Kantian aesthetics. Of course, I shall do that in detail in an appropriate, later section of this chapter.  




the moral attitude, according to Kant or the Good itself, according to Plato – is understood 
differently on each view. That is to say, the Kantian moral attitude is something within a person, 
whereas the Platonic Form of the Good is metaphysically distinct from a person. While I 
recognize these points, my aim here is to put forward the analogy that I drew above and to 
suggest that, as a result of that analogy, the possibility of the potential improvement of a person 
as a result of aesthetic experience is the same on both of these views. 
(4) The next point of connection between Plato and Kant is, in part, provoked by my 
earlier discussion of Plato’s arguments concerning the tripartite soul. This point involves a 
question that I have raised after considering Plato’s theory of motivation in the first chapter, and 
it is a question that one might also pose to Kant: How is reason able to motivate or initiate 
action? In other words, one might suppose that reason is an inert presentation of information that 
has no impetus to action of its own and therefore requires coupling with desires in order to 
accomplish anything. Yet, this is neither Plato’s nor Kant’s view.  
It is important to distinguish between the meta-ethical point, which involves what exactly 
reason is and what it is able to do, and, on the other hand, the ethical point, which involves what 
reason ought to do. The question that interests me here is, thus, ‘How is reason able to do what it 
ought to do, on each philosopher’s view?’ Kant’s moral theory requires reason (or at least the 
fact that we have reason) to be able to motivate actions independently of our desires and 
inclinations. Similarly, for Plato, reason has desires of its own, so it is intrinsically motivating; 
Plato wants to show that reason must dominate the appetite and spirit and take the lead, if there is 
to be a certain kind of moral action. Reason must motivate a person to choose the higher option 
(she must choose not to follow lower-level desires for mere gratification, and instead follow 
reason in order to make any contact with the Form).  
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We have seen that, for Plato, reason involves a kind of cognition that has “wings of its 
own” (supposing that the wings represent the capacity to motivate and initiate actions), to use the 
metaphor from the Phaedrus. It is through an ascent of sorts – either the sudden recollection of a 
Form, such as that which occurs in the Phaedrus (here Plato packs into a single vision the whole 
dialectical ascent that was developed through four stages in the Symposium), or an ascent of the 
kind described in Symposium or Republic – that facilitates rational self-control, and hence, moral 
reformation. In the latter case (in the Symposium, in particular) logos works as an agitator, cross-
examining what eros seems to present as a suitable object on which to stop our restless focus. 
The cross examination by logos is a cognitive process that has the power to weaken and defuse 
this object as a possible stopping point. Thus, logos forces eros to look higher. One way to 
describe the successive soul-effects of this process is that reason is bit-at-a-time forcing a 
reordered hierarchy within the soul. As I have argued, moral growth through rational self-control 
is then simply another way to describe this ever-improving hierarchy. 
Comparatively, Kant wants to show that reason has the capacity to force our desires in 
their proper place and to motivate right action. In this sense, reason plays a similar role to that 
which it plays in Plato’s philosophy. In the case of the moral person, it is reason that successfully 
directs her to choose a higher path than that to which the inclinations tend to draw her. Again, 
one might say that reason has “wings of its own,” as it were.  
Furthermore, the Kantian notion of a reflective judgment (the kind we are talking about 
when we refer to a judgment of taste, i.e., an aesthetic judgment) is referred to by Kant – in what 
one might think is dangerously close to a Platonic idea – as an “ascending power of the mind.” 
This kind of judgment, especially when it is a judgment of the sublime, just is what makes us 
aware of reason’s power to dominate the inclinations and to defuse and weaken them. Curiously, 
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on both Plato’s and Kant’s views, aesthetic experience plays a key role in facilitating reason’s 
capacity to motivate and initiate action insofar as it calls forth reason’s strength to overcome 
one’s inclinations and lower-level desires. 
There are two additional points (which mark the fifth and sixth points that I take up in 
this section) of connection that have emerged from this discussion. They are the notions of 
“ascent,” and what Dieter Henrich calls “the Moral Image of the World.”  Next, I shall discuss 
these in turn. (5) As I have already mentioned above, the notion of ascent is obviously very 
fundamental in Plato’s philosophy. Comparatively, not only does Kant talk about an “ascending 
power of the mind” in his third Critique, a fundamental Kantian notion – purposiveness – is used 
in terms of an ascent as well. The Critique begins with particular kinds of purposiveness, such as 
the beauty in an object, and it proceeds to an understanding of the teleological system of nature 
and then to a “moral image of the world;” that is, to an understanding of the way in which moral 
conduct can be backed up by a conception of the world. Hence, in short, just as Kant wants to 
show that aesthetic experience facilitates the ascending power of the mind, and the ascent via 
purposiveness, aesthetic experience also facilitates the Platonic ascent in the Symposium and 
Republic, and also the Phaedrus, assuming that a kind of ascent to the Forms occurs after one’s 
glimpse of Beauty itself in his beloved (253e).
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(6) The other point of overlap between Plato and Kant here is that the “moral image of 
the world” is, in a sense, a fundamental part of both of their philosophies. Plato made a point of 
emphasizing the interrogative experiences that Socrates created for others, and argued that the 
way of the Sophists in fact undermines moral insights. Plato wants to show that any successful 
defense of moral insight must resort to reason and the principles of a theory of ultimate 
                                                             
56 “When the charioteer looks in the eye of love” (253e). 
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knowledge – a theory the primary task of which would be to understand the Forms. Here, Plato 
presents a justification of the moral image of the world. However, Plato wants to show that the 
good life or moral life is something that encompasses the moral image, but the Platonic ascent 
does not culminate in it. Hence, here, Plato and Kant diverge. 
(7) For Plato, content is always present in aesthetic experience – no matter whether one 
has an experience of beauty via art or an erotic experience of beauty, one is put in touch with the 
content of the Good. As I have shown, Plato argues that good content can manifest itself in a 
person’s response to beauty. In other words, for Plato, aesthetic experience is not merely about 
the form of an aesthetic object; rather it also involves a grasping of a certain kind of content. 
Music and poetry can express the content of the good, and as a result of the experience of beauty 
via art a person is able to absorb the good content that is potentially expressed by it, and act 
accordingly.  
Kant also introduces content in his aesthetics, but he does so specifically in the context of 
fine art, which employs the symbol of morality through a presentation of aesthetic ideas. Fine art 
expresses aesthetic ideas (content) through symbolic representation. As will become clearer in a 
later section of this chapter, the artist has the capacity to present a rational idea through an 
aesthetic exhibition, and – in fact – it is the power of aesthetic presentation that makes possible 
the manifestation of these ideas to their full extent. As a result of such a presentation, a rational 
concept can come to be thought of in terms of the aesthetic work; the artist provides an 
experiencing subject with a way to grasp the concept in an aesthetic way. Hence, Kant’s theory 
of art is reminiscent of Plato’s position regarding the experience of beauty via art and its capacity 
to acquaint a person with good content. 
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However, one might suppose that these two philosophers are talking about two very 
different kinds of good content: Plato’s view is that we become acquainted with good content 
through objects that share in the Good itself in deficient ways, and Kant’s view is that we 
apprehend good content through a symbolic representation of the good (that is, through the 
analogous relationship between aesthetic experience and morality that is involved in the 
presentation and apprehension of aesthetic ideas). Furthermore, the Good on Plato’s view is 
something metaphysically distinct from persons, while on Kant’s view it is a moral attitude 
within a person. However, the way in which such content cashes out on each view is quite 
similar. For Plato, the Good itself is a unity; things that partake of it are proportionate, 
harmonious and united, e.g. the good city and the good soul. For Kant, morality involves a 
formal ability to universalize maxims in accordance with the moral law; it involves a consistency 
and universality among persons. Though the good content that Kant alludes to in his discussion 
of fine art is, unlike Plato’s conception of good content, very formal – it involves a relationship 
among the faculties of an agent – it, too, seems to cash out as a kind of unity. The moral person’s 
faculties engage in a certain relationship, the capacity for which is universally shared. The moral 
judgment is one that we can impute to others, and it is one of which everyone should come 
together and share in the recognition. Indeed, I recognize that the good is understood by Plato 
and Kant in metaphysically different ways, but an analogy can be drawn here because both 
Plato’s and Kant’s understanding of good content, turns out to be, in a certain way, unity. 
(9) The final point of connection that I want to emphasize in this section involves a link 
between Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus and Kant’s general discussion of aesthetic experience: 
Both philosophers seem to suggest that in aesthetic experience one may find one’s true self. For 
Plato, one is able to become a better version of herself (she is able to grow morally) by climbing 
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the ladder of the Symposium, or by having an experience such as that which is described in the 
Phaedrus. Here, as I have previously shown, one becomes morally good by becoming a certain 
kind of agent. She likens herself to a God through a relationship with an educator, and is hence, 
more like the Forms themselves.  
For Kant, aesthetic experiences put people in touch with freedom, which is only 
predicable of the noumenal self. In this way, aesthetic experiences are perhaps linkages to the 
noumenal realm and the noumenal self. However, Kant wants to show that an aesthetic judgment 
allows a person to abstract from her point of view, and to become broad-minded. “A conception 
of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we were not able to rise 
above the senses to higher cognitive powers,” and this is something that aesthetic experience 
allows us to do (160). Thus, Kant emphasizes the notion that aesthetic experience involves a 
redirecting of one’s consciousness away from oneself and one’s material and personal 
concerns.
57
 Interestingly, we have seen that Plato also wants to show that aesthetic experience at 
least involves a directing away from one’s material concerns. 
This notion is related to Iris Murdoch’s point that aesthetic experience facilitates 
reflection on our judgment from a universal standpoint, which we can determine just insofar as 
we transfer ourselves to the standpoint of other people. I will take up a more thorough 
examination of this point in Chapters 3 and 4. For now, I need to focus on the task of this current 
chapter, which is to provide a thorough analysis of Kantian aesthetics. 
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 To clarify, one might suppose that selflessness is part of becoming one’s true self. In other words, by selflessness I 
mean “focusing on something beyond the phenomenal self.” 
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II. THE AIM OF CHAPTER TWO  
I have merely introduced Kantian aesthetics in the previous section. My aim in the 
remainder of this chapter is to give a thorough analysis of Kant’s discussion of beauty in nature 
and art, and finally, his discussion of sublimity, which I argue entails some surprisingly 
underappreciated remarks. I shall argue that, as a result of the different symbolic relationships 
that the beautiful and the sublime have with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a 
different way, are instructive. They can be considered ways of knowing the good, and, as such, 
they influence the practical aspect of our lives. The following are two important passages that are 
concerned with my thesis:  
If we judge aesthetically the good that is intellectual and intrinsically 
purposive (the moral good), we must present it not so much as beautiful 
but rather as sublime, so that it will arouse more a feeling of respect 
(which disdains charm) than one of love and familiar affection. For 
human nature does not of itself harmonize with that good; it can be 
made to harmonize with it only through the dominance that reason 
exerts over sensibility. (29:271) 
In this passage, Kant summarizes his examination of the sublime. Later, in the following, 
famous passage, Kant claims that the beautiful is the primary symbol of morality, and that it is 
only via beauty that the aesthetic judgment can be considered universally valid: 
Now I maintain that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; 
and only because we refer the beautiful to the morally good (we all do 
so naturally and require all others also to do so, as a duty) does our 
liking for it include a claim to everyone else’s assent, while the mind is 
also conscious of being ennobled by this reference above a mere 
receptivity for pleasure derived from sense impressions (59:353). 
A proper understanding of these two passages requires an analysis of the distinction 
between exactly what takes place during the process of an experience of beauty vs. exactly what 
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takes place during the process of an experience of sublimity, and that is part of my aim 
henceforth. In a first approximation, an object is called beautiful when the disinterested 
apprehension of something sensible is bound up with an immediate pleasure due to a purposive 
harmony of the form of the object and the faculties of the subject (Intro., VII, 190). On the other 
hand, an object is called sublime when it presents such formlessness or boundlessness that it, at 
first, appears to violate all purpose. This gives rise to a feeling of pain in the experiencing subject 
due to the inability of the imagination to grasp the presented whole. However, because the 
object, in so doing, calls out ideas of reason which point to a certain kind of purposiveness in the 
subject, the overall result is a negative pleasure that is associated with respect
58
 (23:245 and also 
see Intro VII, and Sections 9 and 22). In the remainder of this chapter, I shall give a thorough 
analysis of these two kinds of experience and their connections with morality. I shall begin by 
considering the Kantian experience of beauty. 
 
III. THE LINK BETWEEN BEAUTY AND MORALITY 
My aim in the next two sections of this chapter is to analyze Kant’s examination of 
beauty and to argue that beauty is capable of preparing us for loving something without interest 
(29:267). I shall argue that beauty gives us a picture of morality, symbolizing the good via a 
disinterested liking and an acquaintance with freedom and independence; the pleasure that we 
take in the beauty in nature cultivates a certain kind of freedom from the merely personal 
inclinations on which we tend to focus. I want to begin by considering an important passage 
from Kant: 
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Beautiful objects of nature or of art are often called names that seem to 
presuppose that we are judging these objects morally. We call buildings or 
trees majestic and magnificent, or landscapes cheerful and gay; even colors 
are called innocent, humble, or tender, because they arouse sensations in us 
that are somehow analogous to the consciousness we have in a mental state 
produced by moral judgments. Taste enables us, as it were, to make the 
transition from sensible charm to a habitual moral interest without making 
too violent a leap; for taste presents the imagination as admitting, even in its 
freedom, of determination that is purposive for the understanding, and it 
teaches us to like even objects of sense freely, even apart from sensible 
charm (354). 
This passage requires an explanation, which I shall provide through the course of this 
section, but, ultimately, it grounds my focus on the specific points that I take up here. For the 
purposes of my project I am interested in Kant’s remarks regarding the way in which the 
experience of beauty is related to morality, and in particular, the way in which it draws us away 
from our own contingent interests. Kant argues that when we experience something beautiful and 
make a judgment of taste, this shows us something different – something unusual and unlike our 
sensible inclinations (22:241, 243, and esp. 5:210). The judgment of taste thereby shows us 
something other than our own way of viewing things as gratifying, and something beyond our 
pursuit of gratification (3:206). Furthermore, Kant wants to show that when we judge something 
as beautiful, this reminds us of the good. In connection with passage from Section 59 that I cited 
above, he famously argues that beauty is a symbol of the good, and that our implicit grasp of the 
moral law grounds our interest in beauty. He even maintains that interest in beauty “is always the 
mark of a good soul.”
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 In order to show that the judgment of taste is objectively valid, Kant turns to a morally grounded interest in the 
beautiful which justifies demanding agreement in judgments of taste as a sort of duty. By interest here he means a 
liking for or “being drawn to” the beautiful and he still means that the judgment is disinterested insofar as no 
determinate concept is present. For an additional argument in favor of this point, see Paul Guyer’s “Pleasure and 
Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste,” Esssays in Kant’s Aesthetics, pp. 51. 
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In order to examine these points, I shall need to consider Kant’s analysis of beauty in 
nature as well as the way in which he brings content – aesthetic ideas – into his discussion. 
Notably, during Kant’s analysis of fine art, he explains that the highest form of aesthetic 
experience is one in which content is introduced. Thus, my analysis of Kant’s examination of 
beauty will comprise two sections: This present section will focus primarily on beauty in nature 
and the following section will involve a discussion of beauty in art. 
I shall begin this present section by discussing the way in which a judgment of taste is 
distinguished from both a judgment of the agreeable and a moral judgment. Then I will be 
prepared to analyze Kant’s argument that beauty is a symbol of the morally good (59:353). That 
analysis will comprise a discussion of both the deduction of the objectivity of taste and our right 
to impute the judgment of taste to others. After I have done this – that is, after I have shown how 
it is that experiences of beauty “arouse sensations in us that are somehow analogous to the 
consciousness we have in a mental state produced by moral judgments” (354) – I will be ready to 
discuss the way in which taste teaches us “to make the transition from sensible charm to habitual 
moral interest” (354). With this strategy in mind, I turn to a discussion of what sets the judgment 
of taste apart from other judgments. 
Kant argues that an experience of beauty involves a feeling of pleasure, and this feeling is 
made possible by the judgment of taste, which is devoid of any interest in the object. The 
following passage is suggestive of why the judgment of taste is wholly disinterested and 
necessarily impartial: 
If the question is whether something is beautiful, what we want to know is 
not whether we or anyone cares, or so much as might care, in any way, 
about the thing’s existence, but rather how we judge it in our mere 




In other words, while I might make a judgment of taste about an object that I relate to 
through interest (perhaps I own a beautiful horse), and while it is also the case that a judgment of 
taste gives rise to interest (at a minimum, I wish to preserve any object that I take to be 
beautiful), no mere interest grounds the judgment of taste itself. In judging something as 
beautiful, we must judge it via a mere, disinterested contemplation.
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 Indeed, Kant argues that “if 
a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial and not a pure 
judgment of taste” (2:205). Hence, the judgment of taste must be distinguished from the 
judgment of the agreeable, which “expresses an interest in [its] object;” an interest that involves 
a desire for that object. When I find something agreeable, this “presupposes something other than 
my mere judgment about the object: it presupposes that I have referred the existence of the object 
to my state insofar as that state is affected by such an object” (my italics). For example, when I 
have an appetite, I am interested in food. I call the food agreeable because it gratifies me. 
However, if a person has a liking of this sort, this does not prove that she is “selecting by taste.” 
We cannot be interested in the beautiful in the way that we are interested in gratification (5:210). 
Accordingly, if someone were to remark, ‘This object (e.g. the Eiffel tower, the iris, or the poem) 
is beautiful for me,’ she would not be making a judgment of taste, since a person cannot call 
something beautiful if it only means that she likes it.
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 When I make a judgment of the agreeable, 
or when I refer a judgment to my state insofar as the object affects me, this kind of judgment 
                                                             
60 The judgment of taste is, thus, a peculiar one. Though it is a reflective judgment, which I discuss below, it can be 
categorized – with moral judgments and determinate judgments – in a class of judgments that give rise to interest 
and that we relate to through interest. Yet, the judgment of taste is a disinterested one. Other judgments in this class, 
as it were, all require determinate concepts, but the judgment of taste is devoid of one. 
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 At Section 3:206, Kant argues that there is a problem with a subjective view of moral and aesthetic value. I refer 
to the view that holds that something is moral or beautiful only insofar as a subject’s expression that something is 
moral or beautiful accurately represents the attitude of the subject. That is to say that something can be beautiful for 
me and, at the same time, ugly for you since value is allegedly dependent upon what each particular person feels, and 
no one can be right or wrong about it, according to an objective standard. In Kant’s view, the problem with this view 
is in its conception of pleasure at base.  
73 
 
produces an inclination, and it involves gratification. Any judgment that involves these elements 
cannot be a judgment of taste (2:204, 205 & 3:206, 207).  
The judgment of taste is also quite distinct from the moral judgment. For Kant, the good 
is something that we like through its concept; it always involves the concept of a purpose.
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Hence, we have a liking for the existence of an object or action in the moral case, which means 
that we have an interest of some kind in it. The good contains an interest of some sort because, in 
order to consider something good, I must have a determinate concept of it. That is, I must know 
what sort of thing the object is meant to be. However, I do not need a determinate concept or any 
knowledge of what sort of thing an object is meant to be in order to judge it as beautiful. In order 
to see this point, it is helpful to consider what Kant means by a “reflective judgment.” 
Liking for the beautiful depends on reflection
63
 regarding an object. For Kant, a reflective 
judgment is one for which “no objectively valid, predetermined universal is available and 
judgment must reflect over the situation seeking to discover a hypothesis for the situation” (Intro. 
IV, 180).  However, this reflection leads not to a determinate concept, but to an indeterminate 
one (4:207).
64
 Thus, since the liking for the beautiful rests on an indeterminate concept (not 
sensation) it is not a judgment of the agreeable. A judgment of the agreeable involves interest via 
gratification whereby one’s state is affected by the object and the desire that it arouses. 
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 A purpose, for Kant, is the “object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause (the real 
basis of is possibility); and the causality that a concept has with regard to its object is 
purposiveness…Consciousness of a presentation’s causality directed at the subject’s state so as to keep him in a 
state, may here designate generally what we call pleasure.” (10:220). The moral judgment has a purpose, and is not 
devoid of a concept, whereas the aesthetic judgment is devoid of a concept (purpose) but it involves purposiveness: 
consciousness of a presentation that is directed at one’s state so as to give her a certain kind of pleasure. 
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 Meerbote puts it this way “To call pure judgments of taste reflective is to say of them that they consist of the 
result of reflection (without reference to determined concepts) and that they are acts of reflecting in the sense in 
which to be reflecting is to be holding together and to be comparing representations either with one another or with 
one’s cognitive capacities.” See “Reflection on Beauty,” Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, pp. 71. 
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 I will say more about this indeterminate concept below.  
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Furthermore, since the liking for the beautiful rests on an indeterminate concept and not a 
determinate one, it does not involve interest in terms of purpose like the moral judgment does.
65
 
 Hence, the judgment of taste is not grounded in interest as a gratification of some desire, 
nor is it directed to concepts. It arises as a result of our detecting something; that is to say, what 
we detect does not simply occur within us, rather, we must notice it; it must be an object of 
conscious attention.
66
 What is detected in the beautiful object and, hence, gives rise to the feeling 
of pleasure is purposive appropriateness.
67
  
A pure judgment of taste is disinterested and free. It is not an object of inclination or one 
that a law of reason enjoins on us as an object of desire (5:210). Thus, it is not at all obvious 
what grounds the feeling of pleasure (16:229). This feeling of purposive just-rightness is not 
analyzable in terms of anything about the properties of the object of which we are aware (Intro 
VII, 189). Kant’s claim is that its ground must lie in some fact about the subject of this 
awareness, in particular in some fact about the cognitive apparatus of the person who has this 
experience. What is detected is a purposive harmony in the way in which this experience leads 
these powers to function in relation to one another (9:217).  
The two powers that attain this harmonious relationship are the imagination and the 
understanding. When the imagination and understanding function together for cognitive rather 
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 See 3:206 – 4:209 for more discussion on this. 
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 Interestingly, Kant argues that “the frame of mind needed to admire divine greatness…requires that we be attuned 
to quiet contemplation and that our judgment be completely free” (263). 
67
 This feeling of “purposive appropriateness” might be explained this way: “If we look at a flower, say a rose, we 
may have the feeling that it is, as we say, just right; we may have the feeling that its form embodies or fulfills a 
purpose. At the same time we do not represent to ourselves any purpose which is achieved in the rose. It is not 
merely that if someone asked us what purpose was embodied in the rose we should be able to give any clear account 
of it: we do not conceive or represent to ourselves any purpose at all. And yet in some sense we feel, without 
concepts, that a purpose is embodied in the flower…There is a sense of meaning; but there is no conceptual 
representation of what is meant. There is an awareness or consciousness of finality; but there is no concept of an end 
which is achieved.” See Copleston’s A history of philosophy: the enlightenment Voltaire to Kant, Volume 6, 
pp. 360–361.  
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than aesthetic purposes, the imagination is the mediator which enables us to bring an experienced 
particular under the appropriate concept (9:218). For Kant, in order for a theoretical cognition to 
occur – as we know from the first Critique – the empirical manifold must by synthesized by 
imagination in conformity with the concepts of the understanding. In the case of a practical 
cognition – as we know from the second Critique – the purposes of the will must conform to the 
ideas or normative principles of practical reason. Both theoretical and practical cognition 
designate purposeful relationships of representations to certain standards of objectivity through 
determinate judgment. In the case of the aesthetic judgment, the aesthetic object is intelligible 
but not cognized, so the conditions for intelligibility must be satisfied even though an actual 
cognition (theoretic or practical) does not ground the judgment. Although I cognize an object as 
a thing of a certain sort (e.g., a horse) that could play a role in my practical life, such cognition 
does not ground my judgment that the horse is beautiful; it does not ground my judgment of 
taste. In the case of a judgment of taste, the conditions for intelligibility are satisfied when the 
faculties are in free play and the representation is not referred to a pre-established criterion of 
objectivity, but rather to the experiencing subject and her feeling of pleasure. 
What makes the aesthetic judgment unique is the absence of any determinate concept 
present to the understanding (Intro. VII, 190, 191, 6:212, 8:214).
68
 When beauty is experienced, 
the imagination is confronted with something felt to be purposively just right, but the 
understanding has no concept of any sort of entity of which this particular now being 
experienced may be considered an exemplar. The imagination is free in the sense that it is not 
constrained by any prior conceptual boundaries. Here, the faculties are able to harmonize without 
the application of a determinate concept. This results from what Kant calls the “free play” of the 
                                                             
68
 “If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, we lose all presentation of beauty.” (See 8:216) 
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imagination and understanding (9:218). By this he means that the interplay between the faculties 
is a state that would normally lead to the application of a determinate concept of the object, 
which is the subjective condition for objective cognition, as I explain below. However, in the 
aesthetic case, no determinate concept is available.
69
 The aesthetic judgment is a disinterested 
reflective judgment about the form of something in nature that gives a person a contemplative 
feeling of pleasure. The pleasure is associated with consciousness of the form’s harmonization 
with the cognitive relations between the faculties (9:219).
70
  
In his first Critique, Kant showed that the relationship between the cognitive faculties is 
one in which the imagination is the mediator which enables us to bring an experienced particular 
under the appropriate concept. This relationship between the imagination and understanding is a 
necessary condition for the cognition of an object, and the required harmony of the faculties is a 
subjective condition for the power of judgment in general. In other words, the harmonious 
relationship between the faculties that takes place during a judgment is the subjective condition 
for objective cognition.  
Although no determinate concept is reached by the imagination during a judgment of 
taste, it still involves this harmony.
71
 The judgment of taste, then, feels objective because it 
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 Dieter Henrich interprets “free play” as follows: Since we must be able to make a judgment of taste “without 
having a description of the object at our disposal,” this ability “is readily explained in terms of a cognitive process 
that precedes the process of concept formation in principle, although it is compatible with it.” Dieter Henrich, 
“Kant’s Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment,” Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in 
Kant (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pg. 38. Paul Guyer puts it this way: “The harmony of the faculties 
is a state in which, somehow, a manifold of intuition is run through and held together as a unity by the imagination 
without the use of a concept.” See Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2
nd
 ed. pg. 76 
70
 Kant is not clear about the role that pleasure plays in experiences of beauty; there are various explanations that 
might account for it. However, this is not something that I need to deal with for the purposes of this dissertation. The 
point that is important to my work here is that the experience is indeed associated with a pleasure. 
71
 Again, in general, the understanding proceeds from intuition to concepts. Since there is no concept present in the 
judgment of taste, this judgment must consist in the subsumption of the very imagination under a met condition. The 
imagination is free insofar as it schematizes without a concept. The judgment of taste rests on the feeling of 
harmony which allows us to judge by the purposiveness of the presentation as it furthers the free play. Therefore, as 
a subjective power (a power in the subject), the judgment of taste contains an extraordinary principle of 
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mimics the harmony that takes place when the imagination is in fact able to employ a 
determinate concept (Intro.VII, 191). Thus, the faculties still carry out the formal roles they play 
in making a judgment, and the judgment of taste still contains the subjective condition, which is 
the harmony of the faculties.  
If the condition for the possibility and knowledge of experience (objective cognition) is 
justified,
72
 so is the necessary condition for the possibility of cognition.
73
 The objectivity of the 
judgment of taste is grounded in the subjective condition for objective cognition because during 
an aesthetic experience the harmony of the faculties that takes place is isomorphic with the 
epistemic relation that must be achieved in the theoretical determination of a given object as it is 
subsumed under a prior concept (35:287). Thus, the objectivity and universality of the aesthetic 
judgment is parasitic on the objectivity and universality of theoretical cognition which Kant 
established in the transcendental deduction of the first Critique. Hence, there is a certain analogy 
here between aesthetic and theoretic judgment. Since Kant is able to draw this analogy between 
aesthetic and theoretical judgment, he argues that like the theoretical judgment, the judgment of 
taste is intersubjectively valid. 
 A second crucial feature of aesthetic judgment is the right to impute it to others. This 
means that “the judgment of taste asserts that we are justified in presupposing universally in all 
people the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves” 
(38:290).  This imputation of the judgment of taste is analogous to the moral imputation of what 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
subsumption. By this I mean that it subsumes the power of the intuitions – imagination – under the understanding 
insofar as the imagination’s freedom harmonizes with the understanding’s lawfulness.  
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 Kant assumes that the transcendental deduction in his first critique is sound, and that the objective validity of the 
categories is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. In this way, the deduction of the objectivity of 
taste is parasitic on the first Critique. 




is required for moral action in the second Critique (7:213). During a moral judgment, the 
practical freedom of the will (autonomy) is the agreement that the will reaches when it accords 
with the Categorical Imperative.
74
 During an aesthetic judgment, the freedom of the imagination 
comes to harmonize with the understanding even though the understanding does not imply a 
determinate concept. The judgment of the beautiful is valid for everyone but devoid of a 
determinate concept and, in addition to its analogy with theoretic judgment, Kant argues that it 
will be analogous to the moral judgment in that it is also necessarily universal. The difference is 
that the moral judgment employs determinate (not reflective) judgment, and is knowable by a 
universal concept.  
That the imagination and understanding have a certain sort of relation to one another is a 
fact about how the human cognitive apparatus functions. It is not merely a fact about how some 
persons happen to feel or think (7:212); rather, it is the ground of the universality that we claim 
in putting forward a judgment of taste (6:211). When we make a moral judgment the relationship 
between our cognitive faculties is analogous with their relationship when we make an aesthetic 
judgment. For Kant, if there is nothing about me – no interest or attitude toward the existence of 
the object on my part – that makes me judge the object beautiful, I am justified in demanding 
that the object be universally recognized as beautiful. He argues that we all have a common 
sense of taste, which makes such a judgment universally communicable (7:213). Thus, there is 
nothing about such a judgment that individualizes it with respect to one particular person. It is 
not the pleasure, but the universal validity of the pleasure that can be attributed to others.
75
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 Here, we bring a particular maxim under the law of a universal. The Categorical Imperative says: “Act in such a 
way that the maxim of your will [could] always hold at the same time as a principle laying down universal law” 
(Critique of Practical Reason, §7 5:30).  
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What is assumed here is that anyone who possesses a properly functioning cognitive 
apparatus will have this relationship between her faculties when she experiences something 
beautiful. The beautiful object is attuned to everyone’s common cognitive capacity. Thus, we are 
entitled – in the same way in which we are entitled to demand universality in the case of a moral 
judgment – to demand that everyone judge a beautiful object the same way we do.  
However, the key to understanding the analogous relationship between the judgment of 
taste and the moral judgment is that, while there is no determinate concept present in aesthetic 
experience, an indeterminate concept,
76
 as it were, is presented.
77
 This point requires some 
clarification:  First, as I have shown, beauty is experienced when a natural object’s form is 
purposive for the subject’s faculty of judging. When the cognitive relations (the formal 
conditions for theoretic cognition) are satisfied, yet no determinate concept is present, it seems as 
if beautiful objects in nature are attuned to our subjective cognitive capacity.
78
As I apprehend the 
beauty in a natural object, and the imagination and understanding are in harmony, I take the 
object to be fitted to me. I think of nature’s subjective purposiveness. That is, I apprehend an 
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 Interestingly, in the Analytic, Kant argues that no determinate concept is present during the judgment of taste. 
Yet, in the Dialectic he argues that an indeterminate concept is indeed present during such a judgment. It might seem 
here that Kant is reconsidering the problem of the judgment of taste and is offering a different solution to it, namely, 
one that involves an indeterminate concept. However, this is not the case. Instead, in the Dialectic, Kant is going a 
step beyond what he did in the Analytic: Kant wants to show in the Dialectic that an apparent contradiction arises 
from the following two propositions that are maintained in the Analytic: (1) We demand that a true judgment of taste 
be universally shared by others and (2) we demand that no proof can be or should be provided to determine the way 
in which we judge beauty (56:339). So, Kant reaches the following thesis in order to solve this conflict: “A 
judgment of taste is indeed based on a concept, but on an indeterminate one (namely that of the supersensible 
substrate of appearance.)”
 
In other words, although the judgment of taste is devoid of a determinant concept (as was 
shown in the Analytic), Kant argues in the Dialectic that there is in fact an indeterminate concept presented in 
aesthetic experience (57:341).  
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 This concept of the supersensible will be presented in both experiences of the sublime, and experiences of beauty. 
In the case of the beautiful it is an indeterminate concept of the understanding, whereas in the case of the sublime it 
is an indeterminate concept of reason. 
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 Hannah Ginsborg argues that during an experience of beauty “I take my imaginative activity in the perception of 
the object to be as it ought to be in the primitive sense, which means that I have no conception of how it ought to be 
except that afforded by the example of my activity itself: namely, the indeterminate conception that it ought to be 
this way.” See “Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of the Imagination and Understanding,” 
Philosophical Topics, 1997, pg. 70 
80 
 
aesthetic object as though it were designed to fit my faculties, purposive for the conditions of 
cognition. Kant puts it this way: “Only where the imagination is free and the understanding puts 
the imagination into a play does the presentation communicate itself as the inner feeling of a 
purposive state of mind” (40:296). As a result of this, I am drawn to an indeterminate concept. 
Kant wants to show that this indeterminate concept is one that no intuition can determine 
(57:340), and that it is the concept of the supersensible that was specified in the second Critique 
as the concept of freedom. This means that the same concept that is associated with a moral 
judgment (the concept of freedom) is associated with the judgment of taste. Hence, when I am 
engaged with a beautiful object, I am engaged with freedom.  
The upshot is that when we experience beauty, the presented form is purposive for our 
faculties, and this just is the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding under 
which objects of nature are subsumed (57:340). Thus, the purposiveness of an object in intuition 
can, in fact, conform to the concept of nature without a determinate concept, and nature is 
thereby seen as a product of freedom. It is this purposiveness that is the ground for imputation. 
The right to impute the application of the aesthetic judgment to others is grounded in the 
recognition that the aesthetic object must be apprehended as though it were a rational object 
produced through freedom (58:347), i.e. as if it were designed to fit our cognitive faculties, 
purposive for the conditions of cognition.
79
  
The imagination’s free, yet harmonious accord with the understanding’s lawfulness 
during the judgment of taste symbolizes practical reason, which is capable of nothing other than 
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 The judgment of taste will involve purposiveness without a purpose – it is purposive, but there is no determinate 
concept (10:220, 17:236).  Again, a purpose is the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the 
object’s cause (the real basis of is possibility), and the causality that a concept has with regard to its object is 
purposiveness. When we are conscious of the presentation’s causality as directed at us as subjects, we feel pleasure. 
So, the aesthetic judgment involves consciousness of a presentation that is directed at one’s state so as to give her a 
certain kind of pleasure, but this necessarily is a case in which no determinate concept (purpose) is present (10:220). 
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acts in accordance with the moral law and hence is truly free. In this way, moral considerations 
are – via the symbolic relationship – involved in the phenomenon of free play. Thus, the analogy 
between beauty and morality occurs, beauty becomes symbolic of the good,
80
 and it is this that 
justifies its imputation to others (59:353). We have seen, then, that in order to understand what 
makes the judgment of taste possible, one must understand its connection with morality.  
Thus, we have seen why Kant famously states at section 59:353 that “the beautiful is the 
symbol of the morally good; and only because we refer the beautiful to the morally good (we all 
do so naturally and require all others also to do so, as a duty) does our liking for it include a 
claim to everyone else’s assent.” Yet, how is it that “the mind is also conscious of being 
ennobled by this reference above a mere receptivity for pleasure derived from sense 
impressions” (59:353)?  
First of all, the beautiful provides us with a hint of freedom – it is not an object of 
inclination or one that a law of reason enjoins on us as an object of desire. Freedom, as will 
become even clearer in my discussion of fine art, is an especially important idea in the general 
connection between the beautiful and the moral. The free play of the imagination in its 
relationship with the understanding during a judgment of taste points (via the symbolic 
relationship with moral judgment) to the fact that freedom – something that moral action requires 
– is a reality for us as rational beings. When the imagination freely accords with the lawfulness 
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 The recognition of a representation as a symbol works by analogy. If I want to use an image of an eagle to 
symbolize courage, it is a symbol because the relation between the eagle and other animals is analogous to the 
relation between a virtuous character and other states of mind. Our experience of an aesthetic object is analogous to 
our experience of a sensible object of knowledge in virtue of the fact that the relations between the faculties during 
each kind of judgment are analogous. Additionally, our experience of an aesthetic object is analogous to being a 
product of freedom because the relations between the faculties during a moral judgment are analogous to the 
relations between the faculties during a judgment of taste. The analogy between beauty and morality does not rest 
on any similarity among the relevant terms. Rather, the analogy can be drawn in virtue of the analogous relations 
between the two sets of relevant terms. 
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of the understanding, this symbolizes (and hints at the practical possibility of) action in 
accordance with the moral law. Beauty, in this sense, “ennobles us above” our inclinations that 
demand something other than that toward which the moral law directs us. 
 Since one can only make a judgment of taste when she is not seized by inclination and 
appetite (28:261), and since a judgment of taste is necessarily devoid of any kind of interest, the 
judgment of taste puts us in a particular kind of state that is distinct from the state by which we 
make a judgment of the agreeable (5:210). The judgment of taste thereby shows us something 
beyond our pursuit of gratification (3:206), and it teaches us to pay attention to something even 
though it is not a means to our own contingent ends. Since beauty brings with it a specific kind 
of pleasure, and since it gives rise to a desire to preserve the beautiful object, it teaches us to love 
something, but to love it for a reason other than that it might gratify us or satisfy our desires.  
For example, while looking out my window at the Kansas sunset and making a judgment 
of taste, I am drawn away from my usual concerns. My attention is directed away from myself, 
and after the experience, I am prompted to wonder why, earlier, I had been thinking about the 
possibility of taking a nap, whether or not I had cleaned my apartment or gotten enough exercise 
that day, or even whether or not I had a satisfying lunch. The experience of beauty draws a 
person away from such things and shows her that there is something higher and other than her 
usual concerns. It can put a person in a state such that she is able to quickly identify what is 
merely hers in her own point of view. After this kind of experience, I am drawn to shift my 
general focus away from my contingent interests, and toward – at the very least – the notion that 
there is in fact a reality that is other than the means of or impediments to the satisfaction of my 
interests. Experiences of beauty facilitate a transition from “sensible charm” to “habitual moral 
interest” because they arouse in us something analogous to the mental state produced by moral 
83 
 
judgments. In this sense, it involves a kind of moral preparation. Experiences of beauty are 
thereby impetuses to our looking toward our moral vocation rather than our personal concerns. 
Kant writes: 
We admire nature, which in its beautiful products displays itself as art, not 
merely as chance but, as it were, intentionally in terms of a lawful 
arrangement and as a purposiveness without a purpose; and since we do not 
find this purpose anywhere outside us, we naturally look for it in ourselves, 
namely, in what constitutes the ultimate purpose of our existence: our moral 
vocation (42:301). 
  Beauty gives us a hint that what we value is realizable; it gives us a hint that we are free 
and that this is a world that answers our concerns as rational beings. As I will discuss further in 
my section on the sublime, Kant recognizes that there is, as it were, a brute fact about humanity: 
reason and the inclinations have a relationship in which one will dominate the other. We are 
sometimes inclined toward mere gratification, and we fail to see that there is something outside 
of such pursuits. Furthermore, our inclinations sometimes tend to draw us toward certain actions 
that do not conform to our duties as moral agents. However, proper moral decision making 
requires the authority of reason over the inclinations and over sensibility. I have shown how 
experiences of beauty are relevant to this context. Yet, they do not go so far as to make a person 
aware of the possibility of reason’s domination of such inclinations. As we will see in a later 
section, experiences of the sublime do just this. Hence, I am arguing that Kant should be 
interpreted to mean that one is put in a state that prepares her to look outside herself (she gains 
attunement to the moral) via an experience of beauty. However, it is via an experience of 
sublimity that one actually has a glimpse of moral feeling, where the inclinations are dominated 
by the power of reason. 
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Before I discuss the sublime, I need to include in my discussion of beauty an analysis of 
Kant’s arguments regarding fine art. Although I have analyzed Kant’s claim that there is an 
analogous relationship between a judgment of beauty in nature and a moral judgment, and his 
claim that an experience of beauty ennobles the mind above the inclinations and sense 
impressions, I have not yet considered the way in which Kant brings content – aesthetic ideas – 
into his discussion. 
 
IV. AESTHETIC IDEAS AND THE POWER OF GENIUS 
In Section 49 of the third Critique, Kant introduces the concept of genius
81
 and its 
relationship with nature because he wants to show that nature is the paradigm case of beauty, and 
that art is only called beautiful if it appears as nature; if fine art is possible, then it must in some 
way be natural. Nature is beautiful if it looks like art, and so it appears as if it were purposively 
designed for our faculties and produced through freedom. Conversely, art – production through a 
power of choice (willkür) that is based in reason  – is beautiful if we are conscious of it as art, 
while at the same time, it looks like nature (43:303, 307). It is, hence, in the context of beautiful 
art that the creative powers of the artist, who is endowed with the powers of genius, and the laws 
of nature come together. In this section, I shall discuss the relationship between genius and 
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 Kant makes what appear to be some cryptic remarks in this section, and according to John Zammitto in The 
Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), §49 was likely added, along 
with the “Analytic of the Sublime,” during the very end of Kant’s composition of the Critique. One of the problems 
that this entails is that it is more difficult to analyze the aesthetic theory as a whole, and it is instead tempting to 
interpret especially this section as fragmented. Consequently, one might think that it reads as though there is a 
tension between the genius (who employs imaginative freedom) and taste. However, Kant’s intent is that genius and 
taste do indeed work together, and in fact depend on one another, as I show below, and this – and the relationship 




nature, as well as the relationship between genius and taste, in order to analyze the way in which 
fine art employs the symbol of morality in the context of expressing aesthetic ideas. 
The genius – the animating principle in the mind
82
 that Kant calls “Geist” – presents a 
beautiful object as if it were produced by nature. Genius involves “a talent for producing 
something for which no determinate rule can be given;” this does not involve a predisposition or 
a learned skill. Genius is something that cannot be taught.
83
 Indeed, the most important property 
of genius is originality (308). Yet, since “nonsense too can be original, the products of genius 
must also be models, i.e., they must be exemplary; hence, though they do not themselves arise 
through imitation, still they must serve…as a standard or rule by which to judge”  (308). Kant 
points to the need for a mechanism in art, suggesting that, without this “the spirit (Geist), which 
in art must be free and which alone animates the work, [i.e., it expresses ideas that make possible 
the universal communication of rational concepts] would have no body at all and would 
evaporate completely.”(43:304, 49:317) It is nature that gives this rule or mechanism. The 
following passage is helpful here: 
Fine art does not permit a judgment about the beauty of its product to be 
derived from any rule whatsoever that has a concept as its determining 
basis, i.e., the judgment must not be based on a concept of the way in which 
the product is possible.
84
 Hence, fine art cannot itself devise the rule by 
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 It is important to note that Geist is not a faculty or power like imagination, understanding, and judgment. Rather, 
it is the “animating principle in the mind” (314); it is the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas.  
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 Bradley Murray in "Kant on Genius and Art", British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007) No.2: 199-214, takes it that 
genius is not required for the creation of beautiful art. He argues that, on Kant’s view, beauty is reducible to form, 
which can actually be imitated with a certain kind of persistence. I disagree, given Kant’s remarks at 308, 318-319, 
as well as my own arguments that the creation of fine art depends on the relationship between genius and nature, 
paired with taste. 
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 The problem of fine art, which I do not have room fully to take up here, involves the question as to how fine art is 
possible on Kant’s view. This problem involves Kant’s claim that a judgment of taste involves purposiveness 
without a purpose. In the context of beauty in art, purposiveness is indeed present (the harmony of the faculties that 
takes place during a judgment of taste is required in the creative process, and this process is purposive) but a kind of 
purpose – intention – is also present. Thus, it is tempting to question whether a judgment of taste can be possible in 
such a context. However, this issue is quickly resolved if one sees that while an artist intends to create his work, he 
does so without any kind of determinate concept of the way in which the product is possible. The artist purposively 
creates his product without knowing how. The artist is able to convey a rational idea – a full manifestation of an idea 
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which it is to bring about its product. Since, however, a product can never 
be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must be nature in the subject 
(and through the attunement of his powers) that gives rule to art; in other 
words, fine art is possible only as the product of genius (307). 
The idea here is that if the judgment were based on a determinate concept of any kind, it 
would not be a judgment of beauty because a judgment of beauty just is one that is devoid of a 
determinate concept. However, since art must agree with certain rules that have to be followed in 
order for it to be what it is intended to be, a standard or mechanism must be involved. The 
standard must be given by nature – the nature in the subject (the genius) – and so the work must 
appear like nature, agreeing with the rule so “punctiliously” that it gives no hint of it (307). 
Fine art must be exemplary, serving as a standard for others to judge, and yet the artist –if 
he has truly created fine art, and has been endowed with genius – will be necessarily unable to 
“describe or indicate scientifically how [he] brings about [his] products” since it is not the artist 
himself, but rather nature via genius that “gives it the rule” (308). The genius does not know how 
he came by the ideas for his art, and he is unable to communicate his procedure to others in such 
a way that they could produce like art. With this in mind, Kant wants to argue that the genius has 
the talent for putting others in touch with the supersensible without knowing how (or being able 
to demonstrate how) he has done so. The genius delivers his presentation by way of symbols and, 
as such, his art is able to represent the supersensible through the aesthetic exhibition of rational 
concepts. This representation of the supersensible can make an experiencing subject aware of her 
ability to act in accordance with rational principles. A look at the following passage will help to 
shed light on what makes this phenomenon possible: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
such as fortitude, integrity, freedom, etc., but since the creative process involves purposiveness without a 
determinate concept (purpose in a determinate sense), due to the relationship between genius and nature, the creation 
can be called fine art. For more on this point, see Henry Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Taste, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) pp. 272. 
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Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty 
king of heaven, and the peacock is an attribute of heaven’s stately queen. 
Through these attributes, unlike through logical attributes, we do not 
present the content of our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, 
but present something different, something that prompts the imagination to 
spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought 
than can be expressed in a concept determined by words (315).  
This passage requires a fair amount of unpacking. First, aesthetic attributes (like the ones 
mentioned above) yield aesthetic ideas. The following is Kant’s definition of an aesthetic idea: 
By an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which 
prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever [no 
determinate concept] can be adequate, so that no language can express it 
completely and allow us to grasp it. It is easy to see that an aesthetic idea is 
the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which is, conversely, a concept 
to which no intuition (presentation of the imagination) can be adequate 
(314). 
 In other words, aesthetic ideas are “inner intuition[s] to which no concept[s] can be 
completely adequate,” which is the opposite of a rational idea (314). They are presentations of 
the imagination that go beyond experience and, hence, “try to approach an exhibition of rational 
concepts (intellectual ideas).”
85
 That is to say, a presentation of the imagination for which no 
concept can be determined gives us a glimpse of an intellectual idea that cannot be grasped 
otherwise. The rational idea itself cannot fully be represented by the imagination, and thus, 
cannot be comprehended.  
While an aesthetic idea is conjoined with a given intellectual concept, it is connected with 
a multitude of partial presentations such that no expression that stands for any determinate 
concept can be found for it. As Kant puts it, there are objects whose concepts are rational ideas 
“and hence cannot be exhibited adequately.” However, the aesthetic attributes of these objects 
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 See 57:342 for Kant’s explanation of ideas and the difference between aesthetic ideas, or “unexpoundable 
presentations of the imagination,” and rational ideas, or “indemonstrable concepts of reason.” 
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are supplementary presentations that are capable of expressing such concepts as well as their 
implications and their “kinship with other concepts.” These aesthetic attributes produce (yield) 
aesthetic ideas (49:315). For example, when a poet describes the “pleasures of a completed 
beautiful summer day, which a serene evening calls to mind,” he can present his rational idea of 
a cosmopolitan attitude. He does this by means of an attribute that the imagination – when it 
remembers the pleasures described – unites with the presentation and thereby arouses in an 
experiencing subject “a multitude of sensations and supplementary presentations for which no 
expression can be found” (315-316). In this way, the poet (the genius) is able to give sensible 
expression (through an aesthetic presentation) to rational ideas, yet he does so in a way that 
exceeds the limits of experience with a completeness that nature cannot exemplify (314).  
The powers of the mind that constitute genius are the imagination and understanding,
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and in this case, since the aim is aesthetic, the imagination is free, so instead of performing its 
usual role in the process of subsumption,
87
 it supplies “in an unstudied way, a wealth of 
undeveloped material for the understanding” (317). Kant states: 
Genius actually consists in the happy relation [between the relevant 
cognitive powers] – one that no science can teach and that cannot be learned 
by any diligence – allowing us, first, to discover [aesthetic] ideas for a given 
concept, and, second, to hit upon a way of expressing these [aesthetic] ideas 
that enables us to communicate to others, as accompanying a concept, the 
mental attunement that those ideas produce (317).  
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 Reason is also involved in the creative process insofar as a rational concept is presented, but the way in which it is 
presented – the animation and aesthetic presentation, which is the role of the genius – really takes place as a result of 
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 The imagination generally uses schematism to connect us to concepts, but is unable to do so in the case of an 
aesthetic experience. Notably, however, while the imagination is involved in subsuming a particular under a 
concept, subsumption itself is the application of a concept, which is a judgment and an act of the understanding. 
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Genius, thus, illuminates a natural ability to freely use one’s cognitive powers. While the 
“process of empirical judgment moves from imagination to understanding to judgment, whereby 
a determinate judgment is made, the process of creativity moves from reason to imagination to 
judgment, whereby the process begins with a rational idea that is later expressed.”
88
 The 
imagination presents various aesthetic attributes of the concept, i.e., presentations that develop 
the concept’s various implications and associations. For instance, Kant points out that the 
rational concept of virtue can be expressed in the following simile: “The sun flowed forth, as 
serenity flowed from virtue.” The concept of virtue has the implication, serenity, which connects 
the two concepts and expands the concept of virtue by adding something to it that is not logically 
contained in the concept itself.  
In the case of visual art, for instance, when one experiences Michelangelo’s David,
89
 the 
subject grasps the possibility of the individual triumphing over the powers of nature. 
Michelangelo, in creating David, captured the steadfast refusal to be dominated by nature, and as 
a result, the rational concept of human fortitude comes to be thought of in terms of this work of 
genius. There is no sensible or determinate concept of human fortitude present, but the artist (via 
genius) has provided us with a way to grasp the concept of human fortitude in an aesthetic way. 
This talent of genius, then, consists in the ability to render a rational concept in such a way that it 
seems to be natural. In this way, the genius, as he has an audience of potential experiencing 
subjects, generates an expression of a rational concept. 
Thus, the principle of genius provides the way for some small part of nature to become 
subject to rules that originate in human reason. This is the way in which nature can act 
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subjectively (within the subject); it is nature that gives rise to genius. So if something constitutes 
fine art, nature acts through the genius who produces the work, and this natural power of genius 
is the source of creativity. What the genius creates, then, is a product of nature. In this way, 
genius takes nature as a model for the creation of fine art. It is nature that provides the material 
for genius and, as I discussed above, it is thereby also nature that gives genius an example for 
rules (497).  
With this in mind, it becomes apparent that the creation of art is the creation of another 
nature – a nature that comprises ideas that exceed the bounds of sense and yet can be captured by 
aesthetic ingenuity. This explains why Kant argues that a work of art is purposive for exhibiting 
a given concept. The artist does not merely imitate nature; rather, she takes nature as a model 
through which she creates another nature out of the material that actual nature provides – a 
nature of aesthetic ideas. This nature exists in virtue of purposive creativity. 
However, this is not possible without taste. Genius is the creative power behind the art, 
while taste is the basis for judging. So, genius, with spirit, exhibits the concept, but this requires 
the capacity of the imagination to provide presentations, and also taste, which is the capacity of 
reflective judgment to select the best presentations from the imagination that will communicate 
the concept in a universal way (49:316).  
It will be helpful to consider Kant’s example of the inexperienced poet (32:282). This 
poet does not subject the presentations of his imagination to judgment, and thus, he is not able to 
create a work of genius; he has failed to create a sensible expression to a rational concept. His 
poetry, while it is purposive for exhibiting a rational idea, is not aimed at expressing the idea 
aesthetically. In other words, while his imagination has come up with presentations of a given 
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concept, he has not engaged in reflective judgment so as to select the best presentations of the 
concept for his audience. That is, he has not selected the presentations that best communicate the 
concept aesthetically. Again, one is reminded of why Kant says that the genius creates another 
nature out of the material that actual nature gives it (314). The genius must create a new nature 
for the concept via an aesthetic expression of it. Unfortunately, this inexperienced poet has failed 
to create another nature. 
The artist must be able to give the product a likeable form, which is the “vehicle for 
communication,” and this requires the ability to judge (taste). He must, as Kant puts it, “override 
the private subjective conditions of his judgment, into which so many others are locked, as it 
were, and reflect on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can determine only 
by transferring himself to the standpoint of others)” (295). It is this that gives a meaningful form 
to the material that genius provides for art. Since the judgment of taste is universally valid, taste 
gives the artist the ability to universally communicate aesthetic ideas, and hence, the ability to 
create for experiencing subjects the highest kind of aesthetic experience. However, without 
genius, taste cannot pass judgment on any material, and the artist who does not possess genius 
has nothing to which to give form. Without taste, on the other hand, genius produces nonsense 
(313). Hence, the two must function together in order for a symbol of the supersensible to be 
produced by fine art. This symbol is akin to ideas of reason, and also to nature because it is a 
representation in our empirical intuition. Thus, aesthetic experience is analogous to an 
experience of a sensible object of knowledge. Furthermore, it is – at the same time – also 
analogous to being a product of freedom through the role of the genius.  
To clarify this point, we have seen above that ideas such as freedom, honor, and integrity 
cannot be instantiated in intuition, but they can be presented symbolically through aesthetic 
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objects. We have already seen, in Section III, that freedom is an especially important idea in the 
general connection between the beautiful and the moral: The existence of natural beauty provides 
us with a hint of freedom even though it doesn’t give us any evidence of it, and our status as 
moral agents depends on the reality of freedom. The idea of freedom
90
 refers to something that is 
transcendent and supersensible, and hence, it can never become cognition; no adequate intuition 
can ever be given for it (57:342). Yet, while freedom itself is otherwise ungraspable, in the 
context of fine art, we are presented with an aesthetic idea of it. Since the aesthetic idea of 
freedom is one among other possible aesthetic ideas that fine art can express, the possibility of 
this expression of the aesthetic idea of freedom is part of the connection between fine art and 
freedom.  
The other link between all fine art (not just the fine art that expresses the aesthetic idea of 
freedom) and freedom lies in the powers of the genius, which is the exemplar “of a subject’s 
natural endowment in the free use of his cognitive powers” (318). As I have shown, the genius 
creates a work that is an expression of his own freedom of imagination and understanding, and 
he gives rise to the free play in the imagination and understanding in his audience. Again, these 
two cognitive powers – imagination and understanding – are indispensable to each other, but 
usually they are combined via constraint. However, in the case of fine art, the imagination and 
understanding must appear to harmonize spontaneously, giving us a certain example of the 
imagination’s free accord with the understanding.  
Poetry, in particular, accomplishes play that provides “food for the understanding and 
gives life to its concepts by means of [the] imagination.” The poet creates “an entertaining play 
with ideas, and yet the understanding gets as much out of this as if he had intended merely to 
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engage in its [own] task” (321).  When we judge fine art as beautiful, we present the freedom of 
the imagination, and hence, of our power of sensibility as harmonizing with the lawfulness of the 
understanding. In a moral judgment we think the freedom of the will as the will’s harmony with 
itself according to universal laws of reason (354).Thus, all fine art represents nature as being 
such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possibility of achieving the 
purposes we are to achieve according to the laws of freedom. 
 In this section, we have seen that freedom is a crucial idea in the context of connecting 
beauty with morality in both natural beauty and fine art. We have also seen Kant introduce 
content in addition to form in his aesthetics, and this content is provided by fine art, which 
employs the symbol of morality in the context of presenting aesthetic ideas. It is only via fine art 
that content (aesthetic ideas) can be expressed via symbolic representation. 
To quickly review, thus far, I have argued that beauty reveals something different from 
(transcending) pleasure and sensible impressions. Furthermore, I have shown that beauty – via 
fine art – is the symbol of morality by expressing aesthetic ideas, and it gives us an experience of 
loving something without interest (29:267). However, as I noted above, the experience of beauty 
does not go so far as to rein in the inclinations toward such pleasures. The sublime, on the other 
hand, is relevant to such a context. 
 
V. SUBLIMITY AND ACHTUNG 
 I have already argued that the free play between the imagination and the understanding 
that takes place during an experience of beauty shows us an example of freedom. It also makes 
us aware of something other than our own point of view. Beauty – as an exhibition of freedom 
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and the transcendence of pleasure and sensibility – is perhaps best described as a symbol of the 
good. My aim in this section is to argue that sublimity, on the other hand, which involves an 




Furthermore, I want to examine the difference between the moral improvement that may 
come from an experience of beauty and the moral improvement that may come from an 
experience of sublimity. Thus, for my purposes here, I shall discuss exactly what happens during 
an experience of the sublime, and exactly what distinguishes it from an experience of beauty. In 
so doing, I shall discuss the symbolic relationship between sublimity and morality. Finally, I 
shall argue that an experience of the sublime – like an experience of beauty – is not only 
instructive for us as knowers, but also has practical import. I want to begin by considering Kant’s 
explanation of sublimity: 
What happens is that our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, 
while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so the 
imagination, our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world 
of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal 
in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power; and what 
is absolutely large is not an object of sense, but is the use that judgment 
makes naturally of certain objects so as to arouse this feeling, and in 
contrast with that use any other use is small (25:250). 
We judge something as sublime when it presents such formlessness or boundlessness that 
it at first appears to violate all purpose. This gives rise to a feeling of pain in the experiencing 
subject due to the incapacity of the imagination to grasp the presented whole, and the overall 
result is a negative pleasure that is associated with respect. That is to say, the imagination strives 
to realize the rational idea. This striving for accord between the aesthetic estimation and the 
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intellectual estimation of reason reveals to us that we should regard as small anything that nature 
may present when it is compared with the ideas of reason. The displeasure brought about by the 
conflict between reason and the imagination allows us to see that we are “aesthetically confined 
within bounds” (27:260), and inadequately equipped for conceiving of the absolute.  
The judgment of the sublime is similar to the judgment of the beautiful in certain ways. 
Both are explications of universally valid aesthetic judging and, as such, refer to subjective 
bases. Both are appreciated for their own sake. Both presuppose that we make a reflective 
judgment rather than a determinate judgment or a judgment of sense, and hence, neither of them 
depends on a sensation or a determinate concept (23:245). Instead, the judgment of sublimity, 
like the judgment of beauty, is associated with an indeterminate concept of the supersensible.
92
  
There are, however, several important distinctions between these two kinds of judgments. 
Sublimity brings about a disharmony or agitation in the mind, rather than the “restful 
contemplation” that arises from an experience of beauty. The liking for the sublime is not a 
liking for the object of sublimity as the liking for the beautiful is a liking for the beautiful object. 
Instead, the liking for the sublime is one for the “expansion of the imagination itself” (25:249).  
Furthermore, any judgment without interest must involve a purposiveness that is 
subjective and yet universally valid. However, since in the sublime (unlike the beautiful) our 
judging is not based on a purposiveness of the form of the object, the purposiveness must be 
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present in the subject (26:253).
93
 Hence, sublimity is in the mind of the judging person, not in the 
natural object the judging of which prompts this mental attunement (26:256). Since the agent is a 
member of the intelligible world as an end in itself, and since the idea of freedom governs the 
actions/ends of the agent, it is the agent (subject) who is purposive in relation to the presentation 
of sublimity. This presentation appears analogous to a rational purpose (end), which causes the 
purposiveness in the subject in relation to it. Kant explains: 
Just as when we judge the beautiful, imagination and understanding give 
rise to a subjective purposiveness of the mental powers by their accordance, 
so do imagination and reason here give rise to such a purposiveness by their 
conflict, namely, to a feeling that we have a pure and independent 
reason…(27:258) 
The feeling of sublimity does not display anything purposive in nature, but rather it is the 
subject’s use of the intuitions of nature that produces in her a feeling of purposiveness. Thus, it is 
an internal state of mind that we can truly call sublime; the sublime “must not be sought in things 
of nature, but must be sought solely in our ideas” (25:249). This is because when we experience 
sublimity, the imagination seeks to harmonize with reason’s ideas, but the sublime resists the 
senses and makes us aware of the magnitude of our power of reason.
94
 Reason and the 
imagination are the same faculties that function in relation to one another during a moral 
judgment, and the relationship between them is the subjective condition for a moral judgment. 
Importantly, the judgment of sublimity is analogous with the moral judgment because the 
cognitive relations between reason and the imagination during a judgment of the sublime are 
analogous to the cognitive relations between reason and the imagination in the practical 
cognition of an object of practical reason.  
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The relationship between the imagination and reason during this an experience of 
sublimity is such that the imagination is inadequate for exhibiting an idea. That is, it proves 
inadequate to its usual role in the process of judgment, and it therefore fails to comply with the 
demands of reason (25:250, 26:256). When the imagination “strains to treat nature as a schema, 
reason exerts a dominance (Gewalt) over sensibility” (29:265).  Although the imagination proves 
its own limits and is left unable to determine an idea, we are left with a feeling of respect 
(Achtung) for our own capacity to strive toward rational ideas.  
Kant draws an analogy between the feeling of sublimity and the moral feeling. When the 
inclinations are confronted with the moral law (in cases in which the moral law directs a person 
to do something other than that toward which the inclinations are drawn) there is a resulting 
feeling of pain. However, at the same time, one has a positive feeling toward the law itself – a 
feeling of respect. Respect (Achtung) for the moral law, the delight at one’s freedom to be moral 
mixed with the pain of frustrated desire, is not a cause or basis but an accompaniment of moral 
judgment. When I experience the sublime I get the same feeling of respect for what I am as a 
rational being; it arouses in me a respect for my own faculty of reason. As I shall argue below, 
this is particularly important since respect is the counterforce to the inclinations.  
At this point, I have given an analysis of what happens during an experience of the 
sublime, and I have shown what distinguishes an experience of sublimity from an experience of 
beauty. Furthermore, I have shown that the sublime reminds us of the practical, and, as such, the 
sublime functions – akin to beauty – as a symbol of morality. We are now ready to examine 
what, I argue, is a surprisingly underappreciated passage: 
In the case of the beautiful, the reference is to subjective bases of sensibility 
as they are purposive for the benefit of contemplative understanding. In the 
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case of the sublime, the reference is to subjective bases as they are 
purposive in relation to moral feeling, namely, against sensibility but at the 
same time, and within the very same subject, for the purposes of practical 
reason. The beautiful prepares us for loving something, even nature, without 
interest; the sublime, for esteeming it even against our interest (of sense). 
(29:267, my italics) 
As I have argued, the beautiful – which involves purposiveness in the object – gives a 
much more comfortable picture of morality, symbolizing the good via a disinterested liking and 
an acquaintance with freedom and independence. The pleasure that we take in the beauty in 
nature “cultivates a certain liberality in our way of thinking, i.e., an independence of the liking 
from mere enjoyment of sense,” but the freedom is presented more as play than as something 
subject to a law (29:269). Yet, as Kant maintains, “not all aesthetic judgments…as such refer to 
the beautiful; but some of them arise from an intellectual feeling and as such refer to the 
sublime”(Intro. VIII, 192, my italics).
95
 The sublime – which, as I have shown, involves 
purposiveness in the subject – presents a picture of the painful struggle that we sometimes 
endure when we act in accordance with our duty. Thus, it is sublimity that best represents moral 
motivation as it exhibits the proper relationship between reason and the inclinations during a 
moral judgment. In light of my arguments below, it will become apparent that sublimity 
genuinely characterizes morality – moral dignity, in particular – through reason’s dominance 
over sensibility (29:269).  
When we behave morally, e.g., when we discipline ourselves, we liberate the will from 
the control of our desires. Kant maintains that “we are conscious of ourselves as obligated by an 
a priori moral law,” which commands us to fulfill our duty even in the case that doing so requires 
a struggle. Specifically, sometimes fulfilling our duty involves a struggle “against circumstances 
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in nature or against our natural inclinations.” We must, however, act only in accordance with 
maxims that can be universalized – not maxims that cater to our inclinations or excuse us from 
our duties. This is a fact of reason, which presupposes that we have a free will in the sense that 
the will can act independently of natural inclinations. It is sometimes permissible to act in 
accordance with our inclinations (i.e., when the moral law does not direct us to do otherwise). 
However, other times we desire to act in accordance with our inclinations even when the moral 
law has directed us to do otherwise. This results from a mistaken supposition that there is 
something more important about ourselves, personally, than moral action. When we realize that 
acting in accordance with our inclinations is forbidden, reason has triumphed over sensibility. 
The inclinations are dominated by reason when we choose to act in accordance with the moral 
law instead of our desires.  
As we have seen, the cognitive relations between reason and the imagination during a 
judgment of the sublime are analogous to the cognitive relations between reason and the 
imagination in the practical cognition of an object of practical reason, when reason dominates the 
inclinations. An experience of the sublime, in particular, gives a person a “flash” of the 
appropriate relationship between reason and the inclinations; it is in this way that sublimity 
symbolizes reason’s dominance over the senses and represents moral motivation.
96
 This flash, as 
I am calling it, acquaints a person with Achtung and as Kant puts it, “it calls forth our strength 
(which does not belong to nature [within us]), to regard as small the objects of our natural 
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concerns” (28:262). In this way, the sublime shows us the authority of reason and our ability to 
act in accordance with the moral law.
97
 Kant states: 
Our imagination, even in its greatest effort to do what is demanded of it and 
comprehend a given object in a whole of intuition (and hence to exhibit an 
idea of reason), proves its own limits and inadequacy, and yet at the same 
time proves its vocation to obey a law, namely, to make itself adequate to 
that idea. Hence, the feeling of the sublime in nature is a respect for our 
own vocation (27:257). 
Through this experience, we see the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive 
powers over any power of sensibility (27:257). An element of fear is present in sublimity, but the 
object which provokes it “[raises] the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle range and [allows] 
us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist…which gives us the courage that we could be a 
match for nature’s seeming omnipotence”(28:261).  Hence, Kant argues that we call something 
sublime because it brings to the forefront our power to regard the objects of our natural concerns 
(our inclinations) as small and comparatively unimportant. We are able to regard nature’s might 
– something that we are subjected to in the case of our natural concerns – as something that 
cannot overcome us (28:262). Hence, in an experience of the sublime, we feel a cognitive 
relation to something greater than sense.  
It is important to notice that an experience of the sublime is not only instructive for us as 
knowers, i.e., an experience of the sublime is not just a way of gaining knowledge about 
morality, or being acquainted with a characterization of it, but it also has practical import – it 
teaches us that we can triumph against the interest of sense. We will encounter instances in 
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practical life that tempt our inclinations and draw us to act in a manner opposite to that which the 
moral law directs. However, since the sublime gives us a flash of the appropriate relationship 
between reason and the senses, after having that experience, we have gained a certain awareness 
of our power of reason and our own moral capacity. We know that it is possible for us to act 
against our interest of sense because we have been shown reason’s authority over the 
inclinations. Indeed, the sublime (because it makes us aware of these possibilities) teaches us to 
respect our capacity of reason, and hence, it teaches us about the possibility of carrying out our 
moral vocation.  
An experience of the sublime provides “an expansion of the mind that feels able to cross 
the barriers of sensibility with a different (a practical) aim.” (26:255) When the formal condition 
of practical cognition and its feeling of Achtung are aesthetically fulfilled (i.e., without moral 
determination) one has the feeling of sublimity. For example, when I look at the thunderstorm, I 
become aware that this phenomenon in nature could destroy me. Yet, the thunderstorm could 
never destroy humanity’s shared capacity for reason. I am made aware of the fact that although 
the thunderstorm seems omnipotent, it is no match for reason’s power. This experience gives rise 
to my recognition that reason and my moral vocation itself is owed a proper amount of respect. I 
learn, through this experience, that reason should never be dominated by my senses or my 
inclinations. Kant wants to show that “this keeps humanity in our person from being degraded” 
and that our natural concerns should not have “such dominance over us, as persons, that we 
should have to bow to [them]” (262). As a result, I am driven to remember, in practical cases, 
that reason always has authority over the inclinations; the inclinations ought not take over in 
cases in which we desire something other than that toward which the moral law directed us. This 
prompts me to respect my capacity to reason and its authority, and to act in accordance with it as 
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opposed to anything else. Therefore, the experience of sublimity – via its representation of the 
moral feeling – gives us, as it were, a revelation about reason, and we are thus carried to apply it 
to the practical. Therefore, I have shown that an experience of the sublime – like an experience 
of beauty – is not only instructive for us as knowers, but it also has practical import. As I noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, Kant sums up the point at 29:271: 
If we judge aesthetically the good that is intellectual and intrinsically 
purposive (the moral good), we must present it not so much as beautiful but 
rather as sublime, so that it will arouse more a feeling of respect (which 
disdains charm) than one of love and familiar affection. For human nature 
does not of itself harmonize with that good; it can be made to harmonize 
with it only through the dominance that reason exerts over sensibility. 
 It is in the context of the sublime, which involves a displeasure that is purposive for 
reason, that we witness reason’s power, and hence, the feeling of Achtung teaches us moral 
dignity. It not only makes us aware of reason’s power, but it teaches us that, in our practical 
lives, that power should be given due respect, and that it should never be defeated by nature.  
In the third Critique, Kant shows us that the experience of sublimity evokes in the mind 
of its experiencing subject a sense of the superiority of her moral destiny. My arguments have 
shown that Kant’s goal of reintroducing the bond between ethics and aesthetics
98
 did not only 
concern the experience of beauty in natural objects, art, genius, and creativity. There is more to 
his conception of the connection between aesthetic experience and the morally good than the 
analogies that can be drawn between judgments of beauty and moral judgments: While Kant’s 
claim in section 59, in a certain sense, constitutes the heart of his thesis in the third Critique, the 
further analogy between the sublime and the moral that he describes in section 29 provides 
additional support for his project by bringing in the notion of purposiveness in the subject. The 
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fact that sublimity occasions this kind of purposiveness represents an experience in the subject – 
not regarding the object – but regarding the subject herself. The aspect of the subject to which 
the experience of sublimity points is in fact the moral dimension of transcendental freedom. 
Though the “Analytic of the Sublime” was a late addition to Kant’s project, it was added in order 
to establish a more substantive connection between aesthetics and ethics than that which beauty 
alone could provide. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that, as a result of the different symbolic relationships that 
the beautiful and the sublime have with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a different 
way, are morally instructive. They can be considered ways of knowing the good, and, as such, 
they influence the practical aspect of our lives. 
I have argued that, for Kant, an experience of beauty is one that is capable of teaching us 
to love something without interest. Beauty gives us a picture of morality, symbolizing the good 
via a disinterested liking and an acquaintance with freedom and independence. The pleasure that 
we take in the beauty in nature cultivates a certain kind of freedom from the merely personal 
inclinations on which we tend to focus. Beauty shows us something unusual and unlike our 
sensible inclinations, and it reminds us of the good.  
Furthermore, I have provided an analysis of Kant’s remarks on the experience of the 
sublime. I argued that during an experience of sublimity, the imagination reveals to us the 
presence of our power to overcome the inclinations and act in accordance with freedom. Through 
experiences of sublimity we witness reason’s power, and hence, the feeling of Achtung teaches 
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us moral dignity. It not only makes us aware of the power that we have through our own capacity 
to reason, but it teaches us that, in our practical lives, that power should be given due respect, 
and that it should never be defeated by nature. I have shown that experiences of sublimity have 
the capacity to keep our power of reason from being degraded. The experience of sublimity – via 
its representation of the moral feeling – gives us, as it were, a revelation about reason, and we are 
carried to apply it to the practical. Thus, I have argued that, for Kant, there are two kinds of 
aesthetic experience, and each one is morally instructive: (1) the experience of beauty is 
especially capable of teaching us to love something without interest. (2) On the other hand, an 
experience of the sublime best captures what Kant calls ‘moral feeling,’ and it teaches us to 
“esteem something even against our interest” (29:267).  
As I argued in Chapter I, Plato also distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic 
experience (experiences of beauty via art and erotic experiences of beautiful people), which are 
both, in different ways, morally instructive. The moral improvement that, on Kant’s view, results 
from an experience of beauty is akin to the experience of beauty via art that Plato describes in the 
Republic. In Kant’s view, when I experience beauty, my attention is directed away from myself, 
and it draws me away from my daily routine. The experience suggests to me that there is 
something higher and other than my usual concerns. An experience of beauty can put a person in 
a state such that she is able to quickly identify what is merely hers in her own point of view. 
After this kind of experience, I am drawn to shift my general focus away from my contingent 
interests, and toward – at the very least – the notion that there is in fact a reality that is other than 
the means of or impediments to the satisfaction of my interests. Experiences of beauty facilitate a 
transition from “sensible charm” to “habitual moral interest” because they arouse in us 
something analogous to the mental state produced by moral judgments. In this sense, 
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experiencing beauty involves a kind of moral preparation. Such experiences are thereby 
impetuses to our looking toward our moral vocation rather than our personal concerns. Thus, one 
is put in a state that prepares her to look outside herself (she gains attunement to the moral) via 
an experience of beauty. 
In Plato’s view, an experience of beauty via art not only gives one an attunement to the 
moral, but it aids in training her to be moral. In Plato’s discussion of art and morality in the 
Republic we see that it is the perception-based nature of music and poetry that gives them an 
important role in training the soul to become good. The sort of experience of beauty via art that 
is described in the Republic as a part of proper education involves a training of character and 
one’s desires, but it does not give rise to understanding the nature of the good in the way that the 
erotic experience of a beautiful person does.  
Although Kant does not discuss eros or erotic experience of a beautiful person in his 
aesthetics, the moral improvement that results from an experience of Kantian sublimity is akin to 
the sort of reformation that occurs as a result of an erotic experience of a beautiful person in 
Plato’s aesthetics. Experiences of the Kantian sublime may take a person one step further than 
experiences of beauty are able to do because sublimity has the capacity to make a person aware 
of the possibility of reason’s domination of the inclinations. Via an experience of the Kantian 
sublime, one actually has a glimpse of moral feeling, where the inclinations are dominated by the 
power of reason. This kind of experience, in particular, gives a person a “flash” of the 
appropriate relationship between reason and the inclinations; it is in this way that sublimity 
symbolizes reason’s dominance over the senses and represents moral motivation. Thus, the 
sublime shows us the authority of reason and our ability to act in accordance with the moral law.  
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This is similar to the kind of moral transformation that occurs as the result of an erotic 
experience of a beautiful person in Plato’s Symposium and Pheadrus. Both the Kantian sublime 
and Plato’s erotic experience of beauty command our attention through a kind of emotionally 
gripping presentation. The Kantian sublime makes us feel fear and pleasure together, and, above 
all, respect. Plato’s description of the way in which the charioteer apprehends the boy in the 
Phaedrus is not far from this. The charioteer is struck with awe, so much so that he is able to pull 
the black horse under control. This experience facilitates a change that is produced in the person, 
and a cognitive grasp of true value. The soul is prompted to recall the form of Beauty, and the 
description of this experience is akin to the sort of experience that takes place in the context of 
the love of beauty that Plato describes in the Symposium. As we have seen, in the Symposium, 
Plato maintains that an erotic experience of a beautiful person may prompt a person to love the 
form of Beauty and then the form of the Good. Ultimately, in the best case scenario, the person 
who goes through such an experience emerges as a philosopher, and achieves knowledge of the 
Forms and then of the Good itself. 
Thus, in Plato’s discussion of art in the Republic and in Kant’s general discussion of 
beauty, we see a connection between beauty and the moral. Moreover, we are able to see a 
connection regarding the moral progress that may occur as the result of erotic experiences of 
beautiful people in the Symposium and Phaedrus and the moral progress that may occur as a 
result of an experience of the Kantian sublime. As I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, Iris Murdoch 
brings these dimensions of Plato and Kant together in her theory that aesthetic experiences 
facilitate what she calls ‘unselfing,’ and, hence, becoming good.  
However, before I move on to Chapter 3, I note seven important differences between the 
aesthetic theories of Plato and Kant. (1) The good – either the moral attitude, according to Kant 
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or the Good itself, according to Plato – is understood differently on each view. That is to say, the 
Kantian moral attitude is something within a person, whereas the Platonic Form of the Good is 
metaphysically distinct from a person. In connection with this, for Plato, Beauty exists as a 
Form, independent of human feelings and thoughts. For Kant, beauty is universal and objective, 
but it is defined by a process that takes place within the experiencing subject. (2) For Plato, 
beauty in art is a method of moral training and erotic experiences of beautiful people promote a 
different kind of moral progress. On the other hand, for Kant, all beauty symbolizes the good due 
to the analogy between the formal process that takes place among the cognitive faculties when a 
person makes a moral judgment and the formal process that takes place when a person makes a 
judgment of beauty. This analogy does make possible the attunement to the moral that results 
from a Kantian experience of beauty, but Kant does not specifically discuss any method of moral 
education based on a relationship between beauty and moral training. (3) Plato does not discuss 
the sublime; instead, his discussion of erotic experiences of beauty encompasses the other 
element in his aesthetics that exists in addition to experiences of beauty via art. (4) Kant does not 
discuss eros; in his view, experiencing an attractive person does not even count as an experience 
of beauty because it involves interest, and a judgment of taste must be devoid of all interest. (5) 
While both philosophers suggest that a kind of alteration takes place in the subject when she 
experiences something aesthetic, the alteration that Plato describes is a more permanent one than 
the alteration that Kant describes; for Plato, one’s character may be permanently altered through 
aesthetic experience, whereas for Kant aesthetic experience temporarily alters a certain cognitive 
process. (6) For Kant, beauty turns a person’s attention to something other than her personal 
inclinations, and the sublime actually brings us to carry out the revelation in the practical 
context. For Plato, erotic experiences of beauty draw us “outside of ourselves,” but he does not 
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indicate the possibility of this sort of reformation when it comes to experiences of beauty via art. 
(7) For Plato, content is always present in aesthetic experience – no matter whether one has an 
experience of beauty via art or an erotic experience of beauty, one is put in touch with the 
content of the Good. As I have shown, Plato argues that good content can manifest itself in a 
person’s response to beauty. In other words, for Plato, aesthetic experience is not merely about 
the form of an aesthetic object; rather it also involves a grasping of a certain kind of content. 
Music and poetry can express the content of the good, and as a result of the experience of beauty 
via art a person is able to absorb the good content that is potentially expressed by it, and act 
accordingly. Kant also introduces content in his aesthetics, but only in the context of fine art, 
which employs the symbol of morality through a presentation of aesthetic ideas. Fine art 
expresses aesthetic ideas (content) through symbolic representation. As I have previously 
discussed, Kant maintains that the artist has the capacity to present a rational idea through an 
aesthetic exhibition, and it is the power of aesthetic presentation that makes possible the 









AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, MORAL VISION, AND ‘UNSELFING’ IN 
IRIS MURDOCH 
 
Part I: The Murdochian Moral Pilgrimage 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of her writing career, Iris Murdoch lays out an interesting moral theory. 
A fundamental notion in this theory is that of moral progress. In this section I am going to 
attempt to analyze that notion. The main works that I shall focus on, in particular, are 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and The Sovereignty of Good. One of the metaphors that 
Murdoch uses as she argues for her view in both of these texts is that of a moral pilgrim: 
Life is a spiritual pilgrimage inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth, 
involving ipso facto a purification of energy and desire in the light of a 
vision of what is good. The good and best life is thus a process of 
clarification, a movement toward selfless lucidity, guided by ideas of 
perfection which are all objects of love (MGM, 14). 
This passage is filled with rich concepts, and in the course of this chapter I will have the 
occasion to discuss most of them. In the interest of setting the reader up for a more detailed 
discussion of the concepts above, I shall begin with some more general considerations in this 
introduction, and then, in the next three sections, I shall move to a more specific analysis of 
Murdoch’s view. I shall first focus on selfishness, love, and the Murdochian moral pilgrimage. 
Generally, Murdoch refers to a pilgrimage because the moral life, in her view, is a matter of 
progress. As I discuss at length in a later section, moral perfection is an important part of 
understanding the moral pilgrimage because it is, in a certain way, its goal. For Murdoch, moral 
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perfection is infinite; it is a task that we never fully complete. The point of the moral life is 
endlessly engaging in this process, which involves a freeing from one’s natural selfishness and 
an approaching of something other than oneself. As will become clear throughout the course of 
this chapter, Murdoch wants to emphasize that if we focus on really seeing – on getting our 
perceptions correct – the right actions will follow. Interestingly, moral activity does not happen 
when a person makes a choice; rather it is something that occurs in between choices. It involves 
a vision, whereby one is able to accurately see other people, and hence, act morally toward them.  
Murdoch roots the spiritual pilgrimage in two different things, namely, what she refers to 
as an updated doctrine of original sin, and a kind of Platonic transition from appearances to 
reality. I shall discuss all of these points in detail in what follows. With this in mind, I am going 
to structure my account of Murdochian moral progress in terms of what it means to be a moral 
pilgrim. Before I begin, I need to make two points of clarification regarding the relevance of the 
first part of this chapter to my dissertation as a whole. 
First, Murdoch specifically argues in both Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, and in The 
Sovereignty of Good, that aesthetic experience plays a role in the process that she refers to as a 
moral pilgrimage; aesthetic experience begins our moral transition and transformation by 
teaching us how to keep our attention properly focused and, thus, to know, understand, and 
respect things quite distinct from and other than ourselves.  
The ego, as I shall argue below, is the main obstacle that the Murdochian moral pilgrim 
faces. In a first approximation, Murdoch borrows the term ‘ego’ from Freud and she uses it in 
reference to a natural self-interestedness.
99
 However, contemplation of art temporarily turns our 
                                                             
99 In the next section, I give an analysis of the connection between the ego and self-interestedness. 
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focus away from the ego, and, hence, it shows us that such a focus can be taken (MGM 65). 
Aesthetic experience begins the process by which we attempt to understand reality and truth. 
Eventually, this will be the topic of my discussion. Indeed, given the overall purpose of this 
dissertation, Murdoch’s connection between aesthetic experience and morality is my main 
interest in this chapter. However, I need to begin with an account of Murdochian moral progress 
in order to lay the groundwork for my discussion of Murdoch’s remarks on the connection 
between ethics and aesthetics.  
Second, as I have pointed out, Murdoch thinks of moral progress as a pilgrimage, and this 
brings up some interesting, and perhaps unexpected, connections between her view and Plato’s 
and Kant’s. In his theory of moral progress, Plato did not specifically employ the notion of a 
pilgrimage.
100
 However, Murdoch reads Plato with an eye to such a notion: 
The moral life in the Platonistic understanding of it is a slow shift of 
attachments wherein looking (concentrating, attending, attentive discipline) 
is a source of divine (purified) energy…The movement is not, by an 
occasional leap, into an external (empty) space of freedom, but patiently 
and continuously a change of one’s whole being in all its contingent detail, 
through a world of appearance toward a world of reality (MGM 24). 
Murdoch’s reference to a certain kind of “energy” is interesting here. She explains that energy is  
indeed a versatile and popular concept, as we see it in physics and in some 
philosophical thought. Ambiguous energy can be the virtuous impulse of 
the individual, the enlightened influx, the reward of spiritual attention, or it 
may be seen as the fundamental cosmic energy (ultimate particles, or 
history or archi-ecriture) which dissolves both things and persons into some 
more basic reality (MGM 24) 
 She gives examples of sexual energy, which she says is spiritual energy, and Freud’s 
libido as a kind of energy of the psyche. The point that is most pertinent to my discussion here is 
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 Murdoch states: “In the Cave myth the Theory of Forms is presented as a pilgrimage where different realities or 
thought-objects exist for individual thinkers at different levels…” (MGM, 399).  
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that “our life-problem is one of the transformation of energy” (MGM 24). She claims that “Plato 
uses the concept of energy to explain the nature of moral change.” The thought is that energy 
“dissolves persons into a more basic reality” and this, she suggests, is what happens during a 
successful application of the Socratic Method. It is also what happens during successful moral 
education. She interprets Plato to mean that energy is magnetic attraction and that in the 
redeployment of energy lies individual salvation (MGM 24). This interpretation of Plato informs 
her own view that we must transform base egoistic energy into a higher, “spiritual” energy. 
Thus, the point of the first passage above is that living a moral life involves a change of 
one’s whole being – a kind of Platonic transformation from illusion or appearance to reality. 
Murdoch wants to interpret this transformation as a pilgrimage, which, on her view, is a shift 
from attachments to the self to attachments outside oneself that results from a vision of reality.
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She reads Plato’s myth of the cave as a description of such a pilgrimage: 
Plato’s pilgrim is able, at various stages in his journey, his escape from the 




Murdoch, in a kind of Platonic spirit, sees a moral pilgrimage as a quest by which we 
transition toward, and come to know, reality. Thus, though Murdoch’s moral theory is distinct 
from Plato’s, the Murdochian notion of a moral pilgrimage finds its roots in the ideas of Plato’s 
philosophy. The other philosopher who figures into this discussion is Kant. 
Kant, like Plato, never uses the notion of a moral pilgrimage in his philosophy. However, 
it is interesting that in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that consciousness of the 
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 I will discuss this at length below. Here I only intend to give a first approximation for the purposes of making this 
second point about the relevance of this section to my dissertation as a whole. 
102
 She also refers to a Platonic Pilgrimage on pages 65, 74, and 174 of MGM. Furthermore, in The Fire and the Sun 
she writes: “The pilgrimage which restores our knowledge of this real world is explained in the Republic by the 
images of the sun and the quadripartite divided line, and by the myth of the cave” (FS 4). 
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moral law “strikes down self-conceit” (5:73) and “humiliates every human being when he 
compares it with the sensible propensity of his nature” (5:74). This awareness “deprives self-
conceit of its illusion” and “it strikes down my pride” (CPrR 5:77). I have argued in the previous 
chapter that, for Kant, becoming moral involves being “enobled above” our inclinations. In 
particular, in Kant’s remarks on the connection between sublimity and morality, he makes 
evident that the reason the two are connected is that sublimity draws us outside ourselves – it 
directs one’s gaze away from her inclinations. Murdoch also argues that experiences of sublimity 
give rise to an adjustment of focus,
103
 and she refers to this adjustment as ‘unselfing.’
104
 While 
Kant would not want us to use the notion of a moral pilgrimage in connection with his theory, his 
discussion regarding the effects of an experience of sublimity strongly informs Murdoch’s theory 
of unselfing, which plays perhaps the most important role in the Murdochian Moral pilgrimage. 
As I attempt to give an account of Murdoch’s moral theory, in terms of the Murdochian 
moral pilgrimage, I shall first discuss the point from which the pilgrimage begins. That is, I shall 
discuss Murdoch’s arguments regarding human nature. Then, I shall discuss the aim of the 
pilgrimage; I want to give an analysis of where exactly the pilgrim is headed. Finally, I shall give 
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 Murdoch argues that Kant’s understanding of the effects of an experience of sublimity is “near the mark,” but 
inadequate. She agrees that this sort of experience draws us away from our selfish desires, perhaps our inclinations 
toward immediate gratification or personal wants, but her worry concerns that toward which Kant thinks our focus is 
adjusted. He argues that we are made aware of our own power of reason, and Murdoch objects to this by arguing 
that we are instead drawn toward the realization of other people in all their particularities. I take this issue up in 
depth in Chapter 4. 
104
 I discuss this in depth below. 
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B. BEFORE THE PILGRIMAGE 
Murdoch argues that “human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an egocentric 
kind” (SOG 51). I suggest that, by this, Murdoch means we are ‘naturally self-interested.’ The 
following passage is helpful here:  
Are there any techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy 
which is naturally selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice 
arrive we shall be sure of acting rightly? (SOG 53) 
Here she refers to the ‘energy of an egocentric kind’
105
 that she talks about two pages 
prior as ‘an energy which is naturally selfish.’ The passage constitutes Murdoch’s formulation of 
what she insists is one of the main problems in moral philosophy. Indeed, as Murdoch sets up her 
moral theory, her central focus is on figuring out how to progress from our natural egotism, or as 
I am interpreting it, our natural self-interestedness. She wants to show that if we are going to 
come up with a good theory of moral progress, we need to find a method for dealing with the 
egocentric nature of humanity.  
 I want to leave aside for the moment a discussion of the method that Murdoch proposes 
as a solution. Instead, I shall focus more specifically on Murdoch’s understanding of egotism. In 
The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch writes, “In the moral life, the enemy is the fat relentless ego” 
(SOG 51). Then, she goes on to say that “the chief enemy of excellence in morality is personal 
fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one 
from seeing what is there outside one” (SOG 57).  Given these two passages, one can reasonably 
suppose that Murdoch means that the enemy of the moral life is both the ego and personal 
fantasy. I suggest that this can be explained as follows: the ego glorifies the self and belittles 
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 Murdoch maintains that “what we really are seems much more like an obscure system of energy out of which 
choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and often dependent on the 
condition of the system in between moments of choice” (SOG 53).  
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everything else – and fantasy just is “the proliferation of blinding self-centered aims and images” 
(SOG 65). Thus, it follows that fantasy is egotistic. Interestingly, Murdoch makes this claim 
directly in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (MGM 86). She goes on there to also say that the 
ego is “illusion-making” and a liar (MGM 86). With this in mind, there is sufficient reason to 
believe that her understanding of the ego and its relationship with fantasy is consistent between 
these texts. Even so, one might still ask why it is that we have reason to believe that human 
conduct is moved by the ego. In both Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and The Sovereignty of 
Good, Murdoch turns to Freud to substantiate her answer to this question (MGM 20-21, and 
SOG 51-52). In her view of human nature, she draws on two notions – Freudian psychology and 
the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin – in order to give an idea of the initial selfish stage of our 
moral progress; that is, to characterize the point at which we start the pilgrimage. More 
specifically, Murdoch adopts something like the Christian notion that sin is a universal aspect of 
humanity, but she argues that Freud helps us understand this notion. In her view, he made an 
“important discovery about the human mind.” The following passage from The Sovereignty of 
Good best sums up her point: 
Modern psychology has provided us with what might be called a doctrine of 
original sin, a doctrine which most philosophers deny, or attempt to render 
innocuous. When I speak in this context of modern psychology, I mean 
primarily the work of Freud. I am not a ‘Freudian’ and the truth of this or 
that particular view of Freud does not here concern me, but…one may say 
that what [Freud] presents us with is a realistic and detailed picture of the 
fallen man. He sees the psyche as an egocentric system of quasimechanical 
energy, largely determined by its own individual history, whose natural 
attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand 
or control. Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, 
and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness 
are not natural to human beings (SOG, 51). 
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Murdoch’s emphasis in this passage on the ambivalence and confusion of our selfish 
aims is interesting. Her use of the term ‘ambivalent’ here seems to suggest that our natural 
motives are indeterminate, and perhaps, indecisive, or even incoherent. The point that “fantasy is 
a stronger force than reason,” suggests that fantasy is irrational. This ‘quasimechanical energy’ 
along with the irrational and the incoherent all seem to be a part of the fantasy system that 
Murdoch describes. 
Objectivity and unselfishness are, in the first instance, unnatural to us because we are 
self-focused. We are drawn to pursue our selfish fantasies because by nature we are all, in a 
certain sense, “fallen.” By “original sin” here Murdoch means that we are born with selfish 
tendencies, and we need to be freed from our egos. We are naturally drawn to selfish 
attachments, by which she means things that we are drawn to because they gratify our egos. Our 
egos are attached to beliefs that paint the world in a way that is agreeable to us. However, this 
egotistic “lens,” as it were, that we look through gives us a picture of the world that is merely a 
fantasy and illusion. Murdoch writes: 
[The psyche] is predisposed to certain patterns of activity…its 
consciousness is not normally a transparent glass through which it views the 
world, but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to protect the 
psyche from pain (SOG 78-79). 
Our vision of the world is usually unclear and mistaken, as a result of this, and we must 
correct that vision. The task is to correct what it is that we value and that to which we are 
attached. In order to understand what Murdoch means by selfish attachments, fantasy, and 
illusion, it will be helpful to consider her own famous example of a mother relating to her 
daughter-in-law: 
A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility toward her daughter-in-law, 
whom I shall call D. M finds D a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly 
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common, certainly lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be 
pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively 
rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does not like D’s accent or the way D 
dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath him (SOG 16-17). 
Later, however, M – whom Murdoch tells us is capable of self-criticism, intelligent, etc. –
tells herself, “I am old-fashioned and conventional, I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I 
may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again” (SOG 17-17). M realized that her 
own interests might be getting in the way of her perception of D. This change in M’s mind 




For now, I am interested in one specific point regarding this example. Later, I shall return 
to it in order to discuss some of its richer elements (such as what changed in M when she was 
later able to see D correctly, and how, exactly, M was able to change). My main concern at this 
stage is to point out that M’s change of mind allows her to have an altered vision of D, and what 
M saw before the altered vision was an illusion. M’s illusory perception of D in the beginning 
was the result of her attachment to her son, her own pride, perhaps, and the status of her 
relationship with her son, e.g., we may suppose she did not want to stop being the most 
important woman in his life. In this example, then, Murdoch gives us an idea of what it means to 
have a selfish attachment, and hence, illusory perception. Indeed, M, in the beginning, 
exemplifies how it is that our natural egotism builds up “convincingly coherent but false pictures 
of the world” (SOG, 36). Thus, we need a kind of redemption from this state, as it were. We need 
                                                             
106 While there are cases in which people are truly vulgar or undignified, Murdoch is pointing to the sort of case 
where one person incorrectly judges someone as such because of her own egotistic desires/fantasies. That is the case 
in which judging a person as vulgar, etc., is wrong. In other words, we can correctly judge a person to be vulgar if 
that person really is that way, and if we are not making the judgment simply in virtue of the fact that it fulfills some 
egotistic desire of our own. On the other hand, if we incorrectly judge someone to be vulgar, etc., we need to correct 
that judgment. Murdoch’s point is that an incorrect judgment of this kind results from an egotistic fantasy in which 
one is absorbed, and that correct judgment only occurs when one overcomes such fantasies. 
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to learn to become selfless, but that is difficult for us. Indeed we are “anxiety-ridden animals. 
Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often 
falsifying veil which partially conceals the world” (SOG 82).             
Murdoch makes two remarks that are very similar to this one in Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals: “Nothing is more evident in human life than fear and muddle, and the tumultuous 
agitation of the battle against natural egoism. The ego is ‘unbridled.’ Continuous control is 
required” (MGM 260), and then, “In real life, we have…the deep devious ingenuity of egotism, 
those ‘devices and desires of our own hearts’” (MGM 131). So, our natural tendencies must be 
continuously controlled, and we (like M) must defeat the selfish desires of our own hearts in 
order to see others accurately.  
However, at this point, one might question why we have reason to believe that being 
egotistic is not good for a person. In what follows, I shall argue that Murdoch means to suggest 
that egotism is problematic to our moral progress because it inclines us to under-appreciate other 
people (SOG, 51-52); this under-appreciation of other people results in an under-appreciation of 
and lack of knowledge of reality. As I shall show in this section, gaining a vision of reality is that 
which facilitates our becoming good. Thus, the ego draws us to something that is not truly good 
for us (MGM 51). It prevents us from seeing, clearly and justly, the new possibilities that lie 
before us and from responding to the “good attachments and desires which have been in [the 
ego’s] eclipse” (MGM 323), and it presents us with falsehoods. This is detrimental to us because 
“Truth is important” (MGM 325). The good man “may see what is right without prolonged doubt 
or reflection, large because, being less egoistic, he can see more of life. (He returns to seeing, 
really seeing, rivers and mountains as rivers and mountains. He has fewer temptations.) Truth is 
very close to good” (MGM 325). 
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Since, due to our natural egotism – which I am arguing entails, for Murdoch, a natural 
self-interestedness – we mistakenly perceive the world around us, fallibility is built into our 
nature (SOG, 23). We need to correctly perceive the world around us so that we will not fail, i.e., 
seek that which is only apparently valuable. Specifically, we need correct perception in order to 
gain knowledge of what is truly valuable (MGM 331). For Murdoch, since egotism involves 
narrowly focusing on ourselves and overestimating our moral understanding of things outside 
ourselves,
107
 egotism is the fundamental obstacle to our ability to know anything (which involves 
appreciating something other than that which gratifies our selfish attachments). If we do not 
overcome our egos and learn correct perception we will never gain knowledge. “The mind is 
indeed besieged or crowded by selfish dream life” (MGM 317), and this is why “it is a task to 
see the world as it is” (SOG, 91). This task is a moral one, and we must find a way to carry it out. 
I will return to the topic of how exactly Murdoch argues that we must do so in a later sub-
section, but at this point I want to consider where it is that the moral pilgrim is headed. In other 
words, I shall discuss the goal of the Murdochian moral pilgrimage. 
 
C. THE AIM OF THE PILGRIMAGE 
In the previous section, I have shown that the Murdochian moral pilgrimage involves a 
transition from appearances to reality, and a shift from attachments to the self to attachments 
outside the self. This shift of attachments leads to a defeat of the ego, and hence, a vision of 
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 By this I mean that the ego convinces us that there is no need to know anything else about other people, and that 
we need not focus our attention on them. After all, if we focus on others, we will focus less on ourselves, and that is 
contrary to what the ego seeks. Thus, the ego convinces us to accept the illusion that we are perceiving others 
correctly, but instead, all we are doing is feeding our egos. As I discuss at length in later sections of this chapter, 
Murdoch thinks we overestimate our moral understanding of other beings and that we all have an indefinitely 
extended capacity to imagine the being of others (S&G 52). Our moral obligation is recognizing and respecting, this 
otherness. However, in order to do so, we must defeat the ego and the illusions that it creates. 
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reality. I want to structure my discussion in this section in terms of the following question: What, 
exactly, is the aim of the Murdochian moral pilgrimage? I shall begin by looking at Murdoch’s 
notion of reality. 
In her essay, “The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited,” Murdoch states that our moral 
task is to recognize “a vast and varied reality outside ourselves” (SBR 283). One will likely 
wonder exactly what reality Murdoch has in mind. What is it to recognize this reality? Is it a 
matter of knowing other people, or knowing general principles of morality, or transcendent 
metaphysical facts, or something else?  
I would argue that the answer to this question lies in the first essay in The Sovereignty of 
Good, “The Idea of Perfection.” Therein, Murdoch suggests that knowing transcendent
108
 moral 
reality is knowledge of things such as another individual’s character, for instance, in the example 
of M and D, that D is “spontaneous” (SOG 17-18). She writes, “The central concept of morality 
is ‘the individual’ thought of as knowable by love, thought of in the light of the command, ‘Be 
ye therefore perfect’” (SOG 29).This command refers to the idea that our thinking is governed by 
the notion that our knowledge of other individuals is infinitely perfectible (SOG 28-33). 
Murdoch gives her own take on this quotation, and in her view, being perfect is something of 
which we are able to possess an idea, yet it is also something that is unattainable. Murdoch 
insists that, due to our naturally selfish condition, we are inevitably imperfect. She argues that 
“since we are neither angels nor animals but human individuals, our dealings with each other 
have this aspect;” that is, they are imperfect because we are ‘fallen,’ as she puts it (SOG 27). 
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 However, we have an idea of what it is to be perfect, an idea of an “ideal limit of love or 
knowledge” (SOG 27). With an eye to Plato, Murdoch argues that this is because we are able to 
experience images and shadows of perfect truth and goodness.
109
 In all sorts of cognitive 
activities (study, work, art) we learn to distinguish levels and gradations of goodness and 
badness. It is the whole of our experience that gives us evidence of the idea of perfection in the 
activity of truth-seeking. Murdoch states: 
A deep understanding of any field of human activity (painting, for instance) 
involves an increasing revelation of degrees of excellence and often a 
revelation of there being in fact little that is very good and nothing that is 
perfect…We come to perceive scales, distances, standards, and may incline 
to see as less than excellent what previously we were prepared to ‘let 
by’…The idea of perfection works thus within a field of study, producing 
an increasing sense of direction (SOG 61-62). 
This sense of direction toward an ideal is something that is rooted in a fundamental 
orientation toward the good as an ideal of consciousness. Consciousness discriminates among 
levels and degrees of goodness and it is led to seek goodness through the gradual apprehension 
of degrees of goodness in its environment. Indeed “We are always in motion toward or away 
from what is more real” (MGM 295). Hence, this activity is a pilgrimage from appearance to 
perfected knowledge of reality, and the idea of perfection is a principle of goodness within us 
that prompts our endless striving to reach an ideal limit.  
Murdoch’s moral theory takes shape in her connection between the idea of perfection and 
the individual. Indeed, “love is knowledge of the individual” (SOG 27). Our moral task is just 
this: to really see other individuals. This is an endless task because “‘within,’ as it were, a given 
concept our efforts are imperfect, but also because as we move and as we look our concepts 
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 See Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The Moral Thoughts of Iris Murdoch, “The Reality of the Good: 
Murdoch’s Ontological Proof,” pp. 127 
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themselves are changing” (SOG 27). We are inevitably imperfect; the ideal limit of love and 
knowledge is always beyond us.  
For Murdoch, moral reality is actually a world of people and things with individual 
qualities. However, this world is transcendent insofar as it has an unending complexity; its 
complexities go beyond whatever we may capture of it in any one moment. Furthermore, the 
concepts of the moral and the personal understanding in which we try to capture that 
transcendent world, themselves, have an unending depth: Our understanding of “concepts 
alter[s]; we have a different image of courage at forty from that which we had at twenty. A 
deepening process, at any rate an altering and complicating process, takes place” (SOG 28).  
Our understanding of concepts may increase continually “in the direction of an ideal 
limit” (SOG 28). By an ideal limit, Murdoch means knowledge of a concrete universal
110
 (SOG 
29). On Murdoch’s view, moral concepts are to be considered concrete universals, and other 
non-moral concepts may be considered as such also: “Why not consider red as an ideal end 
point, as a concept infinitely to be learned, as an individual object of love?” (SOG 29) The 
thought is that there is more to something like ‘spontaneity,’ ‘courage,’ or even ‘red,’ for 
example, than what is captured in our personal conceptions of it. Therefore, the depth in which 
we understand these concepts can always increase.   
In connection with the thought that our concepts of the moral and the personal 
understanding in which we try to capture it can always increase, the moral task that Murdoch 
describes is an endless one: a person must always seek a better understanding of other 
individuals around her, and of the moral and the good. Yet, knowledge of such things is “beyond 
                                                             
110 I take it that Murdoch is referring to Hegel here: This term refers to something that has universal import and has 
individual effects in the world. This is a universal that denotes a concrete reality as opposed to a universal that 
denotes one thing in a class, e.g., mankind as opposed to man.  
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us.” Hence, a person might wonder what the point of Murdoch’s moral pilgrimage really is, and 
why it is worth doing. In other words, why take on a task that never ends and that can never be 
completely fulfilled? I suggest that Murdoch thinks we must take on this task because when we 
increase our knowledge of reality we become increasingly free; i.e., freedom is the aim of the 
Murdochian moral pilgrimage (SOG 37). Murdoch has a distinctive notion of freedom, and in 
what follows I shall try to give a brief analysis of it. In a first approximation, on Murdoch’s 




More specifically, Murdoch’s view of freedom draws on that of Simone Weil, who 
argues that being free is “almost automatically” doing things that we see to be good. When we 
are free, “we no longer have a choice” (Weil, Notebooks 205, Murdoch, “Knowing the Void,” 
159).
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 The thought is that once we do the moral work that the pilgrimage requires, the idea of a 
moral choice will no longer be present to us. We will simply take (and, in a sense, live) the moral 
point of view and, once we do so there will be no question as to whether or not we have behaved 
morally. Instead we will inevitably behave that way, and, for Murdoch, this is the ideal toward 
which we should strive. 
Becoming free involves a process of continual activity whereby we build and adjust our 
picture of the moral character of people and things in the world. Indeed, freedom is a matter of 
progress in seeing justly and lovingly something that is infinitely perfectible. Murdoch writes, 
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 Murdoch insists that we should recognize the importance of the internal reflection that is required in order to 
achieve a just view of another person’s moral character. Instead of seeing freedom as the exercise of choice, we 
should see the ideal form of freedom as something that we reach upon a progression of moral development. Freedom 
is found at a point at which choice disappears, and due to our developed ability to see justly and lovingly, we simply 
automatically do what is genuinely good. For more on this point, see Justin Broakes’ Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, pp. 
37. 
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 One might argue that cases in which no choice is presented are not cases in which freedom can be present. 
Broakes examines 3 main objections to Murdoch and compares these with some of the reasons in support of 
Murdoch’s view that it is in fact possible to be free and not have a choice. See 53. 
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“Freedom is…simply a name of an aspect of virtue concerned especially with the clarification of 
vision and the domination of selfish impulse” (SOG 97). Murdoch’s view of freedom involves 
escaping from or defeating fantasy and illusion in order to clearly see the external world.
113
 
Freedom is the knowledge that we derive from accurate perception or clear vision (SOG 37). To 
be free is to see the world with justice and attentiveness, e.g., to see what is seen by the person 
who sees that D is not undignified but spontaneous. This is a matter of “refined and honest 
perception of what is really the case.”
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This “vision” is not merely a realization; rather it is a kind of “moral discipline” (SOG 
37). The notion of vision involves ‘seeing’ other people clearly and justly, and I shall introduce 
three different notions to clarify what it means to truly see other people: (1) It is to see them from 
their own points of view, (2) to see them in a positive light, and (3) to see them as works in 
progress (MGM 250 & 503).
115
 This is what M has done when she is able to accurately see D: 
She has looked at her justly and lovingly. The essence of morality is love, on Murdoch’s view, 
and love “is the perception of individuals” and “the extremely difficult realization that something 
other than oneself is real” (SOG 215). Thus, love is the discovery of reality. The realization of 
our destiny is realizing the “unutterable particularity of nature,” and as Murdoch puts it, the 
“most particular and individual of all natural things is the mind of man” (SOG 215). 
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 In the next part of this chapter, I take up the question as to why Murdoch thinks that selfishness is a threat to 
freedom. See Section I, “Imagination and Fantasy” for a thorough discussion of this topic. Murdoch argues that 
freedom may be clarified by the contrast between fantasy and imagination, and she says that freedom “may also be 
defined in terms of the triumph of the imagination over fantasy” (MGM 326). 
114 This vision is shown in another individual’s mode of speech, silence, and choice of words. It is about noticing her 
assessments of others, her conception of her own life, and what she thinks is attractive, praiseworthy, or funny. See 
R.W. Hepburn and Iris Murdoch, “Symposium: Vision and Choice in Morality,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 30 (1956). 
115
 I discuss this further in the next section.  
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The successful moral pilgrim is a person who continually does what M has done in her 
relationship with D. She is the person who has been freed by realizing the possibility of vision 
and the discovery of moral reality. She has recognized the importance of internal moral 
reflection, and the way in which it can be aimed at achieving a just view of another person in 
general; i.e., her needs, her particular situation. This is a matter of “really looking” – keeping 
one’s attention fixed upon reality and preventing it from “returning surreptitiously to the self 
with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy, and despair” (SOG 89).  
 This brings us to another element in Murdoch’s theory of moral progress. Murdoch wants 
to show that the moral pilgrimage brings about what she calls ‘unselfing.’ By this she means an 
alteration of one’s consciousness by the perception of reality outside of selfish fantasy. Murdoch 
describes unselfing as follows: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, 
oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to 
my prestige. Then I suddenly observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment 
everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. 
There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other 
matter it seems less important (SOG 84).
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 This experience is one of beauty in nature, and I shall discuss the role that beauty plays in 
unselfing in a later section. At this point, however, my focus is on unpacking the notion of 
unselfing. The idea is that during the abovementioned experience, the importance that one places 
on herself and her selfish attachments fades away. Her attention and focus is drawn away from 
her resentment and anxiety and instead toward something other than herself. This experience 
clears “our minds of selfish care” (SOG 82); unselfing is a transformation that is prompted by 
love whereby: 
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 Since my aim here is to discuss where it is that the Murdochian moral pilgrimage leads, my reference to this 
passage is, for now, only aimed at bringing out the meaning of Murdoch’s term, ‘unselfing.’ In the next section, I 
shall return, in detail, to Murdoch’s account of the relationship between beauty and morality.  
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the lover learns to see, and cherish and respect, what is not himself. There 
are many aspects to this teaching: for instance, letting the beloved go with a 
good grace, knowing when and how to give up, when to express love by 
silence or clearing off (MGM 17). 
Unselfing involves learning to relate to and perceive others in a morally correct way. In 
light of my arguments here as well as in sub-section II, in particular, we have reason to believe 
that the person who has been unselfed is the person who has been freed from her ego. This is the 
person who will learn moral perception. Thus, since love is the correct perception of others and 
“the realization that something other than oneself is real” (SOG 215), the successful moral 
pilgrim will be a person who has truly learned to love.  
Before I close this section, there are three more points that deserve attention: (1) One 
might wonder whether Murdoch thinks we ought to love everyone. In other words, it would be 
reasonable to question whether Murdoch thinks it is the case that I need to develop a “just and 
loving gaze” toward someone who has committed a terrible evil, e.g., Hitler, a terrorist, a serial 
rapist, and so on. Must we look at evil lovingly? Murdoch’s remarks on this are unfortunately 
sparse. Keeping that in mind, I suggest the following potential answer: Murdoch’s goal is to 
convince us that we need to see others as they really are, and see them justly. The problem with 
failing to pay someone proper attention is that we tend to fabricate our own illusions about other 
people in order to satisfy our own egos. The reason we must practice attention is to justly – really 
– see other people as they truly are, aside from or without those egotistic fabrications. So, if a 
person really is crude, evil, malicious, or whatever and we give that person loving attention, we 
have done what we need to do, morally. We will see them as they are – crude, evil, malicious, 
whatever – but we have acted morally because we have not created illusions about that person. 
Murdoch does say that “love is knowledge of the individual” (SOG 27), so part of what it is to 
see an individual lovingly just is to know her; that is, to see her as she truly is. If I pay a 
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malicious, evil person loving attention, and I, therefore, see her as malicious and evil, then I am 
seeing her as she is. On the other hand, it would be immoral of me to fabricate illusions of a 
good, honest person as evil and malicious rather than attempting to see her justly – as she truly 
is. Perhaps Murdoch is taking a “pray for your enemies” sort of view. By this I mean that 
perhaps she wants us to love (truly know) even evil people, and also pay them the kind of 
attention that we pay the people that we love, or the kind of attention that we pay the most 
beautiful work of art. This kind of attention will, then, allow us see whatever value they may 
have. Indeed, she says that “human beings are valuable, not because they are created by God or 
because they are rational beings or good citizens, but because they are human beings” (MGM 
365).  
 (2) It is interesting to notice that, while Murdoch insists that we must overcome our 
selfish attachments, our egos, our personal self-interestedness, she is not abstracting from all 
personal engagement. Indeed, love – the discovery of reality – is affective, and thus there is an 
affective element to the kind of vision that Murdoch advocates. When we try to really see other 
people in this Murdochian sense, our successful attempts to do so will involve love. Thus, I am 
arguing that it is necessary for the moral pilgrim to overcome certain affective parts of herself – 
her egotistical feelings and attachments – and that a transformation of her affective elements is a 
crucial aspect of a successful moral pilgrim, and thus, Murdoch’s moral theory. 
 (3) Another point that should be made here is that unselfing involves a kind of 
benevolence. That is, a person who has been unselfed will have developed an attitude of seeing 
human beings as they are, and she will do so not only because she is no longer focused 
egotistically on herself, but also because she is inevitably striving for perfection, i.e., for 
goodness. It is best to understand Murdoch to mean that the goal is to be able to see people each 
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as individual works in progress, just as we, ourselves, are, and to be supportive of them. Indeed, 
we are all “moving through a continuum within which we are aware of truth and falsehood, 
illusion and reality, good and evil. We are continuously striving and learning, discovering and 
discarding images” (MGM 250). 
 For Murdoch, moral change is a function of a progressive re-education of moral vision 
(MGM 177). I suggest that obtaining the vision that Murdoch describes means seeing the good in 
people and seeing how they should be focused, even regardless of whether they see that, 
themselves. No individual is perfect, and all individuals are naturally selfish, i.e., immoral. 
Everyone must work to achieve morality, and part of that achievement just is realizing that 
everyone else must also go through a process of development in order to overcome selfishness. 
 The Murdochian moral pilgrim, once she has completed her journey, will be free in the 
sense that she will no longer be focused on selfish illusions. She will truly and justly see reality, 
which is something a person can only perceive when she is no longer focusing solely on herself.  
Indeed, the “self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there, one may see nothing else” 
(SOG 31). Reality transcends us and we are prevented from seeing it when we focus only on 
ourselves. Freeing ourselves from the egotistic illusion that we are under will allow us to see 
what is real and true, including the truth about correct moral behavior.  
At this point, one might raise a question regarding moral internalism:
117
 Why, exactly, 
does correct seeing lead to moral behavior? In order to suggest an answer to this question, I shall 
need to consider the method that Murdoch suggests to the pilgrim as she tries to accomplish her 
task.  
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 I address the topic of Internalism specifically in Chapter 5.  
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D. THE WAY  
I have shown that, on Murdoch’s view, the ego is the fundamental obstacle to an accurate 
perception of reality. Thus, the moral pilgrim must work to overcome this obstacle. It is a good 
question as to how this is possible, and in what follows, I shall give an analysis of Murdoch’s 
answer. 
Let us begin by returning to Murdoch’s M and D example. When M has her change of 
mind, and is thus able to finally see D accurately, though – as Murdoch emphasizes – her 
outward behavior does not change, something within M does indeed alter. Indeed, Murdoch 
makes a point of noting that M’s outward behavior is already all that it should be, and that it is, 
instead, something within M that changes. Here is the relevant passage once more: 
The M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable 
of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object 
which confronts her. M tells herself: ‘I am old-fashioned and conventional, 
I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly 
jealous. Let me look again’ (SOG 17-17).  
Murdoch’s point that M is “well-intentioned” emphasizes the moral side of this example, 
and her point that M is “capable of self-criticism” emphasizes the fact that M wants to have a 
correct view of D – she wants to get it right, as it were. Indeed, it is important to notice here that 
M is prompted to reassess her view.
118
 When she does so, “M observes D or at least reflects 
deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters.” Murdoch insists that the change is 
not in D’s behavior but in M’s mind, and the change in M’s mind allows her to see that “D is not 
vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous,” etc.  
The metaphor of vision is suggested by this situation: “M looks at D, she attends to D, 
she focuses her attention” (SOG, 22, my italics). There is a progression that M goes through – it 
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is a struggle, and a process – that facilitates her seeing D clearly. That is, it gives her a kind of 
moral vision. Murdoch is using M’s activity as an example of moral activity; it is an example of 
attention aimed at an accurate perception. However, M, in attending to D, is trying to see D 
“justly or lovingly” and, hence, accurately; that is, M is exercising attention. Murdoch describes 
this notion as follows: 
I have used the word ‘attention,’ which I borrow from Simone Weil, to 
express the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality. I believe this to be the characteristic and proper mark of the active 
moral agent (SOG, 33). 
Attention is that which adds the affective element to the kind of vision that M has had; 
that is, M’s change of mind and her ability to see D accurately involved love. It is important to 
notice that when M approaches D justly and lovingly, it happens between her choices: “M has 
been doing something, something which we approve of, something which is somehow worth 
doing in itself. M has been morally active” (SOG, 19-20). M’s moral activity begins with her 
starting to question and investigate whether her impression of D has been correct. When she asks 
herself whether she is old-fashioned, prejudiced, or narrow-minded, she is investigating her 
thoughts, her feelings, and her motives for having the perception of D that she has. Perhaps it is 
jealousy that is motivating her to have a false perception of D. Murdoch means to draw out the 
point that M questions her motives and she then exercises attention on D. Attention is the key; 
the “just and loving gaze directed upon individual reality” is what grounds M’s discovery about 
D and her new, moral behavior towards D. 
Learning to exercise attention is the way in which one may overcome the obstacle that 
the ego presents us with. Though we tend to be selfish, and unselfishness is difficult to obtain, 
the answer – the solution – to this problem (and the redemption and healing, as it were, of the 
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fallen human being) lies in “an exercise of justice and realism and really looking” (SOG 89). 
However, how does a person learn to do this? 
Murdoch suggests that study, art, and prayer are all examples of things that can teach us 
this moral spirit and cultivate our capacity to exercise it as we grow older. In this sense, these 
disciplines play a role in our moral progress, and it is in this way that we endure a process by 
which we learn respect for something other than ourselves. Murdoch writes: 
Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien to 
me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny 
or make unreal. The honesty and humility required of the student – not to 
pretend to know what one does not know – is the preparation for the 
honesty and humility of the scholar who does not even feel tempted to 
suppress the fact which damns his theory (SOG, 87).  
This kind of discipline gives us an ability to forget ourselves because it demands of us 
that we pay attention to something independent and outside us. Indeed, Murdochian attention 
always takes on something independent and real as its object. This independent reality can be 
anything that exists outside the perceiver’s mind, but the quintessential example is an individual 
person. Interestingly, attending to Russian and attending to another individual do seem to require 
different things. For example, when I study another language I do indeed let the subject matter 
govern me in a certain sense. That is, when I am really concentrating, I become absorbed in the 
subject matter, and it takes me away from my usual concerns. (I am also drawn here to think 
about the way I ‘attend to’ the subject matter in this dissertation.) When we focus on learning 
Russian or doing philosophy or engaging in a task of a similar sort, we do not impose ourselves 
upon it. Rather it takes our full attention and we become absorbed in it: we become attached to it 
in a certain sense. When I attend to another individual I still take on this attitude of being drawn 
away from myself and my concerns, but I must also take on a loving and just attitude. 
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This just and loving attitude is an important element in the context of Murdochian moral 
theory, but one might wonder whether it is extended to the context of intellectual disciplines. 
That is, does one take on a loving attitude toward Russian when she studies it? I would argue that 
Murdoch’s arguments in The Sovereignty of Good suggest that, while an intellectual discipline 
can enable the mind to perceive the reality that transcends our selfish focus, and while it can 
teach honesty and humility by showing us the limits of our current knowledge, the degree to 
which it can teach us the proper moral attitude is limited. In particular, it is limited in comparison 
with an experience of art. Murdoch insists that it is in the context of art that we are given the 
most fitting experience in which to defeat the self. Indeed, Murdoch says that art is “the most 
educational of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen” 
(SOG 87-88). I suggest that this is, in part, because art involves an affective element, which is 
something that I have argued is crucial to Murdochian moral theory. Indeed: 
Art and morals are one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of 
them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely 
difficult realization that something other than oneself is real. Love, and so 
art and morals, is the discovery of reality (S&G 215). 
Art involves love, just as moral activity does. If we want to be moral, we must learn to 
exercise the same kind of attention toward other people that we exercise toward art, in particular, 
and this is what M did in order to change her view of D.
119
 To expand on this point, when I 
attend to another individual, I take on an attitude of seeing that individual as she truly is. I will 
grasp the sense in which she is relevantly different from me at any given time (perhaps the 
person has experienced racism or sexism that I have not experienced, or perhaps the person has a 
love for something that I do not.) Murdoch writes: 
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 Again, I shall discuss the connection between experiences of beauty, art and morals more specifically in the next 
section of this chapter. 
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The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and 
the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s 
own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing. (SOG 66) 
When I exercise attention, I realize that the person is both real as herself, and separate 
from myself. I realize that this person is not an extension of myself, but rather, has his or her own 
needs. Ironically, being separate – being a separate center of concerns and source of value – 
involves being like me insofar as I am also a center of concerns and source of value. However, 
also, and even more importantly, I am arguing that exercising attention means that I see the other 
person from her own point of view. That is, I see her in a positive light and as she truly is. This 
kind of seeing translates into action: once I see the other person correctly, I no longer treat her as 
a pawn in my own selfish, fantasy-driven version of reality that I have constructed. I mean to 
suggest that when I stop treating the other person as a pawn, as it were, a change in my (at least 
inward) behavior occurs. 
 Indeed, in the example, M finally sees D as she really is. I suggest that this means she 
sees her in a positive and supportive light, and as a work in progress; she sees the good side of 
her. When M sees this, M is able to see that she has been wrong – she realizes that D is not 
simply an extension of herself; e.g., that D doesn’t only have value insofar as she is related to M 
as her son’s wife.  
I would argue that this is what Murdoch means by a just and loving perception of another 
person, in all of that person’s particularity and complexity; learning to attend to other individuals 
is learning to really see the good in another person, and to see that person not simply as an 
extension of oneself. Indeed, for Murdoch, the main moral aim is learning to focus on something 
other than oneself: 
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It is…a psychological fact, and one of importance in moral philosophy, that 
we can all receive moral help by focusing our attention upon things which 
are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps the idea of goodness itself. 
Human beings are naturally attached and when an attachment seems painful 
or bad it is most readily displaced by another attachment, which an attempt 
at attention can encourage (SOG 55). 
Murdoch means that we have a natural ability and tendency toward attachments, and 
toward altering or replacing those attachments with others when they bring about discomfort. 
Attention can encourage this sort of switching or replacing of attachments in a positive manner 
insofar as it can prompt us to replace egotistical attachments and with attachments to something 
outside ourselves. This will allow us to see reality as it truly is, rather than though the distorted 
perspective of the ego. Focusing our attention on valuable things outside ourselves works to 
undo, as it were, the hold that the ego naturally has on a person.  
We are now ready to return more specifically to the question as to why correct seeing 
leads to moral behavior. I have shown that that moral perception is and results from exercising 
attention. To attend is to approach something with a just and loving gaze; that is, to try to 
perceive it in its unbounded particularity and complexity –as it truly is. To attend is to take on an 
infinitely perfectible activity (SOG 28). Attention gives rise to true perceptions of its objects 
insofar as the virtues of love, justice, honesty, courage, humility, and tolerance are exercised.
 120
  
However, there is another element at work in the process that I have been describing, and 
that element is the Good.
121
 At the beginning of this section, I quoted Murdoch’s remark that 
“life is a spiritual pilgrimage inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth” (MGM 14). 
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Bridget Clarke sheds some light on this in “Iris Murdoch and the Prospects for Critical Moral Perception,” as does 




Murdoch means to suggest, here, that there is something pulling us toward becoming better. As 
naturally self-interested beings we are inevitably imperfect and the Good prompts us to remedy 
that. Murdoch writes: 
The proof of the necessity or unique status of good runs through our grasp 
of an idea of perfection which comes to us in innumerable situations, where 
we are trying to do something well or are conscious of failure. Kant rightly 
suggests that there is often a unique ‘feel’ about such situations…What is 
perfect must exist, that is, what we think of as goodness and perfection, the 
‘object’ of our best thoughts, must be something real, indeed especially and 
most real, not as contingent, accidental reality but as something 
fundamental, essential and necessary (MGM 430). 
With this in mind, Murdoch wants to show that that attention is guided by the Good, and 
attending entails approaching a perfect perception; that is, when one attends, one is prompted to 
seek a perfect perception of the objects she encounters. The desire for a better perception 
necessarily brings with it an ideal goal, the notion of perfect perception. This is why attention, 
which involves “a just and loving gaze upon an individual reality,” prompts investigation and 
correction: it is bound up with a striving for perfection. Attention allows us to approach perfect 
perception, so attending is seeing the world in its moral aspect on the basis of qualities of 
character. It is also realizing that one has not yet seen as clearly as she might.
122
 Murdoch writes: 
“As soon as we begin to use words such as ‘love’ and ‘justice’ in characterizing M, we introduce 
into our whole conceptual picture of her situation the idea of progress, that is, the idea of 
perfection” (SOG, 23). 
In the M and D example, something is pulling M toward becoming better. She is not 
comfortable settling with her current perception of D because she has a need
123
 to seek better 
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impulses. However, the content or details of our attempts may differ amongst us. Yet, the idea of perfection is the 
common source which prompts our individual attempts to see other individuals as they are, and thus, to act morally. 
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perceptions and to perfect her view. It is this that gives M critical questions to ask about herself 
and her perceptions of D; the Good, insofar as it embodies the idea of perfection, prompts M to 
consider whether D is really juvenile and whether she herself is just being jealous or old-
fashioned. Notably, Murdoch wants to show that the Good furnishes these sorts of questions, but 
it does not furnish the answers. This is important because having the right questions, and having 
to seek out their answers, is an indispensable element in the development of the character that a 
person needs if she is to learn to answer those very questions correctly. This point requires some 
unpacking. 
It will be helpful to consider the following example, in a separate context: When one 
learns the art of horsemanship, one will be told that she must sit up straight in order to master the 
art and communicate with the horse correctly. As the person hones her skills, and as she directs 
the horse about and tries to exercise proper horsemanship, she will (in a certain sense) be asking 
herself ‘am I sitting up straight?’ She does not know the answer at first because she will be 
focusing so hard on directing the horse about that it will be difficult for her to determine the state 
of her posture. However, she will later – after practicing and continuing to check herself and ask 
herself whether she is sitting up straight – come to do so naturally and will come to recognize 
when she is doing so. At this later point, she will have become a good horseperson, and hence, 
she will be able to answer to the question “Am I sitting up straight?” The thought that I am trying 
to get across is that one needs to be a good horseperson to correctly answer the questions 
relevant to horsemanship: she needs to have mastered the art of horsemanship in order to get to a 
point where she is capable of recognizing whether she is sitting up straight while riding. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bridget Clarke (“Iris Murdoch and the Prospects for Critical Moral Perception,” pg. 243) argues that “Whether one 
is trying to understand another person, on [Murdoch’s] account, one is guided by the sense that there is something 
beyond what one’s current lights reveal to one, that there is more to be understood.” Murdoch identifies this sense of 
perfection with a principle of Good that is both elemental and indefinable (SOG 90). 
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However, it is asking the question “Am I sitting up straight?” in the first place that allows one to 
develop the skills that she needs to master the art. In other words, asking the question is 
necessary for learning good horsemanship.
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Similarly, one must engage in the practice of asking the question “Am I perceiving X 
individual correctly?” in order to get to a point where she is capable of recognizing when she has 
or has not done so – to get to the point where she can answer the question. Thus, again, asking 
the right question is an indispensable element in mastering the art, which, in this case, is 
perceiving other people correctly. So, M underwent a process of question and answer (just like 
the one the horseperson underwent in the example above) when the Good prompted her to 
question her perception of D. 
However, as I have shown, becoming a moral person is an endless task. Thus, M should 
never be satisfied with her perceptions of other individuals. Indeed, to attend to something is to 
engage in an infinitely perfectible activity (SOG, 28). The moral life “is something that goes on 
continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrences of explicit moral 
choices.” Since exercising attention is something that occurs continually, not merely during the 
moment in which one faces a moral dilemma or choice, Murdoch argues that it is what happens 
in between our choices that is crucial (SOG, 36). 
 This is why Murdoch maintains that morality should not be confined to questions of 
external behavior; rather, in her view, we should speak of it in terms of internal moral reflection 
that is aimed at obtaining a just and loving view of another person. Furthermore, the notion of 
freedom comes into her view of morality because – like the horseperson who automatically 
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recognizes whether or not she has good posture after continually practicing the art – we will 
“almost automatically” behave morally after we have continually practiced attention (the idea of 
perfection, when paired with the practice of attention, gives rise to moral activity). This involves 
a process of building and adjusting our pictures of the moral character of people and things in the 
world. Just as the horseperson who has mastered the art of horsemanship (and hence who has 
asked the right questions) will be able to direct the horse more tactfully and better enjoy her 
experience on the horse, the person who eventually – via practice – automatically does what she 
sees to be good will be freed from her illusory perceptions. This is the moral work that we do, 
and it is continual, endless activity – the activity of attention. As Murdoch puts it, “If I attend 
properly I will have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at” (SOG 40). 
 
E. THE REALITY OF THE GOOD 
The good plays a central role in Murdoch’s philosophy, and it first appears in her work in 
The Sovereignty of Good. In that book, Murdoch presents the good as a guide to the moral life 
and as an ultimate reality. She returns to an extended discussion of the topic 22 years later in 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. In Murdoch’s view, the good – like all moral values – is 
discovered via everyday life; recognizing the good just is a part of everyday life.  Murdoch 
insists that, regarding the way in which one discovers the good, “there is no complicated and 
secret doctrine” (SOG 74). However, Murdoch scholars tend to agree that it is difficult to define 
what Murdoch means by ‘the good,’ particularly because of the “unsystematic presentation of 
her ideas and the difficulty of the issues being considered.”
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  Part of the lack of definition results from Murdoch’s point that the good lies beyond what 
we can know as human beings. We see instances of it, but we cannot (analytically or concretely) 
define it. This is because the moral life – the Murdochian moral pilgrimage, which is a constant 
attempt to see the good more clearly – is a lifelong task. However, Murdoch insists that some 
aspects of the good can be known: “We ordinarily conceive and apprehend goodness in terms of 
virtues which belong to a fabric of being” (SOG, 30). This is a mysterious passage, which I shall 
try to clarify as I proceed in this section. 
However, at this stage it is important to note a certain worry that may arise from this 
general characterization of the Murdochian good: To suggest that the good lies beyond what we 
can know, and also that we “ordinarily conceive and apprehend it” seems odd, at the least. My 
aim in this section is to attempt to explain what Murdoch means by this, as well as to shed light 
on Murdoch’s general discussion of the good. 
  
i. THE MURDOCHIAN GOOD 
In order to signify the way in which the good can be relevant to human beings, and yet is 
also “unique” and “above being,” Murdoch presents the good as both transcendent and immanent 
(MGM 399). While she recognizes that this may be controversial, she insists that the “idea of 
good, perceived in our confused reality, also transcends it” (MGM 405). This means that the 
good “lives as it were on both sides of the barrier and we can combine the aspiration to complete 
goodness with a realistic sense of achievement within our limitations” (SOG, 93). Heather 
Widows sheds light on this point: 
Murdoch uses the term ‘transcendent’ in the Aristotelian sense, namely that 
of transcending the categories. Good is transcendent in that it is never 
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contained in a single object or action which one would describe as good, but 
always exceeds the confines of a particular situation…It is the ‘ideal end-
point’. ‘Transcendent,’ used in this context, does not have supernatural 
connotations, in that the good is not other-worldly, or dependent upon any 
‘thing’ or ‘being’ outside the human world. Rather, it is a reality in the 
world and transcendence is part of its nature.
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Murdoch insists that the good is also immanent, and it is through immanence that the 
good can be known. The “idea of good (goodness, virtue) crystallises out of our moral activity” 
(MGM, 426). So, a kind of recognition of the good is part of the experience of goodness in daily 
life, and each time a person experiences goodness that experience points to an ideal good. 
Interestingly, she notes that “there is…something in the serious attempt to look compassionately 
at human things which automatically suggests that ‘there is more than this’” (SOG, 73). This, she 
says, is a “spark of insight,”
127
 but it should not be interpreted in any kind of theological way. 
Rather, it should be interpreted as pointing to the good and reality (the real). The good is “an 
idea, an ideal, yet it is also evidently and actively incarnate all around us” (MGM, 478). In a way 
the transcendent is recognizable in its immanent aspects because “what is fundamental here is 
ideal or transcendent, never fully realized or analysed, but continually rediscovered in the course 
of the daily struggle with the world” (MGM 427). 
In order to further explain this transcendent and immanent good, Murdoch encourages the 
reader to think of Plato’s allegory of the cave. She explains that in Plato’s description, the good 
is unique and “above being”, but it also “fosters our sense of reality, as the sun fosters life on 
earth” (MGM 399). The good, analogous with the sun, is beyond – it is transcendent – but it can 
have influence and be known on an immanent level. Murdoch insists that “we do really know a 
certain amount about the Good and about the way it is connected with our condition” (SOG, 97).  
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 She insists that this “spark is real, [and] that great art is evidence of its reality” (SOG 73). 
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In short, Murdoch is rejecting a division between transcendence and immanence when it 
comes to the good. If we accept this move, then the notion that the good lies beyond what we can 
know and yet we “ordinarily conceive and apprehend it” can be explained insofar as the good 
transcends our confused reality, but it is also – in a Platonic sense – present in that confused 
reality in a kind of shadow-form, as it were. 
Murdoch gives two main arguments in support of the reality of the good. It is important 
to note that Murdoch means for these two arguments to work together. The first argument might 
be called ‘the argument from perfection.’ The second is her version of the ontological argument. 
Via these arguments, Murdoch sets out a kind of defense of her position. However, she insists 
that the main evidence for her view comes mainly from one’s own experience. Let us first 
consider the argument from perfection. 
 
ii.  MURDOCH’S ARGUMENT FROM PERFECTION 
The term ‘perfection’ is, of course, a key in this first argument, and, interestingly, 
Murdoch maintains that the meaning of this term points to the sort of relationship that she is 
advocating between immanence and transcendence. Murdoch explains that the term ‘perfect’ is a 
comparative one; i.e., it can only be used in contrast with that which is imperfect (and vice 
versa). The perfect is never reached by human beings, and it is, therefore, only an idea. Even so, 
the idea of perfection allows us “to see that A…is really better than B” (SOG 62). The 
comparative nature of this idea is such that “we learn of perfection and imperfection through our 
ability to understand what we see as an image or shadow of something better which we cannot 
yet see” (MGM 405). The thought is that we can see how something (e.g. a particular situation) 
can be better; we can see that it is lacking and needs something more. This idea of something 
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that is lacking gives us, on the other hand, the idea of something that lacks nothing. That we can 
compare and contrast in this way suggests that we intuit what is not already present or visible to 
us insofar as “we know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect” (SOG 472).  
We cannot fully understand or even have knowledge of perfection, but “we are not 
usually in doubt about the direction in which good lies” (SOG, 97). In Murdoch’s view, this 
notion of direction toward perfection, as it were, suggests that the good is real. That is, in 
recognizing distorted/imperfect instantiations of goodness, the perfect good is revealed. The 
following remark from Widows is helpful here: 
This transcending order of perfection is “characteristic of morality,” for it is 
only in the light of perfection – which for Murdoch means what is perfectly 
good – that ‘better’ alternatives can be judged. Because perfection is not 
attainable, but always lies beyond and transcends any particular instance, it 
provides an ideal, a standard against which particulars can be assessed.
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 For Murdoch, perfection is something that functions in all areas of human activity. To 
gain understanding in any area of life “involves an increasing revelation of degrees of excellence 
and often the revelation of there being in fact little that is good and nothing that is perfect” 
(SOG, 61). This happens in the moral context insofar as “we come to perceive scales, distances, 
standards and may incline to see as less than excellent what previously we were prepared to ‘let 
by’” (SOG, 61).  
The unattainability of perfection inspires us, Murdoch argues, since the idea of it “moves 
and changes us…because it inspires love” (SOG, 62). Perfection is ‘beyond,’ as it were, but it 
has a kind of authority over us: “for all our frailty the command ‘be perfect’ has sense for us” 
(SOG, 93). Since perfection is absolute and since it lies in one direction rather than the other, it 
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provides our knowledge of the reality of the good. Thus “morality, goodness, is a form of 
realism” (SOG, 59), and we can see this through the universal applicability of perfection.  
Murdoch’s vision of a moral realism is one which hinges on the concept of good, and, in 
her view, the good is that which connects the virtues. This is proved by experience, Murdoch 
argues, since “if we reflect upon the nature of the virtues we are constantly led to consider their 
relation to each other. The idea of an ‘order’ suggests itself, although it might be difficult to state 
this in any systematic form” (SOG, 57). This reveals the meaning of Murdoch’s remark at SOG, 
30 that “we ordinarily conceive and apprehend goodness in terms of virtues which belong to a 
fabric of being”: The good connects the virtues in a certain kind of unity, which we can 
apprehend as we reflect on our own experiences. This is the way in which we see their relation 
with one another.  
To be clear, Murdoch does not mean to suggest a permanent, strict hierarchy among 
virtues; rather, she sees an implicit connection by which virtues are related because they all are 
connected with goodness. In Plato’s footsteps she writes: 
[Plato] never in fact anywhere expounds a systematic unitary view of the 
world of forms, though he implies that there is a hierarchy of forms…what 
he does suggest is that we work with the idea of such a hierarchy insofar as 
we introduce order into our conceptions of the world through our 
apprehension of Good (SOG, 95). 
Indeed a kind of formal hierarchy is not possible because “the scene remains disparate 
and complex beyond hopes of any system, yet at the same time the concept of Good stretches 
through the whole of it and gives it the only kind of shadowy unachieved unity which it can 
possess” (SOG, 97). In Murdoch’s view, we are inspired by the good (as perfection), in part, 
because it is unattainable. Thus, the good – which is shown via the concept of perfection in 
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experience – is real in and motivating in human life. This first stage in Murdoch’s discussion of 
the good brings us to the idea of perfection as a necessary part of our thinking. The second stage 
is aimed at proving the objective existence of the good. 
 
iii. MURDOCH’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD 
Murdoch’s version of the ontological argument is aimed at grounding the reality of the 
good as something more than merely an idea or concept. This argument – like the argument from 
perfection – involves a sort of scale of goodness. In short, Murdoch reproduces St. Anselm’s 
Ontological Argument for the existence of God, but she argues that while this argument does not 
prove the existence of God, it proves the existence of the good. 
 One will recall that Anselm’s main thesis is that if a Supreme Being or Greatest Possible 
Being can be conceived to exist, then it necessarily exists in reality. In virtue of the idea of 
ascension from lesser to greater, Anselm argues that a being that exists only in the mind is lesser 
than one that exists also in reality. Therefore, if we are talking about the greatest possible being 
as something that exists in the mind, it must also exist in reality. A key aspect of the argument is 
that in virtue of being the greatest, this being necessarily exists in reality. The idea of necessary 
existence is one that only applies to the Supreme Being, Anselm claims. The idea of this being is 
derived from experiences of goodness. He suggests that “by ascending from the lesser good to 
the greater, we can form a considerable notion of a being than which a greater is inconceivable.”  
Anselm’s argument has been met with various criticisms, including Kant’s ‘existence is 
not a predicate’ objection, and, as Murdoch notes, Schopenhauer’s remark that the argument is 
“a charming joke” (MGM, 392). However, Murdoch revisits Anselm’s proof, arguing that the 
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concept of ‘necessary existence’ should be further explored. She turns to Norman Malcolm, who 
claims – in company with Anselm – that ‘God’ is different from other concepts. With this in 
mind, Murdoch suggests that it would make sense to assert that if God exists, then he always 
existed, and that if the concept of God is not to be self-contradictory, God must necessarily exist 
(MGM 410). 
However, Murdoch argues that ‘necessary existence’ cannot be appropriately applied to 
the Christian God. She suggests that this is because “the concept of an existing personal being is 
too deeply embedded in the traditional idea of God” (MGM, 425); yet, if God necessarily exists, 
then he cannot be “a particular, a contingent thing, one thing among others” (MGM, 395). In her 
view, necessary existence cannot be applied to God, but it can be applied to the good. She 
argues: “what is in question…is something unique, of which the traditional idea of God was an 
image or metaphor and to which it has certainly been an effective pointer” (MGM, 412). The 
correct interpretation of Anselm’s argument is, according to Murdoch, that it grounds the 
“necessity and sovereignty of the Good” (MGM, 425). This emerges from Anselm’s description 
of our conception of God in the ‘degrees of good’ argument. Murdoch’s argument from 
perfection is similar to Anselm’s statement that we “recognize and identify goodness and degrees 
of good, and are thus able to have the idea of a greatest conceivable good” (MGM 395). In 
Murdoch’s view, the argument from perfection coupled with her version of the Ontological 
argument – her argument that if the good exists as an idea it must also exist in reality – shows 
that there is real objective content of the perfect good. She suggests that the Ontological 
Argument was always really about the existence of the good and moral value, which comes from 
“our most general perceptions and experience of the fundamental and omnipresent (uniquely 
necessary) nature of moral value, thought of in a Christian context as God” (MGM, 396). 
146 
 
Murdoch concludes that the ontological argument for the good, as she interprets it, addresses the 
problem of explaining “the idea of goodness in terms which combine its peculiar purity and 
separateness (its transcendence) with details of its omnipresent effectiveness in human life” 
(MGM, 408). In her view, pursuing the good in this world just is loving the best thing that can 
be. 
However, Murdoch stresses that she does not mean to replace God with good. The good, 
she suggests, is like God insofar as it provides “a single perfect transcendent non-representable 
and necessary real object of attention” (SOG, 55). The good is “above the level of gods or God,” 
she states, because it is non-personal and indifferent to human aims and pains (MGM, 475). The 
good does not console us, nor does it seek us, and because of this impersonal nature of the good 
it is a better focus for our attention: Indeed, in her view, we must “love the good for nothing” 
(MGM, 344). There must be no other motive for being good, no reward or punishment (for not 
being good) so that the moral life is pure. Thus, Murdoch insists that “good is not the old God in 
disguise, but rather what the old God symbolized” (MGM, 428). In a way, she means that 
eliminating the personality of God allows for the reality of good. On this analysis, her argument 
is that God cannot play the role that the good can. The good captures an aspect of the way in 
which we look at the world when we value things, and this is the aspect of looking that Murdoch 
aims to capture. 
 
iv. THREE OBJECTIONS 
 
In what follows, I note that there are at least three important worries regarding Murdoch’s 
Ontological Argument: (1) Murdoch’s main intention in giving her version of the Ontological 
Argument is to ground the ontological status of the good, and to ground its reality. Her view 
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requires that the good exist in some absolute sense. However, her ontological argument is 
especially confusing insofar as she wants to exclude the possibility of the good being an object, 
because something that is an object cannot have necessary existence. (This is part of her reason 
for asserting that the proof works for good and not God.) However, at other times she refers to 
the good as an ‘object of attention’ and even ‘the best object of attention.’  
One way to explain this might be that Murdoch does not mean that an ‘object of 
attention’ is an object in a material sense. Indeed, she says that “in an important sense, goodness 
must be an idea” (MGM, 478). When she refers to the good as an object of attention, perhaps she 
means that it is an end-point or fixed point that is real in our systems of value, experiences, and 
conceptions of the world. Even if this is so, there are other problems that arise. 
(2) A related worry is that Murdoch promotes the existence of the good (vs. God) insofar 
as it is a “better focus for our attention.” She argues that this is the case because we must love 
good for nothing. The good is a better fit as the ultimate purpose and end point because it does 
not seek us, she claims. “God sees us and seeks us, the good does not” (MGM 83). While the 
good does not have personal qualities such as the ability to see and seek, Murdoch does argue 
that it has the ability to magnetically “pull” at us. Perhaps it is a good question as to whether, 
when the end aim and purpose is the good, a person practices attention in order to produce 
something perfect, or to eventually become perfect. In either case, this would mean that she is 
not practicing attention toward the good for nothing. To clarify my point, when Murdoch says 
“for nothing,” she means that a person is practicing disinterested (in the Kantian sense) attention. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that one might practice disinterested attention toward 
God. (Indeed, Murdoch derives her very notion of attention from Simone Weil, who presented it 





) However, if one is going to argue that it is not possible to practice 
disinterested attention toward God, it really is not yet clear why it is, on the other hand, possible 
to practice disinterested attention toward the good instead. 
(3) Some scholars have argued that Murdoch adopts a very narrow interpretation of 
Christianity. Critics have suggested that Murdoch – in her discussion of the Ontological 
argument – does not clearly understand the Christian notion of God, and has not really succeeded 
in distinguishing God and Good. Furthermore, it is questionable whether or not she has in fact 
replaced God with Good. Some critics will even argue that if her ontological argument works for 
the existence of the good, it also works for the existence of God.
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 Heather Widows explains 
that 
given the place [Murdoch] allots to religion and to religious thinking, 
theologians are underrepresented in her work. Although this does not 
undermine her whole thesis, her lack of familiarity with theologians such as 
Augustine and Aquinas, and with different schools of thought, such as 
Christian Platonism, does lead her into error. As a result, she has 
misconstrued the ways in which God is conceived, and hence simplified the 
Christian view of God almost to the point of caricature. Consequently, 
Murdoch wrongly describes God as an object, and attributes to believers 
elements of belief and practice which many would find unacceptable, 
especially believers at the mystical end of the spectrum.
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With these criticisms in mind, I have called into question whether what has been proved 
to exist via Murdoch’s ontological argument should really be called ‘good’ instead of ‘God.’ The 
argument does at least help to clarify what Murdoch means by the good. However, one may 
wonder if she might have been better able to advance her position if she had avoided Anselm’s 
argument altogether. The point she wants to make – that good is a key part of experience (SOG, 
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42, 93) – can still be made, especially in virtue of her argument from perfection. This argument 
is better suited for grounding her realism and it avoids the issue of the good being interpreted as 
an empirical, material object.  
Thus, while the role that the Murdochian good plays in the moral pilgrimage is fairly 
clear (it is in everyday life, “in efforts of attention directed upon individuals and of obedience to 
reality as an exercise of love” that the good is shown), providing a clear definition and clear 
picture of the ontological status of the Murdochian good is difficult. I shall suggest a way in 
which this difficulty might be resolved, when I present my own view in Chapter 5. 
 
Part II: Imagination, Beauty, and Tragedy in Murdochian Aesthetics 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous section, I gave an account of Murdochian moral progress, which involved 
an analysis of the moral pilgrimage that she describes. I briefly touched on the role that aesthetic 
experience plays in that pilgrimage. Thus, in this section, my general aim is to examine 
Murdoch’s remarks concerning the connection between ethics and aesthetics more closely. 
Murdoch specifically argues, in both Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and The Sovereignty of 
Good, that aesthetic experience begins our moral transformation by teaching us how to keep our 
attention properly focused and, thus, to know, understand, and respect things quite distinct from 
and other than ourselves. In what follows, I shall give an analysis of Murdoch’s view that 
aesthetic experience facilitates the attitude that is necessary to the morally ideal way of relating 
to the world. First, I shall consider Murdoch’s discussion of the imagination. Then, I shall 
examine her theory of beauty and then her theory of beauty in art, in particular. Finally, I shall 
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discuss her arguments regarding the art of tragedy, specifically, in preparation for a discussion 
that will follow in the fourth section of this chapter.  
 
B. IMAGINATION AND FANTASY 
One element of Murdoch’s philosophy that I have not yet discussed is her view of the 
imagination. As will become clear throughout this section, the imagination plays a role both in 
Murdoch’s theory of moral progress and in her theory of aesthetic experience. The two main 
texts in which Murdoch discusses the imagination are The Sovereignty of Good and Metaphysics 
as a Guide to Morals. In the latter text, Murdoch describes imagination as a “searching, joining, 
light-seeking, semi-figurative nature of the mind’s work, which prepares and forms the 
consciousness for action,” and also as “an activity of the senses, a picturing and grasping, a 
stirring of desire” (MGM 323 & 325).  
Murdoch insists that, when discussing the imagination, we need to distinguish two 
concepts: First, there is ‘fantasy,’ which is “untruthful,” “egoistic,” and is the source of base-
level illusions. There is also ‘truth-seeking creative imagination’ which she describes as “truthful 
and free” (MGM 321). Both of these forms of imagination are relevant to morality, but fantasy is 
relevant in a negative sense and truth-seeking creative imagination is relevant in a positive sense. 
In Murdoch’s view, we need creative imagery to grasp reality because perception, in certain 
situations, requires creativity. At MGM 320, Murdoch argues that truth-seeking creative 
imagination can point us to the reality that is overlooked or missed in the context of egotistically 
driven life. It is, therefore, an instrument of moral progress.  
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Fantasy is also a creative activity, but it is different from the other form of imagination in 
terms of the way in which it is motivated. That is, fantasy is motivated by the ego, so it aims at 
sheltering the subject. For example, neurotic fantasies, erotic fantasies, delusions or dreams of 
power are all examples of this. Since these activities (of fantasy) are all aimed at sheltering or 
consoling the subject, they prevent the acquisition of knowledge and virtue, which we have seen 
involves unselfing in Murdoch’s view. Truth-seeking creative imagination,
132
 on the other hand, 
does not misuse creativity in the way that fantasy does. Thus, ‘fantasy’ is a term for pretending 
or constructing false images (MGM 321), whereas ‘imagination’ is the capacity of “freely and 
creatively exploring the world, moving toward the expression and elucidation of what is true and 
deep” so as to improve one’s vision of reality (MGM 321).
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With this in mind, I want to briefly consider the connection between this discussion of the 
imagination vs. fantasy and the Murdochian notion that selfishness is a threat to freedom, which 
I discussed in Section I. Interestingly, Murdoch argues that freedom may be “defined in terms of 
the triumph of the imagination over fantasy” (MGM 326). Properly unpacking this passage will 
involve a discussion of Murdoch’s take on Plato’s Myth of the Cave. At this point, I want to 
suggest a way in which we might interpret Murdoch’s take on the Myth of the Cave, and then 
suggest why this explains her connection between the imagination and freedom. My main aim 
here is to suggest that freedom, for Murdoch, is making one’s way out of the cave, as she 
understands it, which is to make the transition from fantasy to reality. 
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 Also see “Against Dryness,” pp. 19. By ‘deep’ Murdoch means “the sense in which any serious pursuit and 
expression of truth moves toward fundamental questions, as when a political problem refers us to a view of human 
nature.” By ‘truth’ she means “something we recognize…when we are led to a juster, clearer, more detailed, more 
refined understanding” (MGM 321).   
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As I argued in the previous section, Murdoch’s view of moral progress is informed by 
Plato’s, and the use of the term ‘moral pilgrimage’ was occasioned by her interpretation of his 
philosophy. In Murdoch’s view, one begins her pilgrimage from within the cave, where she is a 
prisoner. Being a prisoner, in Murdoch’s view, just is to have a natural tendency towards 
selfishness, egotistic fabrication, uninformed opinion, and base-level illusions. This is the place 
at which one begins her pilgrimage, which I have already discussed at length.
134
 People who 
remain there are not free. They have “no sense of reality…believe what is immediate and easy, 
judge from appearances, thoughtlessly accept convention and habit, have convenient ready-made 
values, and do whatever the priest says, and so on.”
135
 If a person wants to stay in the cave, as it 
were, what she truly seeks is self-consolation.  
On the other hand, people who succeed in making the pilgrimage are enabled to 
acknowledge (and make a reality to themselves) the existence of other people and their 
experiences. They reach a level that is devoid of self and filled, instead, by contemplation of 
other people and then the Good itself. These are the people who are free because their 
“knowledge of the divine and practice of the selfless life has transcended the level of idols and 
images” (MGM 73).  
Murdoch argues that “there is a continuous breeding of imagery in the consciousness 
which is, for better or worse, a function of moral change” (MGM 329). Depending upon whether 
or not one has transitioned from fantasy to imagination in the truth-seeking creative sense, one 
will change morally, for the better or the worse. The person who makes it out of the cave which 
is, in Murdoch’s view, the person who becomes a successful moral pilgrim, goes through a “slow 
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shift of attachments” from appearances to reality, whereby looking, concentrating, and attending 
gives rise to a transformation of one’s whole being.  
By this I suggest that Murdoch means that a person must adjust her focus from 
egotistical, base-level attachments to something higher, and that this is only possible by really 
looking and concentrating on something outside oneself. This results in a change – a moral 
transition – which we might describe as an ascent out of the cave or a transition from fantasy and 
appearances to reality and truth. This ascent or transition changes a person because she no longer 
holds the same concerns, nor views the world in the same way. She no longer sees images but 
sees reality. Thus, this is why Murdoch talks of “Plato’s picture of the progressive destruction of 
images” (MGM 329), and why she says that freedom may be clarified by the contrast between 
fantasy and imagination.  
The transition from fantasy to imagination can be directly mapped onto the Murdochian 
moral pilgrimage, and experiencing beauty is the key to this transition. The thought is that when 
one overcomes her ego and goes through the pilgrimage, she has transitioned away from images 
of fantasy, and is instead using her creative faculty in a manner that is truth-seeking. As we shall 
see, it is an experience of beauty that helps us make use of this kind of imagination.  
  
C. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN BEAUTY AND MORALITY 
Murdoch argues that beauty is: 
the convenient and traditional name for something which art and nature 
share, and which gives a fairly clear sense to the idea of quality of 
experience and change of consciousness (SOG 84).  
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 Beauty has an ability to prompt, almost automatically, the kind of activity which 
Murdoch argues is necessary to morality. As I have previously discussed, this activity is 
described by Murdoch as ‘attention,’ the “just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality” (SOG 34). Murdoch argues that this kind of ‘loving gaze’ involves a detached and non-
possessive attention to the respective object, and it involves an effort to counteract states of 
delusion that result from perpetually focusing on oneself. 
  I want to return now to the passage at SOG, 84 where Murdoch describes a particular 
experience of the beauty in nature: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, 
oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to 
my prestige. Then I suddenly observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment 
everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. 
There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other 
matter it seems less important (SOG 84). 
 During this experience of the kestrel, the importance that one places on herself and her 
selfish attachments fades away. Her attention and focus is drawn away from her resentment and 
anxiety and instead toward something other than herself, namely, the beauty of the kestrel. As I 
have discussed at length in Section 1, Murdoch argues that if a person is to make moral progress, 
she must exercise “unselfing,” which results from exercising attention. Beauty, because it 
prompts the exercise of attention, is “the most obvious thing in our surroundings which is an 
occasion for unselfing” (SOG 84). What we need is a change of consciousness, and beauty is the 
way in which we can change how we see the world. Murdoch gives this example of experiencing 
the kestrel so that we may understand this concept of change the way she wants us to see it. As I 
read that example, Murdoch wants me to recall a time in which I was anxious, resentful, and 
oblivious of my surroundings – even “brooding on some damage done to my prestige,” and then 
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suddenly observed beauty.  In that moment, she insists, everything is altered, and “when I return 
to thinking of the other matter it seems less important” (SOG 82). 
I suggest that Murdoch’s view of what it means to experience beauty might be interpreted 
as follows: When we see art or nature and apprehend beauty, this carries us to withdraw the 
egotistical part of ourselves. Something slips away from us in the moment in which we are 
required to exercise attention. That something is, in fact, ourselves. Yet, it isn’t as if everything 
disappears in that moment – something is surely left. That something is everything else; all that 
is not ourselves. We have never before seen this reality, yet we “gaze” upon it “with the passion 
of a lover.” In that moment, when we no longer figure in our self-focus, all that is not ourselves 
is “filled to the brim with being.” This is Murdochian love, to look and look until the self exists 
no more. In a sense, it is death – the death of the self by which the real world “becomes quite 
automatically the object of perfect love.”
136
 
 It is in this way that an experience of beauty gives us an example of the way in which we 
ought to act toward other objects, i.e., other individuals; that is, we ought to pay them attention. 
Hence, the same loving attitude that we take with respect to beauty is the attitude in which we 
ought to relate to other people, and beauty becomes – in a sense – analogous with morality. The 
notion of attention is the key to understanding Murdoch’s view regarding the relationship 
between beauty (whether in nature or art) and morality. The following passage by Simone Weil 
sheds light on this point: 
Beauty is the supreme mystery of this world. It is a claim which attracts 
attention and yet does nothing to sustain it. Beauty always promises, but 
never gives anything; it stimulates hunger but has no nourishment for the 
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part of the soul which looks in this world for sustenance. It feeds only the 
part of the soul that gazes. While exciting desire, it makes clear that there is 
nothing in it to be desired, because the one thing we want is that it should 
not change. If one does not seek means to evade the exquisite anguish it 
inflicts, the desire is gradually transformed into love; and one begins to 
acquire the faculty of pure and disinterested attention.
137
 
As Weil argues, beauty attracts our attention – our undivided focus – and it teaches us to 
learn to practice that very kind of attention. Drawing heavily on Weil’s view, Murdoch argues 
that acquiring this faculty of disinterested attention is part of what it is to become moral, which, 
as we have already seen, is to defeat one’s ego. Morality requires that a person focus her 
attention on other people rather than herself, and develop a just and loving attitude toward other 
people.  
Indeed, the successful moral pilgrim is a person who has learned to exercise attention 
towards other people, but attention is less accessible in that context than it is in the context of 
beauty. Someone else’s reality is hidden from our view because of the unremitting activity of our 
egos. This activity must be stopped in order for the reality of another person to be seen. 
Therefore, the fundamental connection between moral activity and experiences of beauty, on 
Murdoch’s view, lies in the fact that these experiences can train us to exercise attention. That is, 
experiences of beauty train us to respond and attend to things in the morally ideal way. Since 
exercising attention – something that involves humility – is unnatural to us, and since we are 
creatures of illusions, which we create to feed our egos, we need a venue by which it can be 
made accessible to us. The contemplation of beauty fulfills this role. Indeed, the apprehension of 
beauty, Murdoch argues, makes the purification of one’s consciousness possible. 
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As I have discussed, Murdoch thinks we are creatures of fantasy, which feeds the ego. 
We naturally tend to create illusions about ourselves and others, and attention is something that 
is unnatural to us. Attention to reality implies the forgetfulness of self. It makes us wait and it 
humbles us. Beauty allows us to see that reality is something other than and outside of these 
fantasies. Art and nature cannot be used for us to satisfy our egos; they resist that. So 
apprehending their beauty draws out the connection between reality and the defeat of the ego. 
Earlier I said that an experience of beauty helps us make use of our creative faculty 
(imagination) in a manner that is truth-seeking. Seeing reality requires creative imagination 
because one cannot see reality when she is absorbed in fantasies. In order to see reality, one must 
transition to truth-seeking imagination, which is involved in the exercise of attention. Beauty is 
important here because when we experience beauty we really look at it – we truly see it – 
because it requires of us that we become detached from our own self-interests and that we 
respect it. We do not see it from the perspective of something that we have created for our own 
consolation. Instead, we see it justly and lovingly and doing so involves our faculty of 
imagination (MGM 321).  
The process of imagination is that which allows us to venture into the world outside 
ourselves. We are, in Murdoch’s view, responsible for what exactly it is that we see, since we 
have the capacity to imagine and attend to the world. Being morally responsible is something 
that applies in the context of perception: we are responsible for engaging in a certain kind of 
imaginative seeing, and the work of our faculty of imagination is what produces moral vision. 
Thus, one might say that, for Murdoch, reality is actually made normative in a creative process 
of the imagination. The imagination is the faculty by which reality can be accessed, but the only 
way that imagination can be used to do so is when a person engages in a certain kind of moral 
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activity – just and loving attending. This process requires the exercise of attention and love, and 
it requires humility. When we experience beauty, we discover value in the world around us via 
its ability to compel us to forget ourselves. Beauty, in requiring us to consider and examine the 
reality of something other than ourselves, helps us to overcome our fantasies. It is through this 
kind of experience that we are oriented towards reality and prompted to perceive it justly and 
lovingly. Thus an experience of beauty, and the role that the imagination plays in such an 
experience, is the very kind of experience that allows us to join the world as it truly is.  
However, Murdoch suggests that there are certain experiences that can promote 
absorption into one’s self-centered fantasies. Indeed, she maintains that most of art is self-
consoling fantasy. One might wonder, then, how Murdoch reconciles this with the discussion 
that I have outlined above. I suggest that this issue can be resolved through an analysis of 
Murdoch’s theory of art, and her arguments regarding the difference between good and bad art. 
  
D. BEAUTY IN THE CONTEXT OF ART  
 “Beauty,” Murdoch writes, “is the only spiritual thing which we love by instinct,”
138
 but 
“when we move from beauty in nature to beauty in art we are already in a more difficult region” 
(SOG 83). In her view, there is a difference between bad art – which just is self-consoling 
fantasy – and good art, which has the capacity to affect people in a positive way. Good art is 
something that “affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent” 
(SOG 83). It is something that opposes selfish obsession and self-consoling fantasy, both when it 
is created and when it is experienced and enjoyed. Murdoch insists that art “invigorates our best 
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faculties and, to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul” (S&G 83). 
This is possible because art invites us to unpossessively contemplate it. When we do this, we 
resist being absorbed into our own selfish dreams (S&G 83).  
Literature and painting, in particular, show us the “sense in which the concept of virtue is 
tied onto the human condition” (SOG 84). Murdoch argues that these arts show us the 
pointlessness of virtue, yet they also show us its supreme importance. Thus, experiencing art 
trains a person “in the love of virtue” (SOG 84). Murdoch writes: 
The pointlessness of art is not the pointlessness of a game; it is the 
pointlessness of human life itself, and form in art is properly the simulation 
of the self-contained aimlessness of the universe. Good art reveals what we 
are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the minute and absolutely 
random detail of this world, and reveals it with a sense of unity and form 
(SOG 84).   
This form is something that resists what we are used to; that is, it resists the patterns of 
the fantasies in which we tend to be absorbed. This is part of what distinguishes good art from 
bad on Murdoch’s view: if art does not seem mysterious, and if its form seems recognizable and 
familiar, then it is probably the sort of art that is self-consoling. This is bad art. Good art, on the 
other hand, shows us the difficulty of being objective because it shows us the (quite different) 
way the world looks from the perspective of an objective vision. Good art is free of bias and 
prejudice and “totally opposed to selfish obsession.” It is free of self-interest or partiality, and it 
“invites unpossessive contemplation” (SOG 83). Good art teaches us that it is possible to view 
something without prejudice or any kind of personal agenda, and hence, we see how different 
that point of view – that objective vision – is from the way in which we usually see the world. 
Since this way of looking, as it were, is so foreign to us, it is difficult to learn, and we become 
aware of just how difficult it is via the experience of good art.  
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The good artist creates her work via love of the real. This means that she does not indulge 
fantasy; rather she presents us with a truthful image of our own human condition, and does so in 
a form that can be “steadily contemplated” (SOG 84). It is in this way that art turns us to reality; 
e.g., Rembrandt’s “Head of an Old Woman” is not flattering – it just depicts her as she is. The 
painter does not seek to change her features. Great art involves a beautiful presentation of a 
detailed, yet unexaggerated realism and truth. It leads us to a “juster, clearer, more detailed, and 
more refined understanding” and it “explains truth itself” insofar as a work of art can be seen as a 
symbol of truth elsewhere (MGM 321). Art presents reality in a beautiful way, and because 
beauty commands our full attention, the ego vanishes in its presence. It is in this way that art 
makes reality palpable to us. 
Art, in Murdoch’s view, “can enlarge the sensibility of its consumer,” and it “exhibits to 
us the connection, in human beings, of clear realistic vision with compassion” (SOG 85).  This is 
why Murdoch claims that art is the “most educational of all human activities.” In art, we can 
truly see the nature of morality. Good art is something that exists outside of us, and we surrender 
ourselves to its authority via an unpossessive and unselfish love.  
Furthermore, art that is created via love of the real (good art) can be seen as analogous 
with morality. As I have explained, Murdoch maintains that the great artist can increase our 
awareness of reality. Art shows us the particular, and it sharpens our perceptions of it. A great 
work of art shows us the gap between “self” and world; it commands us to contemplate the other. 
It does not console us, or build up our pride, or feed the illusions that we create of ourselves. 
This is analogous to the way in which we ought to behave toward other individuals: we ought to 
contemplate them in their individual particularities, and we ought to look and look again, giving 
them our full attention. The goal is to see them as they really are – to gain a sharpened perception 
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of them.  Just as Rembrandt does not give us a consoling image of the old woman, our true 
perception of individual realities will not console us; that is, if we are approaching other 
individuals in a moral way, we will come to see them much the same way that we see art: We 
will see them as they are rather than through the lens of our fantasies, whereby they become 
merely what we want them to be. However, in order to be a moral person, one must see others as 
distinct from oneself, and she must recognize the needs that other person has. This requires 
relinquishing the ego’s selfish desire to de-realize that other person. For example, M, until she 
has given D true attention, sees D as she wants her to be – a juvenile person who has stolen her 
son. On a selfish level, M wants to see D this way because it benefits her: It consoles M, and it 
makes her feel better about herself to think that D is not worthy of her son.
139
 When M finally 
sees D as she really is, this is not a self-consoling experience. It is a humbling experience. M 
realizes that she has been the problem all along, and that she has not seen D justly. The 
apprehension of reality, in this way, gives rise to humility.  
When we contemplate art we are acting in the manner in which a moral person will act. 
In fact, having the clear and just vision that art gives us is the fundamental requirement of the 
Pilgrim. Murdoch writes, “To overcome egoism in its protean forms of fantasy and illusion is 
automatically to become more moral” (F&S 45). Reality is independent of our egotistic fantasies 
and illusions and to see reality is to see the truth it presents. The realism and attention in great art 
is found in the moral pilgrim and in the good person. Art connects good with reality: “Art is 
about the pilgrimage from appearance to reality (the subject of every good play and 
novel)…(F&S 80).” It makes us aware of reality, and via its ability to captivate us, it makes us 
act in the manner in which we ought to relate to other people. Enjoying true art is:  
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part of a life-long education in moral discernment…Good art, however 
complex, presents an evident combination of purity and realism: and if we 
think at one of moral teachings which do the same (the Gospels, St. 
Augustine, Julian of Norwich, Parts of Plato), it has to be admitted that 
these too are in their own perfectly natural way art. The development of any 
skill increases our sense of reality. Learning an art is…learning how to 
make a formal utterance of a perceived truth and render it splendidly worthy 
of a trained purified attention without falsifying the process (F&S 84). 
In Murdoch’s view, the notion of a loving respect for an individual reality other than 
oneself is something that is relevant to all forms of art. However, she insists that the highest form 
of art is tragedy, “because its subject-matter is the most important and most individual that we 
know” (S&G 54). Usually, the artist strives to make his creation self-contained and self-
explanatory, but what makes the art of tragedy “disturbing” is that self-contained form is 
combined with something that defies form, namely, “the individual being and destiny of human 
persons” (S&G 55). In the next section, my aim is to examine why, exactly, Murdoch suggests 
that this is the case. 
 
E. TRAGEDY 
I mentioned in Part I that Murdoch develops a conception of ‘original sin.’ I argued that 
by ‘original sin’ Murdoch means that we are born with selfish tendencies, and we need to be 
freed from our egos. This discussion reappears in her theory of tragedy. In Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals, “Comic and Tragic,” she notes that ‘original sin’ “may be seen as a reasonable 
generalization about the natural sinfulness of humans,” or it may be “used as a fantasizing 
protection of the ego, a deterministic myth, concealing chance and obliterating freedom, and 
making everything we do seem innocent because inevitable” (MGM 103). The latter point draws 
attention to our tendency to use the fact that we are ‘human,’ and that ‘humans are naturally 
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sinful’ as an excuse for being immoral. This line of thinking, Murdoch suggests, is commonly 
used to make immorality less of an evil because it is impossible to avoid.  
This is important to Murdoch’s discussion of tragedy because she wants to show that both 
this idea of original sin and tragedy concern the difference between suffering and death. Sin, she 
says, is “the evasion of the idea of death” (MGM 104). If, on the other hand, we acknowledge 
death, this will lead us to morality. That is, acknowledging the fact that part of our human 
condition is that we will die, leads to a humbling of the self, and in turn a death of the ego.  
Murdoch’s discussion of death is highly influenced by Simone Weil’s arguments on the 
subject.  Indeed, Murdoch’s notion of ‘unselfing,’ is connected with Weil’s view. For Weil, the 
idea of death and what she calls the ‘de-creation of the ego’ go hand-in-hand. In his introduction 
to her letters and essays in Waiting for God, Leslie Fiedler writes: “In 1943 [Weil] succeeded at 
last in dying, competing the process of “de-creation” at which she had aimed her whole life.”
140
 
Weil argues that when we renounce ourselves to:  
death itself, even to the point of provisionally renouncing the hope of 
immortality, we are ready for the final gesture of obedience: the surrender 
of the last vestiges of selfhood. In the ultimate ‘nuptial yes,’ we must de-
create our egos, offer up everything we have ever meant by ‘I’ so that 
Divine Love may pass unimpeded through the space we once occupied, 




I am arguing that Murdoch means to suggest that that the idea of death and the realization 
of it leads to something like the de-creation of our egos; that is, this realization plays a role in 
defeating the selfish part of us. While I understand that Murdoch does not want to bring a notion 
of God into her philosophy, and while she parts from Weil on that point, we have reason to 
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believe that Weil’s conception of the death of the self – the ego – informs Murdoch’s discussion 
of death. For Murdoch, it is not a “gesture of obedience” to God, or a “nuptial yes,” but it is a 
surrender of selfhood. Indeed, Murdoch tells us that our evil part must be “condemned ‘not to 
suffering but to death’” (MGM 107). Thus, if sin is the evasion of the idea of death, and if my 
arguments here are correct, it would make sense to say that, for Murdoch, sin also evades the 
defeat of the ego, and, hence, part of sinning just is acting in accordance with egotistic fantasies. 
The connection with this and the way in which Murdoch is using the concept of original 
sin involves the notion of Lucifer, which she brings up both in the Sovereignty of Good and 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals: According to Christian tradition, the “fall” of Lucifer was the 
result of a prideful defiance of God, and a self-focused desire for power. His fate was eternal 
suffering, not death. Murdoch argues in the Sovereignty of Good that this picture of the eternally 
suffering Lucifer was, hence, used “to transform the idea of death into the idea of suffering,” 
(SOG 6) and this gave rise to a shift in our attention which, in turn, led to a 
taming and beautifying of the idea of death, a cult of pseudo-death and 
pseudo-transience. Death becomes Liebestod, painful and exhilarating, or at 
worst charming and sweetly tearful…[this is true of] the general beaten 
track which leads from Kant to popular philosophies of the present day. 
When the neo-Kantian Lucifer
142
 gets a glimpse of real death and real 
chance he takes refuge in sublime emotions and veils with an image of 
tortured freedom that which has been rightly said to be the proper study of 
philosophers (SOG 81). 
I note this passage and the one that follows, because I am trying to draw attention to the 
fact that this neo-Kantian Lucifer illustrates the problem that Murdoch thinks the art of tragedy 
can address. Murdoch argues that Kant “abolished God and made man God in his stead.” He 
made the will the creator of value, and 
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values which were previously in some sense inscribed in the heavens and 
guaranteed by God collapse into the human will. There is no transcendent 
reality. The idea of good remains indefinable and empty so that human 
choice may fill it. The sovereign moral concept is freedom, or possible 
courage in a sense which identifies it with freedom, will, power (SOG 79). 
Murdoch insists that when Kant wanted to find something “clean and pure outside the 
selfish empirical psyche, he followed a sound instinct, but…he looked in the wrong place” (SOG 
81). His inquiry, in her view, led him back to the self, and this is where his followers remain. 
Murdoch’s main worry here is that Kant’s reverence for the human faculty of reason gives rise to 
a dangerous kind of pride. When a person realizes that nothing in nature can defeat her power of 
reason she, herself, has – in virtue of the self-recognition that is involved – taken at least a 
temporary kind of self-focus. This self-focus, in any context in which it may arise, however, is 
exactly what Murdoch wants us to slay.  
The idea of Lucifer entails someone/something that would eternally suffer in the name of 
pride and power, but would not die. Due to what Lucifer represents, if he glimpses the idea of 
death, he (or people who subscribe to the line of thought that has come out of the notion of 
Lucifer) will evade it. He will simply take refuge in Kant’s line of thought, and focus on the idea 
that his faculty of reason cannot be defeated. Hence, he will develop a kind of pride in his own 
power. 
 The eternal suffering of the ‘neo-Kantian Lucifer’ becomes a kind of sublimity, where 
the pain involved just brings him to recognize a certain power. The notion of Lucifer (which just 
is the notion of selfishness, pride, evil, power), then, comes with a kind of thrill. Furthermore, 
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Murdoch wants to show that this attention to suffering instead of death, as a result, veils “the 
proper study of philosophers.”
143
  
I mentioned a moment ago that Murdoch’s discussion of tragedy is concerned with the 
difference between suffering and death. We are ready to turn to that discussion now. With an eye 
to the philosophy of Simone Weil, Murdoch writes: 
Weil says that exposure to God condemns what is evil in us ‘pas a la 
souffrance mais a la mort.’ Not to suffering but to death. Plays in which 
people suffer but do not die are not (strictly speaking) tragedies. Our 
concept of tragedy must contain some dreadful vision of the reality and 
significance of death. Here sin, evil, is the evasion of the idea of death; 
refuge is taken in exercise of power, heroic fantasies of will or fate, cults of 
suffering or the passing-on of pain as damage to others. The tragic art form 
is rare because it is difficult to keep attention focused on the truth without 
the author slipping into an easier…mode. In the truthful vision evil is justly 
judged and misery candidly surveyed. The language which can achieve this 
is a high poetic language. Tragedy is paradoxical art because to succeed it 
must really upset us while exhibiting, but not as mere consolation, some 
orderly and comprehensive vista of evil and catastrophe (MGM 104). 
Tragedy, Murdoch insists, is “the form of art where the exercise of love is most like its 
exercise in morals…art after all is consolation and delight, although really great art gives us a 
mixed and somber delight which is akin to our recognition of morality” (S&G 55). This is 
because in the real world there is incompleteness and action is not always accompanied by 
“radiant understanding” or by “strong and consoling emotions” (S&G 55).  
This brings us to an important distinction that Murdoch makes between ethics and 
aesthetics. She argues that aesthetic experiences differ from moral experiences especially 
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because they are enjoyable: The just and loving gaze (attention) directed at a beautiful object is 
met by a pleasurable awareness of beauty. This does not occur in the context of morality. Indeed, 
pleasure or enjoyment is not present in moral cases. Part of morality just is to admit the existence 
of suffering and the contingency of life, in Murdoch’s view. The truth about the human condition 
is not enjoyable, and virtue is not met with happiness; being moral does not guarantee happiness 
or enjoyment; in fact, it helps us to recognize that life just is not what we fantasize about it being. 
Since tragedy in art is the attempt to overcome the defeat which we undoubtedly suffer in our 
world, since it is “the human spirit mourning and yet exulting in its strength,” it is the most akin 
to morality. Murdoch writes: 
It is the role of tragedy, and also of comedy, and of painting to show us 
suffering without a thrill and death without a consolation. Or if there is any 
consolation it is the austere consolation of a beauty which teaches that 
nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be virtuous…art 
invigorates us by a juxtaposition, almost an identification of pointlessness 
and value. The death of Patroclus, the death of Cordelia, the death of Petya 
Rostov. All is vanity. The only thing which is of real importance is the 
ability to see it all clearly and respond to it justly which is inseparable from 
virtue (SOG 85). 
Morality, on Murdoch’s view, holds no promise of happiness, and it is about facing up to 
the frailty and transience of the human condition. While the Good compels us to do good, as it 
were, we will not ever attain complete perfection. Life involves conflict and misery. However, 
Murdoch agrees with Weil that “beauty is the only source of joy open to us.”
144
 We can see 
human misery as beautiful “when we enjoy great tragedy.” Murdoch argues that the art of 
tragedy is “the image of a (rarely achieved) moral condition” (MGM 106), and this is why she is 
most concerned with it: She claims that, via the emotional experience of tragedy, we can come to 
have the important realization that there are things other than us that exist and deserve our 
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attention, that there is no promise of happiness, that the human condition is frail and transient, 
and that we will not ever be perfect. She argues that Schopenhauer gets “near the center of the 
matter” when he says that “‘[Tragedy] shows us the greatest misfortune, not as an exception, not 
as something occasioned by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as arising easily and 
of itself out of the actions and characters of men, indeed almost as essential to them, and thus 
bring it terribly near to us.’ (WWI, Book III, ‘The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art’)” (MGM 
101). 
Tragedy resists comfort, it is “even thoroughly uncomfortable,” and it is a “broken 
whole.” This “checks” the process of the egoistic mind. Death must be represented in art because 
it “threatens the ego’s dream of eternal life and happiness and power,” and tragedy must – like 
religion – “break the ego, destroying the illusory whole of the unified self.” Indeed: 
Tragedy must break the charmed completion which is the essence of lesser 
art, revealing the true nature of sin, the futility of fantasy and the reality of 
death. Since it is art it must have borders, it must be some kind of magic, 
but must also inhibit magic in its more familiar and consoling uses (MGM 
105). 
Tragedy shows us the way things really are: It can lead us to see things as they are, and to 
see others, rather than to consolation (to self, to pride in a part of ourselves, to illusion). Tragedy 
is the solution to the death/suffering problem because it defeats the ego and it threatens its dream 
of happiness and power. It does not console us, and it shows us the truth about death. When we 
realize that reality for us as human beings is uncomfortable and that it is full of conflict and 
misery, and we realize that the human condition is frail and transient, our egos begin to relent. 
We begin to notice others when our egos are defeated. It is then that we are able to see that those 
particular individuals should be given our loving attention. It is not that experiencing the art of 
tragedy demonstrates this relationship with other people; rather it is that experiencing the art of 
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tragedy threatens and defeats the ego, which in turn allows us to notice something we have not 
focused on before: the reality of other individuals in all of their particularity. 
To briefly review, in this section, I have shown that Murdoch distinguishes good art from 
bad art insofar as bad art promotes egotistic fantasy, while good art gives us a loving respect for 
an individual reality other than ourselves. Furthermore, I have shown that, for Murdoch, though 
morality and aesthetic experience require the same attitude, these kinds of experiences 
themselves are quite different. The same virtue (love) is required of us in both the aesthetic and 
the moral contexts, and in both contexts, fantasy is that which can prevent us from seeing 
properly. Moreover, I have argued that, for Murdoch, experiences of beauty in nature and 
experiences of good art make possible the transition from fantasy to imagination, and, hence, 
these experiences facilitate moral progress.  
 
CHAPTER 4 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PLATO, KANT 
AND MURDOCH 
 
Part I: Murdoch and Plato 
A. INTRODUCTION  
My general aim in this section is to analyze Murdoch’s view regarding the connection 
between aesthetic experience and morality, and to compare and contrast Murdoch’s view with 
Plato’s view. In chapter 1, I argue that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral 
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progress: (1) Some experiences of beauty via art can be used in moral training; that is, these 
experiences can be used to promote the kind of training that Plato suggests should take place 
during the beginning stages of education in the Republic. This is an affective kind of training, 
whereby a person learns to feel appropriately toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty 
via art have the capacity to influence a person’s character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to 
appropriate behavior. (2) An erotic experience of a beautiful person, as it is described in the 
Symposium and Phaedrus, is a more profound sort of experience. This kind of experience can be 
distinguished from (1) in that it adds a higher kind of cognitive component which is lacking in 
(1). In (1), cognition is involved (cognition is involved in all affection), but only as perception-
based thought, which merely has access to appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful 
people, on the other hand, provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of 
vision. They lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by 
the lover of wisdom. Therefore, erotic experiences of beautiful people promote increased moral 
understanding as opposed to affective training. 
With this in mind, I shall divide this first part of Chapter 4 into two sections. In the first 
section, I shall compare and contrast Murdoch’s and Plato’s views regarding the connection 
between art and moral training. Then, in the second section, I shall compare and contrast Plato’s 
and Murdoch’s views of sexual love and its place in aesthetics.  






B. ART AND MORAL TRAINING: POINTS OF CONTACT IN PLATO AND MURDOCH  
Let us begin with a quotation from Murdoch’s novel, The Bell:  
Dora [was] in the National Gallery…[she] stopped at last in front of 
Gainsborough’s picture of his two daughters…Dora was always moved by 
the pictures. Today she was moved, but in a new way. She marveled, with a 
kind of gratitude…and her heart was filled with love for the pictures, their 
authority, their marvelous generosity, the splendor. It occurred to her that 
here at last was something real and something perfect…Here was 
something which her consciousness would not wretchedly devour, and by 
making it part of her fantasy make it worthless…the pictures were 
something real outside herself, which spoke to her kindly and yet in 
sovereign tones, something superior and good whose presence destroyed the 
dreary trance-like solipsism of her earlier mood. When the world had 
seemed to be subjective it had seemed to be without interest and value. But 
now there was something else in it after all.
145
    
As I discussed in Section II, Murdoch insists that experiences of great art, such as the one 
that she describes in this example, are revelations in the sense that, during the time in which we 
take them in, they bring us to forget ourselves. She argues that a great work of art shows us how 
to contemplate something outside of ourselves – something distinct and separate – and it shows 
us the divide between self-centeredness and the world. As I showed in Section I, Murdoch takes 
it that this kind of vision is a fundamental requirement for moral progress. In Murdoch’s view, 
art can elicit this vision, and this is how it gives rise to moral training.  
The notion of attention, which I have already discussed at length, is the key to 
understanding Murdoch’s view regarding the relationship between beauty (whether in nature or 
art) and morality. Murdoch argues that acquiring this faculty of disinterested attention is part of 
what it is to become moral, which, as we have already seen, is to defeat one’s ego, focus one’s 
attention on other people rather than oneself, and to develop a just and loving attitude toward 
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other people. She insists that when children are invited to look at art or listen to music or stories, 
or to contemplate beauty in nature, we teach them to understand how they are to act when they 
experience these things; we teach them the “spirit” in which they should take them in. To 
properly attend to something is to give it our full focus, and to refrain from directing any of that 
focus toward ourselves. In this sense, when someone is trained to exercise attention, she is 
trained to respect something other than herself. Since beauty is something that can capture our 
full and undivided focus, it, in particular, is a vehicle for teaching a person the practice of 
attention. This is the motivation behind Murdoch’s view that experiences of beauty via art, 
through the attitude that they command us to acquire, teach us the morally ideal way of relating 
to the world.   
Therefore, the foundational connection between moral activity and experiences of beauty, 
on Murdoch’s view, lies in the fact that these experiences can train us to exercise attention. That 
is, experiences of beauty train us to respond and attend to things in the morally ideal way. Since 
exercising attention – something that involves humility – is unnatural to us, we need a venue by 
which this practice can be made accessible to us. The contemplation of beauty fulfills this role. 
Indeed, the apprehension of beauty, Murdoch argues, makes the purification of one’s 
consciousness possible: As is evidenced by the example of Dora above, and perhaps by other 
examples of experiences that we, ourselves, might remember having, during an experience of 
beauty one is not self-focused; rather beauty demands that we pay it due attention and this 
requires turning our focus toward only it. These experiences allow us to discover our ability to 
forget ourselves and perceive justly. This makes it possible for us to realize that we can “pierce 
the veil of selfish consciousness.” We learn to respond to the real world in the light of a virtuous 
consciousness, whereby virtue is the attempt to defeat the ego. Beauty shows us something other 
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than our own consciousness, for during the time when we experience it, we are drawn outside of 
that consciousness. In light of this we learn that there is something beyond our selfish concerns 
and we learn that it is at least possible to get beyond them, at least during the moment in which 
we experience beauty. As a result we begin to see that the ego can be overcome. Hence, through 
experiences of beauty, we learn to pay attention and respond to moral situations by keeping our 
attention focused on the real situation rather than allowing our attention to return repeatedly to 
ourselves.  In this sense, experiencing beauty illuminates the fact that reality is connected with 
the defeat of the ego.   
The moral training that occurs through an experience of beauty begins our transition from 
illusion – the egotistic fog which is the starting point of one’s moral pilgrimage – to the defeat of 
the ego and the realization of reality, which as I have argued, is the aim of the pilgrimage. When 
we learn to keep our attention properly focused, we are able to know, understand, and respect 
reality as it truly is rather than from an illusory perspective. Thus, an experience of beauty 
facilitates the Murdochian moral pilgrimage.  
With this in mind, one may recognize important connections between Murdoch’s theory 
and Plato’s. For example, Murdoch, like Plato, argues that experiences of beauty via art have a 
positive transforming effect; they train us to be moral. However, unlike Murdoch, Plato does not 
directly argue that art teaches us to respect things distinct from us, or that it teaches us to attend 
to the needs of other people; rather, he emphasizes the way in which art put’s one’s soul in order. 
Interestingly, though, for Plato, ordering one’s soul does entail disciplining the lower parts, and 
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one might argue that these lower parts of the soul are the parts that ground what Murdoch would 
refer to as our selfish desires.
146
  
However, it is important to notice that, in the Republic, when he discusses the 
relationship between art and moral training, Plato does not specifically mention anything about 
the experience of beauty via art being able to turn our focus away from selfish desires and 
toward the Good. Instead, as I have previously shown, it is in the Symposium and Phaedrus 
where Plato suggests that in experiences of beauty (specifically, erotic experiences of beautiful 
people) at least involve a directing away from one’s material concerns. On his view, through this 
kind of experience of beauty, one may find one’s true self. For Plato, one is able to become a 
better version of herself (she is able to grow morally) by climbing the ladder of the Symposium, 
or by having an experience such as that which is described in the Phaedrus. In both of these 
cases, one becomes morally good by becoming a certain kind of agent. She likens herself to a 
god through a relationship with an educator, and is hence, more like the Forms themselves. In 
this way, she is morally transformed, but the sort of experience that gives rise to this sort of 
moral transformation, on Plato’s view, is not an experience of beauty via art. As Murdoch, 
herself, puts it, “Plato allowed the beauty of the lovely boy an awakening power which he denied 
to the beauty of…art” (SOG 86).  
Murdoch agrees with Plato that some experiences of beauty via art can be used in moral 
training; they have the capacity to influence a person’s character, and they can, in turn, help give 
rise to appropriate behavior. However, unlike Plato, she suggests that these experiences of beauty 
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Plato and Murdoch generally share the view that art has a morally positive affect on those 
who experience it, and that art should not be divorced from morality. I recognize that Plato is 
best known for his apparent rejection of art in Republic, Book X, and that this point is often 
raised as an objection to the view that I am discussing here. However, in chapter 1, I considered 
Plato’s treatment of this point, and I argued that Plato’s view is not at all compromised by the 
abovementioned objection. In the interest of drawing a point of connection between Plato and 
Murdoch’s views of art and moral training, I am going to consider Murdoch’s response to the 
objection, and the way in which her response is influenced by Plato. I want to return briefly to 
the Republic.  
Plato’s discussion of poetry in these two books shows that art can have a positive 
transforming effect, but it should be censored in cases when it misrepresents what is ethically 
appropriate. Plato notes that art does in fact have the power – in the case of buffoonery, sex, 
anger, and desires, pleasures, and pains – to “nurture and water” the lower parts of the soul and 
establish “them as rulers in us when they ought to wither and be ruled” (606d).  
I argued that this is because, on Plato’s view, the appetite and spirited parts of the soul 
are cognitively limited to perception (and they accept evaluative appearances), and since the 
pleasure involved in poetry appeals to the lower parts of the soul (606d, 607), these parts of the 
soul will likely accept the appearances/images that are presented in art. These appearances will 
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be false at worst and reflective of – but removed from – the truth, at best. Therefore, these lower 
parts of the soul will accept (and pursue) the worthless or the bad if it is presented via art as 
good. However, my arguments showed that, by being exposed to art that captures the nature of 
something true – while they cannot perceive it – the lower parts of the soul can be trained to 
track the higher value that such art presents. Thus, though Plato concedes that certain art can 
indeed foster immoral character, this is not at all inconsistent with his claim that good art – that 
which represents what is ethically appropriate – gives rise to moral reformation.  
As she makes particularly evident in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch agrees 
with Plato that there is bad art, and that art can corrupt a person. Indeed, she agrees that art can 
be dangerous. Murdoch argues that the reason certain art can corrupt a person is that “by an 
attractive eloquent commentary upon human affairs it apes a sort of insight, a unified vision, 
which in its true form is a spiritual achievement” (MGM 19). In other words, this kind of art 
represents something which we subconsciously desire to be the case – we see in art an illusory 
unity and perfection. Murdoch wants to show that the problem with this kind of art is that it 
prompts false egotistic fantasies.
148
 The artist “softens egotistic fantasy by disguising it and 
bribes us by the purely formal pleasure which he offers us in his fantasies” (MGM 105). 
Murdoch explains: “Art is the fantasy life of the artist stimulating the fantasy life of the 
client, with the factitious work of art laying overlooked between them as a sort of disguised 
bribe.” Whereas in normal circumstances we would be repulsed by the private fantasies of 
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someone else, the artist “persuades us to accept his by disguising them cleverly, and by offering 
us formal and aesthetic pleasures which then incite us to release, upon our side, a play of 
personal fantasy which is normally inhibited” (MGM 20). Freud, whom Murdoch cites as a 
disciple of Plato, calls the pleasure that comes from art work a ‘fore-pleasure,’ and he argues that 
all art aspires to the condition of pornography, which is the end point to which an art object is a 
mechanical stimulus.  
Yet, important to Murdoch’s view is that this kind of “dangerous” art has its place in a 
good philosophy of art and its relationship with moral philosophy. Murdoch makes the point that 
Plato’s “attack on art” is intended to enlighten us. “It must be seen in the context of his whole 
moral philosophy. Life is a spiritual pilgrimage inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth, 
involving ipso facto a purification of energy and desire in the light of a vision of what is good” 
(MGM 14). What she means is that if we see the possibility that art may present us with an 
illusion, and that the lower parts of the soul will be tempted to accept that illusion, and hence, the 
world of appearances, we will be enlightened; that is, we will come to realize that there is a 
difference between appearance and reality, even on a level outside of art, and we will recognize 
that the transition between the two realms is one that we must make. For Plato, this transition 
(which Murdoch interprets as a pilgrimage) involves properly ordering one’s soul. For Murdoch, 
it involves overcoming the ego.   
Thus, for both Murdoch and Plato, an experience of art presents an alleged good – 
something that appears to be good, but may be merely an appearance or illusion. While art can, 
in some cases, be damaging because it can falsely appear to present or represent goodness, it can 
also – when it captures the nature of something true and real – be the source of and the impetus 
to moral transformation.   
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To briefly review, in this sub-section, I have given an account of Murdoch’s moral theory 
and her view regarding the connection between art and moral training. Furthermore, I have 
considered the way in which her view compares and contrasts with Plato’s view of aesthetic 
education, as he presents it in the Republic. My arguments have shown that the question as to 
whether art may also have a morally negative affect on those who experience it does not 
constitute a strong objection against either Murdoch’s or Plato’s thesis regarding the relationship 
between art and moral training.  
 
C. SEXUAL LOVE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH MORALITY  
I have shown that love is an important aspect of Murdoch’s view regarding the way in 
which beauty and morality are connected. However, I have not discussed Murdoch’s view 
regarding erotic experiences of beauty and sexual love. It is an interesting question as to whether 
Murdoch agrees with Plato’s view regarding erotic experiences of beautiful people. In other 
words, for Murdoch, is sexual love an insight into goodness and beauty or is it, perhaps, a source 
of egotistic fog and illusion?  
In the Phaedrus and Symposium, Plato speaks of beauty in terms of sexual love, and an 
ascent from physical passion to Beauty itself. As I have shown, on Plato’s view, sexual love is an 
important impetus for the soul in its search for the vision of the Good. Due to the unique role of 
beauty and sight, the physical presence of the beloved – as it affects the lover – is, for Plato, 
capable of prompting the soul to search for the Good. As Murdoch puts it, Phaedrus 250e 
“expresses Plato’s sense of certainty about the reality of goodness, which we are properly 
designed to love” (MGM 15). Here Plato suggests that we are able to see and love beauty more 
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easily than good, even though we all have a built-in desire for the Good. In his view, one of the 
ways in which beauty is perceived is through an erotic experience.  
Plato wants to show that a certain kind of moral reformation, which involves the 
discovery of the nature of the beloved person, and the loving actions inspired by this discovery 
(Phaedrus 253b, 255b), takes place specifically as a result of the reaction of the soul to an erotic 
experience of a beautiful person. Sexuality is very much a part of the experience, for the 
immediate reaction that the soul has is caused by the black horse, the appetite. One might say 
that we need the body’s response (that immediate reaction of the appetitive part) to beauty to 
stimulate our vision and send it searching for goodness.   
While Plato argues that erotic love involves an insight to beauty and goodness, he does 
not deny the possibility of blind sexual love. Furthermore, he does not deny the possibility of 
love inciting egotism or jealousy; after all, the young person is specifically warned against this 
possibility (Phaedrus 253b, 255b). However, as I have shown in Chapter 1, this kind of love 
results in one’s inability to either ascend the ladder of love in the Symposium or master the 
horses that pull the chariot of the Phaedrus.   
The opposing viewpoint – the thought that sexual love incites egotism and illusion – is 
important for my purposes here because, central to Murdoch’s moral philosophy, is the notion 
that the ego draws us to natural self-centeredness and makes it difficult for us to escape its 
illusion. Murdoch’s example of the mother and daughter-in-law in The Sovereignty of Good 
shows that envy, anxiety, and jealousy cause the mother-in-law to incorrectly perceive her 
daughter-in-law. When M finally makes an effort to see D clearly, this could be compared to a 
sort of Christian transformation of the self – a transition from one’s fallen state to her potential 
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self. Christianity is something that Murdoch refers to over and over again in her work, and in 
fact, it has been suggested that sexual desire, and the physical aspect of love, are, in Murdoch’s 
works, considered sins in the Christian sense (one might think particularly of the Dantean 
approach to Christianity
149
); that is, they are considered sins insofar as they are sources of 
egoistic self-delusion that come between us and the reality of our beloved.  
What is particularly important for my purposes in this section is the fact that certain 
approaches to Christianity (such as the Dantean approach) suppose that a sexual response to the 
beauty of another is something that decreases motivation to pursue the vision of the good by 
binding the mind to a false object of love. On this view, sexual love, like other sins, creates a 
kind of egotistic ‘fog’ around the lover, impeding his vision of the reality of the other, and of the 
good.  
It is interesting that certain views of Christianity advocate seeing goodness and an 
opportunity to exercise moral decision making in those we pity or in our enemies, but sometimes 
neglect to emphasize that we might see Christ in those with whom we are in (erotic) love.
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Instead of emphasizing the role of sexual love in connecting one to the good, the sinful aspects of 
carnal love are emphasized in certain Christian views in the name of clarifying a difference 
between “good” and “bad” love.   
From this sort of perspective, if sexual desire cannot be avoided as one stage in human 
life, love must be purified of bodily desire before a true vision of the other person or of the good 
can be achieved; that is, before the best form of human love and beneficence can be achieved. In 
                                                             
149 My discussion here is, in part, informed by Martha Nussbaum’s “’Faint with Secret Knowledge’: Love and 
Vision in Murdoch’s The Black Prince,” Iris Murdoch, Philosopher: A Collection of Essays, pp.143 She suggests 
that Murdoch’s view of sexual love is the Dantean view.  




this view, sexual love sees its object as passive, surrendering, and as a venue for superficial 
pleasure.   
Given that both Plato’s view and Christianity influenced (or at least played a role in the 
development of) Murdoch’s work, and given that Murdoch is specifically committed to the fact 
that egotism has a negative effect on people, it is a good question as to where she, herself, stands 
regarding the relationship sexual love and morality. The following passage sheds light on her 
view:  
Love [is] the fruit and overflow of spirit. Plato’s visions may seem far away 
from the mess of ordinary longing, but they shed light, we can understand. 
Falling in love is for many people their most intense experience, bringing 
with it a quasi-religious certainty, and most disturbing because it shifts the 
centre of the world from ourself to another place. A love relationship can 
occasion extreme selfishness and possessive violence, the attempt to 
dominate that other place so that it be no longer separate; or it can prompt a 
process of unselfing wherein the lover learns to see, and cherish and 
respect, what is not himself (MGM 16-17).  
In this passage, Murdoch acknowledges sexual love’s potential for violence and 
selfishness, but she also calls it the greatest source of an unselfing experience that many people 
will ever have.  Love can either facilitate selfishness and possessiveness, or it can “prompt a 
process of unselfing wherein the lover learns to see, and cherish and respect, what is not himself” 
(MGM 17). Murdoch argues that the notion that falling in love is one of our most intense 
experiences. It brings an almost religious certainty and an overflow of spirit, yet it is “most 
disturbing because it shifts the center of the world from ourself to another place;” that is, it gives 
us a vision of reality.  
Murdoch’s moral pilgrimage necessarily involves a desire for perfection, clarity, 
understanding, and truth. In order to begin that pilgrimage, a person needs a starting point and an 
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inspiration – a vision. She must get some spiritual cue and learn to discipline her emotions. An 
erotic experience of beauty is a way to virtue, and it has an obvious starting point. However that 
starting point involves desire, anxiety, and excitement, and so it involves danger and temptation. 
Thus, there are people who will not be moved from the starting point of an erotic experience of 
beauty to a moral vision. What Murdoch has in mind here is Plato’s “fallen prisoner of love” 
(Phaedrus, 252c). There are some people who will succumb to selfish temptations when they 
have an erotic experience of beauty, but there will also be those who overcome such temptations. 
Thus, Murdoch, like Plato, does not deny that sexual love might facilitate something negative. 
However, she insists that it also has the potential to prompt unselfing, which is necessary to the 
successful Murdochian moral pilgrim. Therefore, we can see that Murdoch’s view of sexual love 
is far more akin to Plato’s than it is to a view such as Dante’s: Murdoch does not hold that all 
sexual love incites an egotistic fog or illusion, but rather that some people who experience sexual 
love may be affected negatively, in this way.  
For Murdoch, an erotic experience of a beautiful person, which involves sexual love, can 
either send a person down a path of egotism, or it can bring her to virtue by way of the vision 
that beauty may give. In the latter case, the initial “desire is gradually transformed into love; and 
one begins to acquire the faculty of pure and disinterested attention.”
151
 She writes:  
To overcome egoism in its protean forms of fantasy and illusion is 
automatically to become more moral; to see the real is to see its 
independence and ergo its claims. The proper apprehension of beauty is joy 
in reality through the transfiguring of desire. Thus as we respond we 
experience the transcendence of the real and the personal ego fades as, in 
the words of the Symposium (210d), we ‘escape from the mean petty slavery 
of the particular case and turn toward the open sea of beauty’ (F&S 45).  
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Murdoch is sympathetic to the Platonic notion that moral life involves a slow shift of 
attachments (one may recall her arguments regarding the moral pilgrimage). This shift involves 
looking, attending to something, and concentrating, which becomes a source of “purified 
energy.” For Murdoch, this is a redemption of desire and sexual attachment, and it is one way in 
which the ego may be defeated. In her view, erotic experiences of beautiful people are a kind of 
education because they draw our interest away from ourselves and toward someone else. 
For Murdoch, during an erotic experience of beauty, just as during an experience of 
beautiful art, one is not self-focused; rather beauty demands that we pay it due attention and this 
requires turning our focus toward only it. Beauty, whether it is experienced erotically or 
artistically, shows us that there is something beyond our selfish concerns and we learn that it is at 
least possible to get beyond them, at least during the moment in which we experience beauty. As 
a result we begin to see that the ego can be overcome.   
Thus, for Murdoch, while sexual love has the potential to incite vice, it also has the 
potential to provide a vision of beauty and goodness. Erotic experiences of beauty – which 
involve sexual love – may give rise to moral training and also unselfing. Beauty, whether it is 
found in art or nature, teaches a person to practice attention, and this is the sense in which it 
trains a person to be moral. Seemingly, erotic experiences of beautiful people might entail an 
even more powerful sort of moral training than an experience of beauty via art, from the 
Murdochian point of view, since in the case of an erotic experience of beauty, the beauty toward 
which one is focusing her full attention is actually present in another human being. Since 
attending to other human beings justly and lovingly is the point of moral progress on Murdoch’s 
view, erotic experiences of beautiful people might be the closest experience one can have to 
practicing the sort of attention that she advocates.   
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Part II: Murdoch and Kant 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In addition to its Platonic influence, Murdoch’s general view of aesthetics is strongly 
influenced by Kant’s. Her evaluation of Kant’s view of aesthetics can be discussed in light of the 
particular article, “The Sublime and the Good,” which Murdoch wrote in 1959.
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 In this essay, 
Murdoch argues that Kant’s theory of art must be rejected because it encompasses only “a very 
small area of what we normally think of as art” (S&G, 46), and it “fails to account for the 
greatness of tragedy” (S&G, 48). Her argument in support of this claim can be used as a 
foundation for an analysis of the differences and similarities between Murdochian and Kantian 
aesthetics. Thus, my aim in this section is to examine Murdoch’s main argument in “The 
Sublime and the Good,” and to thereby draw out some important points of connection, as well as 
points of distinction, between her view and Kant’s.   
 
B. ACCOUNTING FOR TRAGEDY IN AESTHETICS  
Let us begin by examining the following remark from “The Sublime and The Good”:  
Kant prefers bird-song to opera. Kant thinks that art is essentially play. Now 
Shakespeare is great art, and Shakespeare is not play, so Kant must be 
wrong (S&G, 49).   
Murdoch argues that Kant “must be wrong” because a proper account of aesthetics 
should involve more than play – it must allow for crisis and conflict, which are both very well 
                                                             
152 In fact, Murdoch’s aim in this essay is to “work towards [her] own sketch of a definition [of art] through a 




represented by tragic art. In her view, it is not surprising that Kant is unable to give us an account 
of tragedy in his aesthetics (S&G, 51) because he wants us to 
live by exceedingly simple and general rules: suppression of history, 
suspicion of eccentricity. Here we can see more clearly how it is that beauty 
symbolizes the good in its sensuous counterpart. The aesthetic judgment has 
the same simple self-contained character as the moral judgment, and it is 
ideally the response to something which is not complicated or highly 
individual. Kant’s aesthetic tastes mirror his moral preferences. He would 
like, as it were, by morality to crystallise out of the historical process a 
simple society living strictly by extremely general rules, with no place for 
the morally complicated or eccentric (S&G, 51).  
Instead, “the true view of the matter,” according to Murdoch, is that:  
Art and morals are…one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of 
them is love. Love is perception of individuals. Love is the extremely 
difficult realization that something other than oneself is real. Love, and so 
art and morals, is the discovery of reality. What stuns us into a realization of 
our supersensible destiny is not, as Kant imagined, the formlessness of 
nature, but rather its unutterable particularity; and most particular and 
individual of all natural things is the mind of man (S&G, 52).  
It is for this reason, Murdoch insists, that tragedy is the “highest art.” Tragedy is the art 
that is most concerned with individuality. It harbors “the true sense of that exhilaration of 
freedom which attends art and which has its more rarely achieved counterpart in morals” (S&G, 
52). As I have already discussed at length in Chapter 3, Murdoch wants to show that this is 
because tragedy allows us to apprehend other individuals and their particularities, and it reveals 
the true nature of sin (MGM 104-105). However, we may fail to see this because we are  
sunk in a social whole which we allow uncritically to determine our 
reactions…we are completely enclosed in a fantasy world of our own into 
which we try to draw things from outside, not grasping their reality and 
independence, making them into dream objects of our own (S&G, 52).  
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Murdoch argues that fantasy is the enemy of true imagination. The enemies of art and 
morals, and hence, love, Murdoch insists, are selfishness and egotism. This is why, on her view, 
one must embark on the moral pilgrimage that she describes. One must overcome oneself, 
fantasy, and convention, and one way that this can be made possible is by experiencing tragic art 
such as King Lear, which is 
exhilarating. It is also…painful. It is very like Achtung. Kant was 
marvelously near the mark. But he thought of freedom as the aspiration to a 
universal order consisting of a pre-fabricated harmony. It was not a tragic 
freedom. The tragic freedom implied by love is this: that we all have an 
indefinitely extended capacity to imagine the being of others…Love is the 
imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this otherness (S&G, 52).  
Murdoch wants aesthetic experience to be connected with this kind of freedom – the 
recognition of our indefinitely extended capacity to imagine the being of other individuals. I 
argued in Chapter 3 that the art of tragedy is connected with humility because it involves a 
presentation of the idea of death. The idea of death and the realization of it, leads to a humbling 
experience, namely, the realization of death plays a role in defeating the selfish part of us. 
Tragedy shows us the truth about human life (and death) without consolation, and the realization 
of this truth brings with it something “very like Achtung.” This wakes us from the egotistic 
dream for eternal power and happiness, and we begin to see what is beyond (or at least other 
than) such concerns. We are then able to notice something that we have not noticed before, 
namely, other individuals in all of their particularity.   
As I argue below, Achtung, for Murdoch, is a feeling of respect for other people, and she 
thinks tragedy gives us Achtung. However, as Murdoch explains, in order to evidence this claim, 
she needs to show that Kant’s theory of Achtung is inadequate. Furthermore, in order to connect 
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aesthetic experience with what she is calling tragic freedom, she needs to transform and transfer 
the core of Kant’s theory of the sublime into his theory of art (S&G, 46).   
Murdoch notes that “Kant’s reflections on genius respond to the need to see art as 
capable of engaging with an intellectual grasp of the world.”  However, she thinks that Kant’s 
theory of art is inadequate because a proper theory of art must “‘account’ for tragedy, for 
poetry;” she specifically states that “tragedies are plays written by great poets” (MGM 93). 
Interestingly, she goes on to quote Kant’s remark in section 53 of the Critique of Judgment that 
“among all the arts poetry holds the highest rank.” While this may seem strange at first glance, I 
suggest the following interpretation: Murdoch wants to make clear that she does indeed 
recognize that Kant sees poetry as the highest art, but she wants to argue that he has not properly 
or fully accounted for it in the context of tragedy. In order to do so, she argues, a theory of art 
must let tragedy join the sublime and the beautiful together:  
The sublime is the proud energetic fear with which the rational being faces 
the contingent dreadfulness of the world. The beautiful (says Kant) is the 
experience of a pleasing formal completeness in a purposeless conceptless 
object. The sublime is a special exercise of reason, a kind of moral 
adventure. The beautiful is a free play of the imagination in a frolic with the 
understanding, working sensuously upon an empty notion of an object 
offered by the latter. The concepts are dissimilar; the sublime is moral, the 
beautiful is aesthetic. We cannot separate the tragic experience from our 
general sense of humanity. Kant elevates the noble sublime above the 
playful beautiful. Tragedy would then be a (unique) moralizing or 
redeeming of the beautiful. Only within high morality can the spectacle of 
terrible human suffering become a thing of beauty (MGM 100).  
I mentioned that Murdoch wants to show that Kant’s theory of Achtung is inadequate. 
With this in mind, Murdoch argues that Kant’s theory of sublimity will not suffice as it stands. In 
particular, she thinks that Kant makes a wrong move in connecting the sublime with reverence 
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for human reason. This connection, Murdoch argues, makes sublimity something about the 
subject encountering itself; that is, what we have is a theory of sublimity that is a theory about 
reason being reminded of its own freedom. This is problematic, Murdoch suggests, because it 
does not allow for any connection between experiences of sublimity and a certain kind of 
conflict that takes place between human individuals; she insists that when sublimity is 
understood properly, it is seen as relevant to this kind of conflict.   
Specifically, Murdoch wants to show that the freedom that is connected with an 
experience of sublimity should be understood as “tragic freedom” – the “exercise of the 
imagination in an irreconcilable conflict of dissimilar beings” (SOG, 217). We should understand 
sublimity, and the boundlessness that it involves, as representative of the infiniteness of the task 
of particular individuals trying to understand each other – not just as rational beings that are 
similar to oneself, as Kant would suggest – but as beings distinct and other than oneself.   
Murdoch wants to show that morality involves becoming aware of free persons in 
conflict, and that tragedy, in particular, provokes such an awareness. With this in mind, 
Murdoch’s aim is to retain the “core” of Kant’s theory of sublimity, and transfer it into his theory 
of art. She argues that the result will be that the essence of morality – the perception of 
individuals and “the realization that something other than oneself is real” – will also be the 
essence of tragedy, and art and morals will be united. Thus, at this point one might wonder what, 
exactly, Murdoch’s view of sublimity is, and why, exactly, she wants to keep the core of the 





C. ACHTUNG AND ITS EFFECTS  
  Murdoch sees value in Kant’s theory of sublimity insofar as she agrees that the 
limitlessness of sublimity is connected with morality. She suggests that in this way the sublime 
has “a superior spiritual function,” and it is able to connect us with experiences that are “on a 
higher level [than base desires and inclinations],” i.e. moral experiences (MGM, 9). However, 
Murdoch interprets the value of sublimity differently from Kant: She argues that the object of 
our feeling of elation at the limitlessness of sublimity is the unlimited variety of free individuals. 
Sublimity takes us from Achtung to respect for others, and it points to the infiniteness of that task 
of particular individuals trying to understand each other as different from oneself. Sublimity 
makes us aware of the possibility of overcoming oneself, which, she argues, is the infinite task of 
love. What Murdoch wants to transform is the Kantian idea that sublimity provokes “pride in our 
free moral nature” (MGM, 9). She argues that:  
[Kant] attempts to make the act of moral judgment an instantiating of a 
timeless form of rational activity; and it is this, this empty demand for a 
total order, which we are required to respect in each other. Kant does not 
tell us to respect whole particular tangled-up historical individuals, but to 
respect the universal reason in their breasts (S&G, 51).   
As Murdoch’s essay, the “The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited”
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 brings out, 
Murdoch wants to show that what sublimity provokes is not a sense of the power of Reason, as 
Kant suggests, but instead a sense of humility and “the un-self-centered…agnosticism which 
goes with tolerance” (SBR, 283). Thus, while Murdoch and Kant share the view that the 
connection between sublimity and morality is grounded in its limitlessness, an important 
distinction between the Kantian connection between sublimity and morality and the Murdochian 
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connection between sublimity and morality can be drawn: Kant means to argue that sublimity 
carries us to look away from self-love and self-conceit and toward the moral law in everyone. On 
the other hand, Murdoch means to argue that sublimity carries us to look away from ourselves 
and toward others conceived of as they really are – as individual beings with their own 
particularities.  
First, Kant recognizes that as rational agents, we have some appreciation of what is 
required by morality. On the other hand, as rational animals, we are affected by the inclinations 
or sensuous desires. Thus, things that bring about well-being and comfort and sustenance, will be 
liable to appear to us as good even if morality requires that we not engage in them. This means 
that within our nature, there will be certain competing conceptions of good. In other words, a 
conflict is embedded in our nature as human beings. Yet, we are aware of our obligation to the 
moral law, which commands us to fulfill our duty even in the case that doing so requires a 
struggle. We must not attempt to excuse ourselves “from our duty when circumstances make it 
difficult for us to perform it.” Kant recognizes that it is sometimes permissible to act in 
accordance with our inclinations (i.e., when the moral law does not direct us to do otherwise). 
When we do this, we are acting in accordance with what he calls “self-love” – that is, we take it 
that some object of inclination ought to be pursued. The point is that self-love is acceptable so 
long as it does not conflict with the moral law. However, there are times when we desire to act in 
accordance with our inclinations even when the moral law has directed us to do otherwise. In this 
kind of case, self-love has given rise to a certain illusion; we develop a mistaken supposition that 
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there is something more important about ourselves, personally, than moral action. This illusion, 
Kant argues, is called “self-conceit” (CPrR 5:74).
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In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that the consciousness of the moral law 
“strikes down self-conceit” (5:73) and “humiliates every human being when he compares it with 
the sensible propensity of his nature” (5:74). This awareness “deprives self-conceit of its 
illusion.” Achtung is, in a word, an attraction to what makes it possible for us to overcome the 
inclinations and sensuous desires; it is something that humiliates a part of our nature, and this 
humiliation is difficult to endure. Awareness of the moral law is not something that is easily 
experienced. It is difficult, and painful: Kant uses the following example to shed light on this 
point:  
Before a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character 
in a higher degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows, whether I 
want it or whether I do not and I hold my head ever so high, that he may not 
overlook my superior position. Why is this? His example holds before me a 
law that strikes down my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct, 
and I see observance of that law and hence its practicability proved before 
me in fact. (CPrR 5:76-77)  
The thought here is that in this man, I perceive a higher degree of character than that of 
which I am aware in myself; that is I perceive the common man’s moral superiority. Kant wants 
to show that when I observe the moral law in a humble and common human being, who is 
comparatively less well-off than myself, I am humiliated. In fact, I feel badly; the experience is 
not a fun one. The humiliation involved in this experience is caused both by the fact that this 
man, like me, is subject to the moral law, and by my realization that this man conforms to the 
moral law better that I have done. This experience is painful; “it strikes down my pride” (CPrR 
                                                             
154 All of my references to this text are to Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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5:77). Hence, this consciousness of the moral law is a humbling experience. Though I held my 
head high, “my sprit bowed,” as a result of Achtung.   
Kant argues that we call something sublime because it brings to the forefront our power 
to regard the objects of our natural concerns (our inclinations) as small and comparatively 
unimportant (28:262). Sublimity gives us the feeling of Achtung (this happens when the formal 
condition of practical cognition and its feeling of Achtung are aesthetically fulfilled) which is the 
feeling that “strikes down self-conceit.” Insofar as sublimity also gives us a feeling of elation as 
we experience the boundless and limitless, it has the unique power of making Achtung palatable 
to us. By sublimity, we are elated in the midst of difficulty, and we are given strength.   
Thus, part of Kant’s connection between sublimity and morality can be found in the 
analogy between an experience of sublimity and the experience of the humble, common man that 
I noted above: Both of these experiences give rise to a humbling of the selfish parts of us. The 
advantage of having an experience of sublimity is that it makes Achtung pleasurable, even 
though it is a negative pleasure. This attracts us to an awareness of the proper relationship 
between our cognitive faculties, and hence, can attract us to moral action vs. immoral action.   
However, Murdoch wants to get something different out of a theory regarding the 
relationship between sublimity and morality. She wants to argue in favor of a connection 
between sublimity and an awareness of other people and their individual particularities – a 
connection between sublimity and human conflict, and the realization that other people (in 
addition to ourselves) must embark on a moral pilgrimage that is difficult for them, due to their 
different points of view; indeed, “it matters how we see other people” (MGM 463). We must see 
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that other people, as well as ourselves, are “constantly in process of recognizing the falseness of 
our ‘goods’, and the unimportance of what we deem important” (MGM 430).   
Murdoch does not agree with Kant that sublimity makes us aware of the moral law in all 
people; rather she argues that sublimity makes us aware of those people themselves. While Kant 
acknowledges that rational beings have lower-level inclinations in addition to the rational part, 
and that Achtung brings us to overcome those lower parts of ourselves, he does not argue that it 
brings us to recognize that other people also have them.   
Yet, this is the very point that Murdoch wants us to recognize in a theory of sublimity. 
For her, instead of recognizing something about ourselves (i.e., that we have the faculty of 
reason), we need to recognize something outside of ourselves, namely, other individuals, and 
their situations. This involves being humbled, which involves overcoming oneself and attending 
to particular individuals outside of or other than oneself. Thus, as I discussed earlier, this is why 
Murdoch wants to connect sublimity with the art of tragedy: Tragedy shows us the way things 
really are: Tragedy does not console us. It shows us the truth about death and it breaks down the 
ego. Tragedy shows us that reality for us as human beings is uncomfortable and full of conflict 
and misery, and that the human condition is frail and transient. We begin to notice others when 
our egos are defeated, and we begin to grasp the fact that “others are, to an extent we never cease 
discovering, different from ourselves” (SOG, 216). It is at this point that we are able to see that 
those particular individuals should be given our loving attention.   
Indeed, if we briefly recall the M and D example, we can reasonably say that M – in 
attending to D – is humbled: she is drawn to see that she could have been wrong. Indeed, she 
sees that she might have been previously, egotistically focused on promoting her relationship 
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with her son, or something else about herself, rather than seeing the truth about D. When she 
eventually, correctly relates to D, she has looked away from her own selfish concerns and, 
instead, toward D.  
Murdoch wants us to exercise loving attention toward individuals other than ourselves, 
and, as I have shown previously, to truly ‘see’ them. Murdoch insists that we need to see the 
conflict among individuals, and recognize that it is part of morality. Thus, in order to connect 
this point with a theory of art, Murdoch wants to transform Kantian sublimity into something that 
can be applicable to her theory of tragedy. It is that transformed theory of sublimity, then, that 
she wants to transfer into a theory of art. This transformation will in turn ground the connection 
between art and morals.  
 
C. CONCLUSION 
My arguments in Chapters 1 and 2 shed light on interesting connections between the 
moral training that occurs as a result of an experience of beauty via art in Plato’s Republic and 
Kant’s discussion of experiences of beauty, and the moral growth that occurs as a result of erotic 
experiences of beauty in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus and as a result of experiences of the 
sublime in Kant’s theory. In this chapter, I have discussed the place that Iris Murdoch’s 
aesthetics takes among Plato’s and Kant’s theories.   
Plato, Kant, and Murdoch all share the general view that experiences of beauty cannot 
and should not be divorced from morality. Specifically, I have shown that Plato distinguishes 
between two kinds of experiences of beauty – experiences of beauty via art and erotic 
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experiences of beautiful people – which respectively give rise to different kinds of moral 
reformation.  
I have argued that Kant, like Plato, distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic 
experience. He wants to show that the experience of beauty is especially capable of preparing us 
for loving something without interest (29:267). On the other hand, an experience of the sublime 
best captures what Kant calls ‘moral feeling,’ and hence, it is the sublime that teaches us to 
“esteem something even against our interest” (29:267). The sublime is what genuinely 
characterizes moral dignity through a presentation of reason’s dominance over sensibility 
(29:269). I have argued that this kind of moral context is more akin Plato’s discussion of the 
erotic experience of a beautiful person than to the kind of moral training that Plato describes in 
the Republic or the kind of moral improvement that Kant alludes to in his discussion of an 
experience of beauty in nature.   
Thus, for Plato and Kant there are two kinds of aesthetic experience, each with its own 
respective morally reformative effect. However, Plato does not speak of the sublime (while Kant 
does), and Kant does not speak of erotic experiences of beauty (while Plato does). Yet, the 
effects that Plato suggests result from an erotic experience of beauty (in particular in the 
Phaedrus) very much resemble the effects that Kant describes of an experience of sublimity.  
Murdoch recognizes and discusses all of the following kinds of aesthetic experiences as 
experiences that may promote moral transformation: beauty in nature and art, erotic experiences 
of beautiful people, and sublimity in art (especially tragedy) and nature. She maintains that moral 
training, and the sort of reformation that results from Plato’s erotic experiences of beautiful 
people, as well as the triumph over the ego, may all result from all or any of those kinds of 
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experiences. Some of these experiences might be more apt than others to teach us about certain 
aspects of moral reformation. For example, an erotic experience of beauty might be especially 
capable of teaching us love for other people, insofar as it teaches us to appreciate the subjectivity 
of another individual. Tragedy is especially capable of showing us the idea of death, which has a 
particularly powerful impact against the ego.  
Like Plato, Murdoch distinguishes between good and bad art, and she argues that while 
bad art may lead to immoral action, good art may be used as an instrument in a person’s moral 
development. Unlike Plato, however, Murdoch finds a place for erotic experiences of beauty, as 
well as sublimity, in art. Like Kant, Murdoch argues that there is a symbolic relationship 
between beauty and morality. However, while Kant and Murdoch both have specific theories of 
sublimity, Murdoch argues that an experience of sublimity does not give rise to the recognition 
of one’s own faculty of reason, as Kant suggests, but rather to the recognition of other 
individuals, and the realization of human conflict.  
Furthermore, I have suggested that erotic experiences of beautiful people might entail an 
even more powerful sort of moral training than experiences of beauty via art, from the 
Murdochian point of view: since in the case of an erotic experience of beauty, the beauty toward 
which one is focusing her full attention is actually present in another human being. Moreover, 
since attending to other human beings justly and lovingly is the point of moral progress on 
Murdoch’s view, erotic experiences of beauty might be the closest experience one can have to 
practicing the sort of attention that she advocates.   
In the latter part of this chapter, I discussed points of connection between Murdoch’s and 
Kant’s views of aesthetics. Both Murdoch and Kant argue that experiences of beauty make it 
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possible for us to see something other than our own interests or inclinations. Also, they both 
recognize a symbolic relationship between experiences of beauty and morality. For Kant, the 
symbolism is more formal, in the relationship between the cognitive faculties during aesthetic 
and moral judgments. For Murdoch beauty shows us the gap between “self” and world – it 
commands us to contemplate the other. It does not console us, or build up our pride, or feed the 
illusions that we create of ourselves. This is analogous to the way in which we ought to behave 
toward other individuals: we ought to contemplate them in their individual particularities, and we 
ought to look and look again, giving them our full attention.   
However, Murdoch disagrees with Kant when it comes to sublimity. She insists that it is 
a mistake to argue that sublimity makes us aware of the moral law in all people; instead, 
Murdoch argues that sublimity makes us aware of those people themselves. Murdoch insists that 
Kant does not properly account for the conflict among individuals, and recognize that it is part of 
morality. As I have shown, she claims that a proper theory of aesthetics must account for the 
conflict among individuals. Thus, in order to connect this point with a theory of art, Murdoch 
transforms Kantian sublimity into something that is applicable to her theory of tragedy. She then 
transfers this transformed theory of sublimity into her theory of art. Thus, in Murdochian 
aesthetics, unlike Kantian aesthetics, sublimity is brought to the context of art. In this way, 
experiences of art not only give rise to moral training, but they also give us the feeling of 





MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM ABOUT THE GOOD AND THE TWO-
TIER SELFLESS PERSPECTIVE 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In this dissertation I am concerned with the connection between the aesthetic and the 
moral. Up to this point, I have given an analysis of the way in which this connection figures in 
the views of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch. In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will sketch a 
theory of my own that has commonalities with their views. I am going to focus on three 
interrelated theses, one in moral psychology, one in normative value theory, and one in the 
intersection between them. The first thesis I shall defend is motivational internalism about the 
good, and the second thesis is the substantive claim that the moral is, in fact, good. Therefore, 
when one understands the moral as good she has motivation towards it. However, humans do not 
necessarily have such an understanding. A person may believe that something is morally 
required without believing it to be good. With this in mind, the third thesis is that art may help us 
to see the moral as good by giving us a new kind of perspective – a new point of view from 
which one understands that there is a higher self. 
In what follows, I will first make some initial remarks about the nature of internalism and 
moral realism, and summarize Plato’s, Kant’s, and Murdoch’s views of moral motivation in 
terms of contemporary views. Then, I will sketch my own view that motivational judgment 
internalism can and does coexist with an objective Good, where goodness is not a function of 




II.   PRELIMINARY REMARKS ABOUT INTERNALISM AND MORAL REALISM  
Motivational value judgment internalism is the view that judgments of value are 
accompanied by motivation. Two versions of motivational value judgment internalism include 
prudential internalism
155
 – the view that judgments that something is good for the agent are 
accompanied by motivation – and moral internalism
156
 – the view that moral judgments are 
accompanied by motivation.  I endorse prudential internalism, but not moral internalism. In 
addition, however, I also endorse the following substantive moral claim: Things that are morally 
valuable are also prudentially valuable. I shall explain this thoroughly in section F. However, in 
this present section, I need to make some preliminary distinctions and clarifications regarding 
internalism and moral realism.  
First, motivational value judgment internalism provides answers to questions such as 
what, exactly, the connection is between value judgments and motivation, and whether such 
judgments are necessarily motivating. In response to these questions, philosophers primarily 
argue either in support of or against motivational value judgment internalism. Second, moral 
internalism claims that a person cannot sincerely make a moral judgment without being 
motivated at least to some degree to act on her judgment. That is, if I sincerely judge that I 
morally should A, then I have a motive to A. For example, one version of this view is that 
reasons must explain actions, but in order to explain actions, one must appeal to motivations. An 
explanation that cites motivations is an internal – not external – reasons explanation.
157
 
                                                             
155 A recent defender of this view is Jyl Gentzler, “Attractions and Delights of Goodness.” We might also call this 
motivational prudential judgment internalism, but I have shortened it to prudential internalism here. 
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 Some recent defenders of this view include Broome, “Reason and Motivation,” Smith, “The Moral Problem,” 
Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” Leben & Wilkens, “Pushing the Intuitions behind Moral Internalism,” 
and Worsnip & Phillips, “Motivating Internalism”. Although this view has been given different names in the past, 
and while it would be consistent to refer to it more specifically as motivational moral judgment internalism, I have 
shortened the phrase for my purposes here.  
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 See Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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Third, “strong moral internalism” has been the common name for the view that, 
“necessarily, the person who makes a sincere moral judgment will be overridingly motivated to 
comply with her judgment.”
158
 Most contemporary views of motivational judgment internalism 
are forms of what has been called “weak moral internalism,” which allows that “even though, 
necessarily, the person who makes a sincere moral judgment will feel some motivation to 
comply with it, that motivation can be overridden by conflicting desires and defeated by a variety 
of mental maladies, such as depression and weakness of will.”
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A familiar debate, and one that is relevant to my purposes here, involves the question as 
to whether only pre-existing desires and wants motivate, or whether beliefs can be a source of 
motivation, possibly by generating desires. The former – the idea that mere belief cannot be 
motivating – is a popular tenet of Humean moral psychology. According to those who hold this 
Humean view, the internalist thesis that value judgments are accompanied by motivation can be 
explained in the following way: Since only pre-existing desires and wants motivate, and since all 
value judgments are accompanied by motivation, all value judgments reflect pre-existing desires. 
In other words, in this view, the motivation that accompanies moral and other value judgments is 
produced by previously existing desires. This involves a constraint on the moral because moral 
judgments are determined by desires and wants; i.e., morality is something that is dependent 
upon the agent doing the judging. In light of this, internalism is frequently allied with 
subjectivism.  
To expand on this point, a case in which internalism is tied with subjectivism is a case in 
which a person holds a subjective theory about the good; that is, when a person maintains that 
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one’s desires or preferences somehow determine what is of value, prudentially, morally or in 
some other way for that particular person. This view suggests that our values and obligations are 
based upon our own motives, actual and potential, and that value consists in the satisfaction of 
desires; what is intrinsically valuable for a person must connect with what he finds compelling or 
attractive. An individual’s good must be “made for” or “suited to” her, but this is only possible if 
that which is valuable for her is within her motivational capacity.
160
 
However, Murdoch, Kant, and Plato do not accept the Humean principle that only pre-
existing desires and wants are motivating. In connection with Murdoch, Kant, and Plato, my 
view is that the Good has an authority that is independent of our wants and desires, and that 
motivation does not determine or change what is good. I maintain that motivation need not be 
derived from desires that we previously possess. Rather, desires arise after the Good is 
recognized. In this sense, I am going to insist that prudential internalism can and does coexist 
with an objective Good, where goodness is not determined by one’s desires. My view is, 
therefore, a non-subjectivist theory about the Good. I suggest that we understand the relationship 
between desires/motivations and the good in the following way: It is not that my desires and 
motivations toward something make it good for me; rather I desire/am motivated toward 
something because I believe it is good. According to the moral objectivist, the moral subjectivist 
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is “putting the cart before the horse.”
161
 It is not that goodness is determined by my desires; 
rather, some desires are generated by perceptions of goodness. With this in mind, my view will 
involve the following two claims: (1) Thoughts about the Good can produce desires and 
motivations that are not derived from pre-existing ones, and (2) Desires are products of 
perception or belief about value. 
I have only given a brief introduction of my view here. However, before discussing my 
view in more depth, I shall turn to a specific consideration of where Plato’s, Kant’s, and 
Murdoch’s views are situated in the discussion.  
 
III.   PLATO AND INTERNALISM  
In Chapter 1, I argued that Plato holds the Socratic thesis regarding motivation and that in 
dialogues from all periods he endorses the view that all desire is for things qua good (we desire 
things that we perceive as or think to be good because we perceive them as or think them to be 
good). This reading involves the theory that the desires of lower parts of the soul as well as those 
of the rational part involve and depend on apprehensions of their objects as good, which is 
commonly referred to as ‘good-dependence.’ Socrates states at Republic 505d-e that  
 
Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake. It 
divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately 
grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, 
and so it misses the benefit, if any that even those other things may give.  
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I argued that this passage should be interpreted to mean that each part of the soul desires 
what it takes to be good and that everyone pursues things under the guise of the good, no matter 
which part of her soul rules her. My reading of Plato’s view entails that only a rational-part-
ruling soul can understand what goodness truly consists in, and that souls that are ruled by the 
lower parts err on account of confused notions of the good. I argued that it is this kind of 
confused notion of the good that gives rise to (and accounts for) the sorts of akratic actions that 
Plato describes in the Republic.  
According to Plato, our subjective perceptions of goodness are reflections through which 
true Goodness shows itself. Thus, a kind of subjective pull begins our awareness of Goodness, 
which in turn may optimally lead to being well-off (leading a good life). While the ideal function 
of this pull would be to provide us with a glimpse of true Goodness, such glimpses can be 
distorted: The lower parts of the soul sometimes perceive vicious things as good. I have argued 
that the appetite and spirit are confined to perception, and that the difference between these two 
parts (the non-rational parts) and the rational part of the soul is that the non-rational part accepts 
appearances unreflectively and the rational part – in its ability to calculate and reflect on 
appearances – transcends them. The consequence of the appetite and spirited parts being 
cognitively limited to perception is that the appearances they accept will be false at worst and 
reflective of – but removed from – the truth at best. This makes them cognitively and ethically 
handicapped. As a result, they pursue the worthless or the bad in the worst case scenario, or in 
the best case, while they cannot perceive it, they can be trained to track the higher value that 
reason calculates as good.
162
 Thus, while it is possible for the non-rational parts of the soul to 
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mistake mere appearances of goodness for true goodness, when our desires and appetites 
function in harmony with reason and spirit – when there is a proper interplay between the three 
parts – glimpses of goodness will be ones of the true Good.   
Furthermore, “there are three pleasures corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one 
peculiar to each part, and similarly with desires…” (Republic 580d). When the soul works in 
harmony, it enjoys the truest possible pleasure:  
When the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war 
in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in 
particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible 
for it (Republic 586e-587a).  
Jyl Gentzler draws on this passage as she argues in support of her own view that a 
Platonic account of prudential
163
 value is superior to a subjectivist account of prudential value.
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Gentzler’s following remark sheds light on the connection between pleasure and the properly 
functioning soul:  
…human beings are such that they are motivated to pursue the functioning 
of the parts of their souls through the mechanisms of desire and pleasure. 
When the different parts of the soul function harmoniously, the subject 
experiences pleasure…all human beings have a natural and necessary desire 
to pursue the functioning of the parts of their souls…human beings are such 
that the functioning of at least some of our parts is under our control, and 
the mechanisms by which they assert this control involve pleasure and 
desire.  Therefore, human beings could not be well off, that is, could not be 
such that all of their human parts function harmoniously together, without 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
able to focus her desires once she understands the Good. The more that she understands that the moral is good for 
her, the more she will understand which desires she ought (prudentially) to satisfy. Thus, I do endorse a certain sort 
of this Platonic notion of “tracking.”  
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In Plato’s view, there are certain pleasures that we experience when the parts of our souls 
perform their respective functions, and these pleasures count as prudential, since they (together 
with certain desires) are part of what motivates the harmonious functioning of the whole soul. 
When one has a harmoniously functioning soul, she will experience pleasure (Rep. 586e-587a); 
i.e., pleasure accompanies goodness.
166
 Furthermore, the harmoniously functioning soul is a 
virtuous soul, and virtue, as Socrates puts it, “is a well-being of the soul” (445e): 
[The virtuous person] puts himself in order, is his own friend, and 
harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical 
scale – high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others 
there may be in between, and from having been many things becomes 
entirely one, moderate and harmonious (Rep. 443d). 
Socrates goes on to state that any action that “preserves [a person’s] inner harmony and 
helps achieve it” will be “just and fine” (Rep. 443e). The virtuous person is constituted such that 
she sees good things, and in this way, as she judges them to be good, she will desire them. Put 
more colloquially, when the soul is working properly, the things that strike a person as good, are 
in fact good things. Hence, the harmoniously functioning soul directs a person toward the Good. 
The harmonious soul gives a person the point of view from which she may also see that the 
moral is good. This is the point of view from which morally required things can be perceived as 
good. A moral judgment made from this point of view will involve a belief about the Good that 
is derived in a certain way (formed under reason in a properly ordered soul), and hence, 
motivation toward the moral will be a subset, as it were, of motivation toward the Good. 
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On the other hand, the soul of an unjust person is in discord; that is, all of its parts pull in 
different directions (444b). With this and the above passages in mind, it makes sense to suggest 
that for Plato when we call something prudential or, on the other hand, harmful for a person, this 
involves some notion of what it is for a person to be “one” – unified and complete – vs. in 
conflict; i.e., when different parts of the soul are pulling in different directions. If a person is in 
the former situation, she is well off, and if she is in the latter situation, she is badly off. Thus, 
having a harmoniously functioning soul both is prudential and involves virtuous activity. 
Furthermore, as I suggested above, when one’s soul is in this state of harmony, she is capable of 
seeing that virtuous activity (the moral) is prudential. 
I should also note that a reference to desires and pleasure enters the Platonist (realist) 
theory of value, but not as an explanation of the nature of value. By a “realist theory of value,” I 
mean a theory that claims there are facts and properties about value, the existence and nature of 
which are independent of people’s beliefs and attitudes. This kind of theory holds that there are 
genuine claims about value and that those claims are true or false. If they are true claims, they 
have a kind of ontological robustness: In particular, they are not reducible to desires and they are 
mind-independent. These claims are facts about value.
167
 
In Plato’s view, it is part of our nature to grasp the objective Good. We have cognitive 
access to the Good in the form of (often distorted) perceptions and beliefs about it.
168
 These 
cognitions have a conative dimension; that is, they are (or lead to) desires. In the best case 
scenario, our motivations and desires will compel us toward the true Good of which they allow a 
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glimpse. However, in some cases, this glimpse may be a quite distorted perception of goodness – 
a mere appearance of the Good. This is caused when the soul is ruled by the lower parts, which 
sometimes mistakenly interpret appearances of the good as truly good things. Only if one’s soul 
is properly ordered and ruled by the rational part, will she understand the Good. It is at this point 
that she will really see what is truly Good vs. what merely appears to be good. In either case, 
however, one’s desires for good (whether real or apparent) results from some kind of perception 
of that good.  
Notably, while it is not the case that all sense perception involves illusions, and 
analogously, not all passions of the lower parts of the soul are vicious – that is, not all of them 
lead people astray – none of them can get past appearances of the truth. Only reason can do this. 
Thus, the lower parts of the soul grasp mere images/appearances, whereas the rational part can 
calculate, and so it desires what it believes to be best overall.  
While the objects of the lower parts of the soul may not always be good things, this does 
not necessarily mean that the motivations are independent of the Good. Seeking the good but 
reaching only an appearance of it gives rise to desires for things that only appear but are not 
good. Hence, it is possible to pursue the good and, at the same, time be motivated toward bad 
things.   
In short, for Plato, we are all motivated toward the Good (each part of the soul seeks it, 
and judgments or beliefs that something is good are accompanied by motivation toward that 
object). However, we may be motivated toward bad things when the lower parts of the soul 
mistake mere appearances of the Good for the real Good. Or, the reasoning part of the soul itself 
may sometimes reach an inaccurate view of what is good.  
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For example, suppose that a person is not motivated to help someone else, or to tell the 
truth or to refrain from drinking too much wine. This can be explained in the following way: a 
person who is not motivated toward the true Good has a mistaken view of the Good; that is, she 
is motivated toward what she believes to be good, but she lacks an understanding of what is 
really Good.  
When reason forms a conception of the Good, it may be autonomous or it may be 
adopted from one of the other parts. The latter may occasion an inaccurate view of the Good: 
When the lower parts are motivated toward the apparent good and reason accepts the content of 
value that the other parts have supplied, reason mistakes the apparent good for the real Good. For 
example, drinking wine in excess will, on this view, result from the misperception that drinking 
in excess is good. Here, a person fails to understand what is truly Good (drinking in moderation 
rather than in excess) because the lower parts of the soul have taken the lead and drawn her 
toward that which they have mistaken as Good. Thus, she is drawn toward something that is not 
good rather than toward the true Good: She will not drink in moderation, but will instead drink in 
excess because she believes doing so is good.   
We might also consider cases of conflict. For example, there are cases in which one’s 
desire for the good is outweighed by her desire to do something else: Perhaps my desire to help 
my elderly neighbor shovel her sidewalk after a snowstorm is outweighed by my desire to stay in 
bed. A person may rationally believe that one thing is good for her, but perceive through a lower 
part of the soul that something else is good. In this case, a person has a desire/motivation for the 
good, even though she may end up choosing to act on something else. This is like the case above 
where one is unaware of what the real Good is, but is motivated toward the apparent good insofar 
as both cases involve a motivation toward the Good. In a similar way, a person may rationally 
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believe that something is morally required, but choose to do something else that the lower parts 
of the soul are motivated toward. Thus, one’s motivation to do the morally required may be 
outweighed by her motivation to do something else. In this case, one need not believe that that 
“something else” is in some way moral in order to be motivated toward it. However, one will 
believe that it is in some sense good, if she is motivated toward it. Furthermore, in the case 
where one’s motivation to do the truly good is outweighed by something else, that something 
else is also a motivation toward the good – it is just an apparent good rather than the real good. 
In light of this, and since he maintains that even though a person who makes a sincere 
judgment about the Good will feel some motivation to comply with it, one might suggest that 
Plato’s view is a kind of prudential internalism. My own view regarding internalism and moral 
realism is in line with Plato’s, as will become apparent in a later section. 
Lastly, I mentioned above that, for Plato, subjective perceptions of goodness are 
reflections through which true Goodness shows itself, and that a kind of subjective pull begins 
our awareness of Goodness, which may lead to being well-off (leading a good life). To clarify 
this point, in both of the following cases – (1) Cases in which a person has a subjective pull 
toward an object that is truly Good, and (2) cases in which a person has a subjective pull toward 
an object that only appears to be good – a positive feeling is evoked in the subject.  
To briefly recap, I have shown that, for Plato, the moral is prudentially good: acting 
virtuously promotes one’s well-being. When a person’s soul is in order, she will see what is truly 
good and, hence, will see that being virtuous and doing what is morally required is, in fact, good 
for her. I have also shown that Plato’s view is a non-subjectivist theory about the Good; i.e., in 
his view, it is not that my desires and motivations toward something make it good for me. 
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Rather, I desire/am motivated toward something because I perceive/believe it to be good, and the 
Good is a real property. I have also suggested that we call Plato a prudential internalist because, 
while he maintains that all parts of the soul are motivated toward the good and always seek that 
which they perceive as good, he also maintains that it is possible for a person to seek bad things; 
some part of the soul may mistake the bad for the good and convince the whole soul to seek what 
it misperceives as good.  
 
IV.  KANT AND INTERNALISM 
While there are many important distinctions between Plato’s and Kant’s views of moral 
motivation, Kant will agree with Plato that feeling is not the source of morality, moral 
motivation, and moral obligation. In Kant’s view, reason is the source. Pure reason can “of itself, 
independently of anything empirical, determine the will” (CPrR 5: 42). Kant claims:  
[Moral] actions … need no recommendation from any subjective 
disposition or taste, so as to be looked upon with immediate favor and 
delight; nor do they need any immediate propensity or feeling for them; 
they present the will that practices them as the object of an immediate 




Moral actions are taken simply because they accord with the moral law, they conform to 
duty. However, feeling does play a role in Kant’s view: reason motivates us by way of feeling, 
specifically, a feeling of respect for the moral law. Indeed, Kant’s remarks on Achtung (respect 
for the moral law) suggest that it is almost a felt aspect of the moral law itself:   
an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination, and 
with it every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that 
                                                             




could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect 
for this practical law (Groundwork, 4:400).   
However, Achtung is not a feeling akin to those of the inclinations. Rather it is a feeling 
that arises from reason. This feeling is not received via external influences, but instead it is a 
feeling that is created (seemingly self-created) out of a rational concept. Thus it is different from 
feelings of the inclinations. In the Groundwork, Kant states that determination of the will via the 
moral law and the consciousness of it is called respect. Respect is not the cause of the moral law; 
rather it is the effect of the moral law on the subject (Groundwork 4:401).  
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes Achtung as both painful and 
ennobling (CPrR 5:73). In the Metaphysics of Morals, he claims that Achtung and love of human 
beings are kinds of feelings that we are made aware of by the moral law (MM 6:399).
170
 These 
feelings are “moral endowments” that “lie at the basis of morality” – they are “subjective 
conditions of receptivity to the concept of duty” (MM 6:399). Furthermore, in his view, feelings 
of pleasure and pain are essential to human moral motivation.
171
 He writes:  
 In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason 
alone prescribes the ‘ought,’ it is admittedly required that his reason have 
the capacity to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of 
duty, and thus there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility 
in conformity with its principles (Groundwork 4:460).   
For Kant, a moral judgment “can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain,” because 
this is how moral considerations motivate us. In the Critique of Practical Reason, when Kant 
maintains that the moral law “strikes down self-conceit,” he wants to show that the feeling of 
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pain that comes with this is part of moral motivation. Achtung has the power to remove the 
“resistance” (counterweight/hindrance) to the moral law that self-conceit presents. Achtung is 
thus the “esteemed equivalent to a positive furthering of [the moral law's] causality” (CPrR 
5:75). One interesting aspect of Achtung is that it gives us the opportunity to feel pain or pleasure 
through moral deliberation.  
As is well-known, Kant warns against the inclinations and desires: “unless reason holds 
the reins of government in his own hands, a human being's feelings and inclinations play the 
master over him” (MM 6:408). He encourages self-mastery and resistance of one’s passions. By 
self-mastery he means that one must “bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason's) 
control and so to rule over himself” (MM 6:408). The thought is not to do away with one’s 
feelings and inclinations, but instead to master them in ways that are compatible with morality. 
In his view, we can cultivate our emotions, and they are, to some extent, products of our choices.  
Thus, this is a version of moral internalism (the view that a person cannot sincerely make 
a moral judgment without being motivated as least to some degree to adhere to her judgment). 
Kant maintains that it is possible to judge some act to be moral without having a pre-existing 
desire to do it. However, we cannot judge an action moral without the feeling of Achtung, which 
motivates us. Reason motivates the will, and it brings with it this special kind of feeling of 
respect for the moral law. 
For Kant, acting from duty – as opposed to other motives, such as desires for pleasure – 
is only possible if the judgment that one has a duty has motivational power. Kant’s view is that 





 For Kant, judgments of duty have motivational power, and they (sufficiently) 
produce and explain the actions that follow from them. 
Since the rules of duty are, in Kant’s view, derived from reason and are also motivational, 
Kant is – as I noted above – committed to the view that reason is motivating. As I have 
discussed, however, Kant agrees that inclinations, in addition to reason, carry motivational force. 
For example, my desires will determine what I judge to be tasty, and sometimes the motivational 
force that is carried by desires will dominate the motivational force that is carried by reason. 
Indeed, Kant does not deny weakness of will, or that inclinations that are contrary to reason, may 
sometimes lead to actions. One might suggest that, for Kant, these instances of weakness of will 
are simply the product of irrationality, or cases in which one fails to exercise reasonable self-
control. Thus, we might call Kant a weak moral internalist.
173
 
I have not yet discussed the topic of prudential internalism, from Kant’s point of view. In 
Chapter 2, I touched on the way in which Achtung is good for a person, via my discussion of the 
connection between aesthetic experience and moral improvement. In that chapter, and also in this 
present section, I have explained that, for Kant, proper moral decision making requires the 
authority of reason over the inclinations and over sensibility. Through Achtung – a respect for the 
moral law – reason may triumph over sensibility (in the case that one’s inclinations are drawn to 
something that is contrary to reason).
174
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However, as I have mentioned, desires and inclinations do play a role in Kant’s moral 
picture: Our desires and inclinations are part of human nature, and reason has “a commission 
from the side of his sensibility [to satisfy desires and inclinations]” (CPrR, 5:61). This is because 
we are beings with needs, insofar as we “belong to the sensible world” (CPrR, 5:61). In other 
words, even though I ought to fulfill my moral duty, this is not to say that I should no longer eat 
or drink; taking those actions is part of what it is to be a human being in the sensible world. 
Importantly, however, in light of the fact that we have these desires and inclinations, Kant 
maintains that we come to form an idea of what it would be to have a maximal satisfaction of all 
of them. This idea of maximal satisfaction is what Kant calls happiness (CPrR, 5:61, 22, 124). 
Happiness, combined with another key idea in Kant’s moral theory, is what connects morality 
and Achtung with the prudential. 
The other key idea that we form, according to Kant, is an idea of a moral world that is a 
supersensible kingdom of ends, in which everyone acts only in accordance with maxims that can 
be universal laws. This perfectly moral world is something that, by itself, cannot constitute our 
“whole and complete good…even in the judgment of an impartial reason;” it is part of our nature 
to need happiness (CPrR, 5:110, 25). Moreover, happiness by itself cannot be unconditionally 
good, because moral virtue is a condition of worthiness to be happy (CPrR, 5:111). Thus, the 
complete end, as it were – the highest good (the summum bonum) for human beings – must 
combine both virtue and happiness:  
Virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a 
person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the 
worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest 
good of a possible world (CPrR 5:110–111). 
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Kant goes on to say at 5:125 that “we ought to strive to promote the highest good;” that 
is, it is our duty to do so. In his view, it is a part of human reasoning that we see/approach all of 
our particular duties as things that lead up to the highest good (CPrR, 6:5). This means that our 
duty to promote the highest good is really the sum of all our duties derived from the moral law. 
In Kant’s view, we have to conceive of the highest good as being possible to reach, if we are to 
do our duty of promoting it.  
However, we may fail at doing our duty. We have a choice about whether to conceive of 
the highest good as possible, to regard it as impossible, or to remain noncommittal (CPrR 5:144–
145). We can fulfill our duty of promoting the highest good only by choosing to conceive of the 
highest good as possible, because we cannot promote any end without believing that it is possible 
to achieve that end (CPrR, 5:122).  
In light of this, we might call Kant a prudential internalist. In his view, thinking 
something as good, as it were, involves a necessary motivation towards it – one that results from 
respect for the moral law. One may experience weakness of will, however, in cases in which the 
motivation given by her inclinations may overpower the motivation given by reason. Thus, in 
addition to being a weak moral internalist, Kant also endorses a kind of prudential internalism. 
As I shall explain in section F, my view regarding internalism can be distinguished from Kant’s 
insofar as I endorse prudential internalism, but not moral internalism.  
 
V.  MURDOCH AND MORAL MOTIVATION  
In Murdoch’s view, our ability to form accurate moral beliefs is part of the capacity to 
love and to truly see – to exercise attention. The central concept of morality is “the individual 
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thought of as knowable by love” (SOG 30), and love is the essence of moral knowledge. For 
Murdoch, just and loving attention to other individuals plays a key role in understanding moral 
requirements. A moral person, in Murdoch’s view, is one who is aware of other people’s 
individual particularities and is moved by such an awareness.  
Murdoch, like Plato and Kant, does not deny that emotions and desires play a role in our 
moral psychology. In her view, when one has the perspective from which she can make proper 
moral judgments, she will be motivated to do them. That is, taking the moral perspective and 
practicing loving attention occasions proper moral judgments, which are accompanied by the 
intent to be virtuous (SOG 66). Murdoch does not mean to suggest that moral judgments are any 
kind of desire or emotion, rather they may give rise to desires and emotions.  
A main thesis in The Sovereignty of Good is that true vision – which makes the self seem 
less interesting – occasions right conduct (SOG 66).  Moral knowledge means not only “seeing” 
others correctly and empathetically: correct seeing gives rise to proper motivation. Thus, moral 
awareness is a kind of vision – a cognitive vision. One way to put this is that moral awareness is 
“a genuine belief-state directed on a real object of knowledge…”
176
 This object may be another 
individual, or it may be the Good itself. The notion of what it means to look at the Good itself is 
quite obscure in Murdoch’s work. However, given the arguments that I made in Chapter 3, a 
reasonable way to interpret this is as follows: we begin on an egotistical, base level, looking 
toward the fulfillment of desires. We acknowledge the objects of our desires as goods. Then, as 
we operate in the world and look around at other people doing the same, we are made aware of, 
and become able to recognize, moral actions. Through social education and activity among other 
people we begin to realize a connection between moral action and goodness. Seeing imperfection 
                                                             
176 See A.E. Denham’s “Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation,” Iris Murdoch: Philosopher, pg. 327.  
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in the world and seeing objects and actions that could be better – that are lacking – gives us the 
notion of moral perfection. We see that all of these moral actions might be situated on a sort of 
scale of goodness, and that we are all drawn to something better and more perfect. This allows us 
to eventually distinguish between agents who act and are in need of our action, and the perfect, 
and then the Good itself.  
Indeed, Murdoch maintains that ordinary people must “attempt to look right away from 
self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of 
new and quite undreamt-of virtue” (SOG 99). This is the Good, and if a person is properly 
informed of the Good, she will have an attraction, a motivation toward it. Murdoch does not 
mean that all people are always motivated toward what is truly good. People are always 
motivated toward what they believe to be good for them, but unless they are properly informed 
of the real good, their other desires for egotistical ends may outweigh motivation toward the real 
good.  
In the case of the moral, once we become aware of what morality requires, and when we 
properly understand it, we are drawn to it. However, if we are not looking away from ourselves 
and toward others or the good itself, it is possible that that our attraction/motivation to the moral 
may not defeat our other desires.  
Thus, like Plato, Murdoch may be considered a prudential internalist: In her view, we are 
motivated toward what we believe to be good, and if we understand the real good, we will be 
motivated toward it. We may be motivated toward that which is immoral, but if so, it is because 
we believe those things to be good for us in some way. If we are motivated toward the moral, it 
is because we understand that it is good.  
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VI.  THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MOTIVATIONAL JUDGMENT INTERNALSIM AND 
OBJECTIVE GOODNESS  
In this section, I shall develop a view that is in the same family with Plato, Kant, and 
Murdoch. From all three of their views, I want to preserve objectivity about the moral and the 
role of aesthetics in connection with morality. I also want to preserve objectivity about the good 
and prudential internalism. Now that I have situated these figures’ views in the contemporary 
debate regarding moral motivation, I am going to sketch my own account. I shall begin with a 
point that Murdoch draws from Plato. 
 In connection with Plato’s view that we all seek the Good, Murdoch presents her view of 
an ‘Idea of Perfection.’
177
 She insists that true perfection is never attainable by human beings, 
and, thus, that perfection is always an ideal. Paradoxically, the fact that perfection can never be 
attained increases its capacity to inspire us toward it. As I discussed in Chapter 3, her argument 
from perfection is one way in which she aims to ground the reality of the Good. In company with 
Plato and Murdoch I am going to insist that we all seek the real Good.   
It is well-known that this claim raises various questions regarding the meaning of the real 
Good and what motivates us toward it, as well as the relationship between the moral and the 
good and the way in which one is able to understand the moral and the good.
178
 My aim in what 
follows is to shed further light on the answers to these questions. In doing so, I hope to clarify 
exactly what is compelling about an account of moral motivation that draws on (as well as 
expands) the views of Plato, Kant, and Murdoch.   
First, there is a difference between (a) conceptualizing something or grasping something 
as moral and (b) understanding that that thing is good (best for me). One may do (a) without 
                                                             
177 See Murdoch, “The Idea of Perfection,” The Sovereignty of Good, (NY: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971)   
178 Gentzler addresses this in “Attractions of Delight and Goodness.” 
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doing (b); it is possible to conceptualize, for example, that helping an elderly person across the 
street is moral without understanding that this has anything to do with one’s own well-being. I 
mean to distinguish between two epistemic attitudes toward the moral: Mere (sincere) belief vs. 
true understanding. One may have a sincere belief that something is morally required without 
truly understanding that it is morally required. I suggest that in order to truly understand that 
something is morally required, a person must understand that the moral is also good; i.e., that 
which is morally valuable is also prudentially valuable. To truly understand that something is 
morally required is to judge it from an impersonal perspective. When one comes to realize that 
the impersonal perspective is also the true first-personal perspective, then one will realize that 
the moral is the truly prudential. The moral is the good because being moral makes a person her 
most authentic self. When one gains the perspective that allows her to see the good, she will see 
that the moral is good for her. Realizing that the moral is good for her gives her an internal 
motivation toward it. One might make sense of this via the claim that the good has an index to 
the self in a way that the moral does not. In order to clarify this, I need to draw on some concepts 
that I developed in earlier chapters. 
In chapters 3 and 4, I discussed the notion of the self as well as selflessness and 
Murdochian unselfing. One will recall that Murdoch’s view of selflessness (which involves 
being unselfed, as it were) involves learning to relate to and perceive others in a morally correct 
way, and being freed from one’s ego. Unselfing involves a kind of benevolence. That is, a person 
who has been unselfed will have developed an attitude of seeing human beings as they are, and 
she will do so not only because she is no longer focused egotistically on herself, but also because 
she is inevitably striving for perfection, i.e., for goodness.   
220 
 
 Like Murdoch, my view is that the moral person is free in the sense that she is no longer 
focused on selfish illusions. She truly sees reality, which is something a person can only perceive 
when she is no longer focusing solely on herself.  Freeing ourselves from egotistic illusion 
allows us to see what is real and true, including the truth about correct moral behavior. We see 
the needs of other people as having a call on us, as it were.  
Murdoch does not use the phrase ‘true self,’ yet she holds the view that defeating the self 
involves becoming free. However, a fruitful way of explaining her account would develop the 
notion of the ‘true self’ as the one that sees from a moral perspective. For Murdoch, the moral 
perspective is the one that is gained by practicing attention – it is a selfless perspective, focused 
on other people and their needs and individual particularities. I mean to take this notion a step 
further. I suggest that there are two stages of this perspective: (1) The moral perspective is the 
one from which a person has access to the realm of the moral (seeing other people’s needs and 
interests as just as relevant as one’s own). However, a person who takes this perspective has not 
yet related it to oneself/seen its true relevance to oneself. (2) The second stage involves coming 
to identify the moral perspective as one’s own prudential perspective – one’s true prudential 
perspective.
179
 At this stage, a person sees the moral and also goes on to see the moral as good 
for her. Thus, I am adding a higher stage – the true prudential perspective – to the original 
Murdochian notion of the moral perspective. In my view, one’s true self will be the one that sees 
not just from the moral perspective, but from the true prudential perspective. 
This notion of what it means to find one’s true self also comes up in Plato and Kant, and, 
as I have mentioned previously, this notion marks one point of connection between their 
                                                             
179 One might suggest that the egoistical perspective can be viewed as prudential, so I am calling this the true 
prudential perspective in order to reduce any ambiguity. 
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respective views of the relationship between aesthetic experience and morality. For Plato, one is 
able to become a better version of herself by climbing the ladder of the Symposium, or by having 
an experience such as that which is described in the Phaedrus. In this case, one becomes morally 
good by becoming a certain kind of agent. She likens herself to a God through a relationship with 
an educator, and is hence, more like the Forms themselves. 
We might say that being selfless involves focusing on something beyond what Kant 
would call the phenomenal self. Like Kant, my view is that this kind of “looking beyond” 
involves a redirecting of one’s consciousness away from oneself and one’s material and personal 
concerns. I have argued that Plato also wants to show that it is beneficial to direct one’s focus 
away from her material concerns, and he articulates this in terms of the soul’s functioning 
harmoniously. My point here is that Plato, Kant, and Murdoch emphasize some kind of 
selflessness, and all of these views involve some version of the claim that becoming selfless is a 
dimension of becoming good.  
Returning to the idea that the Good has an index to the self in a way that the moral does 
not, I suggest that seeing something as truly Good is seeing something as prudential insofar as it 
is understood from a selfless perspective. I realize that ‘prudential insofar as it is understood 
from a selfless perspective’ is seemingly paradoxical, but I am using this phrase to mean that 
something is in one’s interest insofar as it is for the sake of a higher self. To clarify this, we can 
distinguish the following four cases from one another: (1) Self-denial might mean that one 
restrains or denies seeking the gratification of present desires of the self because one sees that the 
difference between her happiness and others’ happiness is irrelevant. (2) Selfless thoughts or acts 
based on concern for others could involve cases in which one risks one's own safety or interests 
in order to help someone in need. Thus, for example, a person might enter a burning building to 
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save someone trapped inside. (3) Disinterested judgments (we might even include ‘disinterested 
awareness’) are judgments about something or someone that are impartial, free of bias or self-
interest; i.e., not uninterested or indifferent. Thus, for example, one might genuinely admire the 
skill or resourcefulness of an enemy or competitor. (4) The absence of self-awareness for a 
period of time might mean that one attends to something so closely, or is so "absorbed" by 
something, that explicit consciousness of the self and its desires/problems/needs is absent for a 
period of time. Thus, for example, one may be so fully caught up in beautiful music that a cough 
by someone sitting nearby is a shocking reminder that we are selves in the company of other 
selves at some specific place and time. Something like this can also happen when we are 
concentrating on some intricate task that requires our undivided attention, as Murdoch notes in 
her well-known passage about learning Russian.   
Each of these seems to be a perfectly ordinary case of what we could mean by 
"unselfing."  That is, when we say that there is something incoherent or paradoxical in talk about 
"losing oneself," perhaps the real point is that the word “unselfing” is only superficially 
misleading. Indeed, to seriously maintain that there is something incoherent about the notion of 
losing oneself is to deny the reality of 1-4, which seems unreasonable.   
I also note that these four distinctions show how the experience of (4) might help us 
toward (1-3) as more reliably part of our everyday modes of consciousness.  That is, in the same 
vein with Murdoch, we might say that having experiences that give rise to (4) help us develop 
ways of thinking and feeling that are necessary to the moral life. Always thinking about the self 
and its desires is not a necessary feature of the human condition, but something more like a 
deeply-ingrained, culturally-reinforced habit that can be progressively altered or undone by 
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cultivating other modes of awareness. (4) is something that can open us to the reality of 
otherness, as it were, remaking us into something more real and grand in the process.  
Thus, ‘selfless’ need not literally mean that a person has lost herself or that there is 
nothing left of what she once referred to as ‘I’ or ‘me’. Instead, being selfless can mean 
restraining one’s present desires for mere appearances of goodness because they conflict with the 
true Good. Thus, it makes sense to say that there could be something like a ‘selfless self;’ that is, 
your selfless self is a ‘you’ who is a most authentically you who, to borrow some terminology 
from Murdoch, has the capacity to ‘see’ from a higher perspective.    
Moreover, Plato’s distinction between the lower and higher parts of the soul is, once 
again, relevant: the appetite and spirit seek things that may only appear to be good, that provide 
immediate gratification, while (reason) the higher part is actually able to calculate what is truly 
good. Restraining the desires of the lower part is not a denial of a person’s self. Rather, it is a 
kind of resisting of the lower parts of oneself in order to promote what is in one’s more vital 
interests; that is, to promote the true and higher good for that person.   
We might say, then, that, for Plato, this “higher soul” is what I want to call the ‘selfless 
self,’ as it were, and these are its values. By the higher soul, I mean the harmoniously 
functioning soul that directs a person toward the Good. As I discussed in section C, it is the 
harmonious soul that gives a person the point of view from which she may see what is truly good 
vs. what merely appears to be good,
180
 and the point from which morally required things can be 
perceived as good.  
                                                             
180 Again, one’s desires for good (whether real or apparent) result from some kind of perception of that good. 
224 
 
Turning to Kant’s view, the selfless self is the one that is most human – we might say, the 
part that is strengthened through Achtung – and it will value the moral law. From Murdoch’s 
point of view the selfless self is the one into which the successful moral pilgrim transforms, who 
values the perspective that is given via the practice of attention – the clear vision of reality.   
With these points in mind, I suggest that in order to see that the moral is good one must 
realize her selfless self; i.e., she must realize who she is. This will cause her to realize what is 
most valuable/most good, which is being moral. Thus, she must see the moral as good.  
However, it is possible to make judgments about goodness from a narrowly, self-focused 
perspective. This perspective involves a narrow conception of the self, and this conception of the 
self requires something different from that toward which the selfless self aims. Drawing on 
Plato’s view, one way to explain this is that the self-focused self may require certain things, 
while the selfless self requires certain others; that which is actually good for the self-focused self, 
as it were, may call on a person to seek specific pleasures and the fulfillment of desires that are 
relevant to the self-focused perspective. (If we were to use Platonic language, we might call 
these the appetitive pleasures and desires.) However, focusing on those pleasures and the 
fulfillment of those desires will not be prudential for the selfless self, because the selfless self 
has, as it were, moved on to a broader perspective. Though the pleasures and the fulfillment of 
desires that are relevant to the self-focused perspective may indeed be good for the self-focused 
self, they are, in a truer sense, only distortedly good. I am arguing that there are distortedly good 
things that are relevant to the self-focused self, and that there are truly good things that are 
relevant to the selfless self. However, the possibility that the self-focused self may desire 
something is purely selfish and immoral, should not be excluded. This will occur when the self-
focused self seeks what is good for it (but which is actually only distortedly good in a true 
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sense). The point is that the self-focused self requires something different from and inferior to 
that which the selfless self requires. I do not mean that the self-focused self is looking from a 
false perspective; rather it is looking from an inferior one. I am suggesting that there is a higher 
self that is called toward the real good. This higher self takes a moral and then prudential 
perspective (which I have shown is consistent with being selfless), and thus, it is to it that the 
true good is revealed. 
To tie these remarks back to the account of moral motivation that I sketched at the 
beginning of this section, we can make the following claims: In the case in which we make a 
moral judgment, we see an action as right but we may not necessarily see it as something that is 
prudential insofar as it is understood from a selfless perspective. That is, I might not see the 
action as in my interest insofar as it promotes higher goodness – the kind of goodness that 
involves a shift of focus from the desires and wants of the self to, for instance, the interests of 
someone else. If a person does not see this, the person has merely gotten the moral judgment 
right, as it were, but she doesn’t understand that the object/action in question is good (she does 
not see the true good). On the other hand, if a person makes a moral judgment and a judgment 
about goodness (if she not only gets the moral judgment right but also understands that the object 
in question is good), she will have made such a judgment from what I have called the true 
prudential perspective.  
Ultimately, then, a person will see that this perspective is what is truly good for her. Once 
she adopts this perspective she will see that what is required as moral is good for her. Normally, 
we see what is morally required, but without the higher, prudential perspective, we do not see 
our own benefit in it. Thus, true claims about goodness are seen as being in one’s own interest 
when they are understood from a higher perspective, and hence, acting in accordance with the 
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good is prudential. Knowing goodness entails identifying the true prudential perspective as one’s 
own – i.e. realizing that what is truly good for oneself is to become selfless. The world, in a 
sense, calls us to respond to it: Our response must be that of acknowledging other people and the 
reality beyond our self-focused perspective. The higher perspective just is a response to the call 
of the world on us, and it is the perspective from which the Murdochian sort of reality is not only 
revealed, but revealed as good for us. Moral education allows a person to reach this perspective, 
which in turn allows one to see who she really is, and to apprehend true goodness. Once we have 
a true vision of the good, we see what is really good for us.  
To quickly review, for Murdoch, the moral perspective is the one that is gained by 
practicing attention – it is a selfless perspective, focused on other people and their needs and 
individual particularities. I have taken this notion a step further and suggested that there are two 
stages of this perspective: (1) The moral perspective is the one from which a person has access to 
the realm of the moral (seeing other people’s needs and interests as just as relevant as one’s 
own), and (2) The second stage involves coming to identify the moral perspective as one’s own 
prudential perspective – one’s true prudential perspective.  At this stage, a person sees the moral 
and also goes on to see the moral as good for her. I have argued that one’s true self is the one that 
sees not just from the moral perspective, but from the true prudential perspective. 
For Murdoch, when a person is trained to exercise attention (which is a function of 
aesthetic experience), she is trained to respect something other than herself. Aesthetic 
experiences, through the attitude that they command us to acquire, train us to respond and attend 
to things in the morally ideal way. I have argued that moral training, in Murdoch’s view, may 
produce the successful moral pilgrim. This is the case because the practice of attention (that 
which aesthetic experiences may train us to do) is that which leads to the defeat of the ego, a 
227 
 
successful moral pilgrimage, and a moral transformation. That is to say that, since moral training 
brings about the transformation of a person that is the aim of the moral pilgrimage, moral 
training is the key to a successful moral pilgrimage, and aesthetic experience is the key to moral 
training.  
 
VII.  MOVING BEYOND MURDOCH  
In what follows, I offer some criticisms of Murdoch’s position, and I suggest ways in 
which my view (which is an extended, and partially amended, version of her view) may 
eliminate those concerns. First, I mentioned above that Murdoch does not directly discuss any 
notion of a “true self” or “selfless self.” Perhaps Murdoch is trying to avoid what I call the 
“prudential-as-understood-from-a-selfless-perspective paradox” in the next paragraph, by 
keeping away from such a discussion. However, because Murdoch argues that the moral person 
is a selfless person, but does not go on to discuss any kind of selfless self, one could argue that 
the self drops out of her view of a moral person (i.e. a successful moral pilgrim). This gives rise 
to an inconsistency, since what she is calling a successful moral pilgrim would no longer have a 
self. Or, on the other hand, if we concede that Murdoch’s selfless self is the person who has 
reached the selfless perceptive, there is still a worry: The Murdochian moral pilgrim is left 
unhappy, and hence, not completely fulfilled. Murdoch does not want to identify one’s happiness 
with selflessness. In fact, she insists that in reality there is no promise of happiness. I part with 
Murdoch here, and I suggest, on the other hand, that selflessness is fulfilling in a way that goes 
beyond being able to face ‘unconsoling’ reality. 
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My account brings in the notion of a selfless self. As I have previously noted, this move 
requires that I deal with the following apparent paradox: something being prudential insofar as it 
is understood from a selfless perspective can seem incoherent. In order to eliminate this problem, 
a successful account of the kind I am developing here must balance selflessness with happiness. 
In other words, it must be possible to identify one’s happiness with selflessness to get rid of the 
prudential-from-a-selfless-perspective paradox. My account allows for a broadening of the self 
via what I am calling the selfless self, and it allows that one’s true happiness is a response to the 
call of the world on that person. This view is still in the same vein with Murdoch’s: It entails that 
selflessness (and a kind of ascent to a selfless vision) is what is called for. For Murdoch, this 
selflessness is devoid of self; however, in my account, selflessness involves the discovery of the 
true self. My view allows that morality be a way of looking that constitutes a self, which 
involves its true happiness (this is the prudential point of view). This point of view is focused on 
different things that are valued for others, yet one’s own happiness can also be valued in this 
same way.  
Second, I noted at the beginning of this section that the Murdochian idea of perfection is 
valuable. Furthermore, I noted in my explanation of the previous problem that the notion of a 
selfless self is necessary to eliminate the prudential-from-a-selfless-perspective paradox. 
However, the selfless self is particularly difficult to define. If we flesh out the idea of perfection 
as the idea of a perfect person – God – then we can more specifically define the selfless self as 
the self that is most God-like, and the selfless perspective as the ideal point of view; i.e., God’s 
point of view. This is the loving point of view to which the morally required is revealed. 
Murdoch would strongly resist this suggestion, given that in her version of the 
Ontological Argument she argues that what has been proved to exist should really be called 
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‘good’ instead of ‘God.’ However, in Chapter 3, I called this into question. Returning to one of 
those points of discussion, one will recall that the reason Murdoch wants the practice of attention 
to be done for nothing – and hence, argues that God cannot be a focus of attention – is that she 
argues that reality is not happy, and that the moral life is not consoling. In her view, the desire 
for such consolation and happiness is a product of illusion. In order to see reality via the practice 
of attention, the practice must be done without the promise of happiness in the picture at all. As I 
have explained, my account is able to allow for happiness in the moral life, which is seemingly 
more attractive.  
In Chapter 3, I maintained that Murdoch might have been better off to avoid a discussion 
of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God altogether, and that the argument 
from perfection better evidences the reality of the Good. Thus, I am suggesting that one might 
take this a step further by suggesting that the idea of perfection – which Murdoch’s argument 
from perfection supports – might be fleshed out as the idea of a perfect person. My claim is that 
this move has the potential to solve some of the problems that I have raised with respect to 




I. A FINAL SUMMARY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND ITS CONNECTION WITH 
MORALITY IN PLATO, KANT, AND IRIS MURDOCH 
Plato, Kant, and Murdoch (each in different ways) share the thesis that aesthetic 
experience is connected with morality. However, this thesis is open to certain philosophical 
objections, such as the question as to whether aesthetic value itself can be morally improving 
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when there is morally corrupting art. In this coda, I shall review the way in which art functions in 
Plato’s, Kant’s and Murdoch’s views. Then I shall sketch a view that suggests certain 
distinctions which help to clear up the relevant objections.  
I have argued that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) 
Some experiences of beauty via art can be used in moral training; that is, these experiences can 
be used to promote the kind of training that Plato suggests should take place during the 
beginning stages of education in the Republic. This is an affective kind of training, whereby a 
person learns to feel appropriately toward appropriate things. Experiences of beauty via art have 
the capacity to influence a person’s character, and they can, in turn, help give rise to appropriate 
behavior. (2) An erotic experience of a beautiful person, as it is described in the Symposium and 
Phaedrus, is a more profound sort of experience. This kind of experience can be distinguished 
from (1) in that it adds a higher kind of cognitive component which is lacking in (1). In (1), 
cognition is involved (cognition is involved in all affection), but only as perception-based 
thought, which merely has access to appearances. Some erotic experiences of beautiful people, 
on the other hand, provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision. 
They lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover 
of wisdom. Therefore, erotic experiences of beautiful people promote increased moral 
understanding as opposed to affective training. 
As we have seen, for Kant, beauty is universal and objective, but it is defined by a 
process that takes place within the experiencing subject. In his view, beauty symbolizes the 
good, due to the analogy between the formal process that takes place among the cognitive 
faculties when a person makes a moral judgment and the formal process that takes place when a 
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person makes a judgment of beauty. This analogy makes possible the attunement to the moral 
that results from a Kantian experience of beauty.  
Kant, like Plato, distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic experience. He wants to 
show that an experience of beauty is especially capable of preparing us for loving something 
without interest (29:267). On the other hand, an experience of the sublime best captures what 
Kant calls ‘moral feeling,’ and hence, it is the sublime that teaches us to “esteem something even 
against our interest” (29L267). In Kant’s view, as a result of the different symbolic relationships 
that the beautiful and the sublime have with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a 
different way, are instructive; they not only affect our feelings, but they also promote 
understanding. The experience of beauty gives us a picture of morality, symbolizing the good via 
a disinterested liking. The pleasure that we take in the beauty in nature cultivates a certain kind 
of freedom from the merely personal inclinations on which we tend to focus. However, an 
experience of beauty does not go so far as to rein in the inclinations toward such pleasures. The 
sublime, on the other hand, is relevant to such a context. An experience of the sublime teaches us 
moral dignity. It makes us feel fear and pleasure together, and, above all, respect. This kind of 
experience gives a person a “flash” of the appropriate relationship between reason and the 
inclinations. Sublimity makes us aware of reason’s power, and it teaches us that, in our practical 
lives, that power should be given due respect, and that it should never be defeated by our 
inclinations.  
Both Plato and Kant seem to suggest that in aesthetic experience one may find one’s true 
self. For Plato, one is able to become a better version of herself (she is able to grow morally) by 
climbing the ladder of the Symposium, or by having an experience such as that which is 
described in the Phaedrus. Here, as I have previously shown, one becomes morally good by 
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becoming a certain kind of agent. She likens herself to a God through a relationship with an 
educator, and is hence, more like the Forms themselves.  
For Kant, aesthetic experiences put people in touch with freedom, which is only 
predicable of the noumenal self. In this way, aesthetic experiences are linkages to the noumenal 
realm and the noumenal self. Kant emphasizes the notion that aesthetic experience involves a 
redirecting of one’s consciousness away from oneself and one’s material and personal 
concerns.
181
 Interestingly, we have seen that Plato also wants to show that aesthetic experience at 
least involves a directing away from one’s material concerns. 
Drawing Plato’s and Kant’s theories together, Murdoch argues for her own theory of 
moral progress, which involves a pilgrimage that we must make from the self-focused fantasy 
life into which we are born to the apprehension of reality, particularly in its moral dimensions. 
This pilgrimage is possible only via the practice of what she calls ‘unselfing.’ In Murdoch’s 
view, certain kinds of aesthetic experiences train us to pay attention to things other than 
ourselves, and hence, they facilitate unselfing. I have suggested that we understand Murdoch’s 
view in the following way: When we see art or nature and apprehend beauty, it commands our 
attention, and something slips away from us in the moment in which we are required to exercise 
attention. That something is, in fact, ourselves. Yet, it isn’t as if everything disappears in that 
moment – something is surely left. That something is everything else – all that is not ourselves. 
We have never before seen this reality, yet we “gaze” upon it “with the passion of a lover.” In 
that moment, when we no longer figure in our self-focus, all that is not ourselves is “filled to the 
brim with being.” This is Murdochian love – to look and look until the self exists no more. In a 
sense, it is death – the death of the self by which the real world “becomes quite automatically the 
                                                             
181 As I discussed in earlier chapters, this is to say that one is focusing on something beyond the phenomenal self. 
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object of perfect love.”
182
 It is in this way that an aesthetic experience gives us an example of the 
way in which we ought to act toward other objects, i.e., other individuals; that is, we ought to 
pay them attention. In this way, one might say that, for Murdoch, the aesthetic just is the realm in 
which our attention can be focused. Indeed, the notion of attention is the key to understanding 
Murdoch’s view regarding the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and thus, in her view, 
aesthetic experiences are the key to moral progress.  
For Murdoch, aesthetic experience shows us the difference between the self and the 
world. It does not console us, or encourage pride, or feed the illusions that we create of 
ourselves. This is analogous to the way in which we ought to behave toward other individuals: 
we ought to contemplate them in their individual particularities, and ought to look in order to 
truly see them, giving them our full attention. 
Murdoch recognizes and discusses all of the following kinds of aesthetic experiences as 
experiences that promote moral transformation: beauty in nature and art, erotic experiences of 
beautiful people, and sublimity in art and nature. She maintains that moral training, the sort of 
reformation that results from Plato’s erotic experiences of beautiful people, and the triumph over 
the ego may all result from all or any of those kinds of experiences (beauty in art or nature, erotic 
experiences of beautiful people, or experiences of sublimity and tragedy). Some of these 
experiences might be more apt than others to teach us about certain aspects of moral reformation. 
For example, an erotic experience of beauty might be especially capable of teaching us love for 
other people, insofar as it teaches us to appreciate the subjectivity of another individual. Tragedy 
is perhaps especially capable of showing us the idea of death, which has a particularly powerful 
impact against the ego. I am not suggesting that, for Murdoch, sublimity cannot train us to love 
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other people or that erotic experiences of beauty cannot aid in de-creating the ego. However, the 
point is that certain kinds of experiences of beauty are especially good at facilitating certain 
aspects of moral reformation. Nonetheless, for Murdoch, it is not out of the question that any one 
kind of aesthetic experience may by itself bring about moral training, moral growth, and the 
defeat of the ego. When a person is trained to exercise attention (which is a function of aesthetic 
experience), she is trained to respect something other than herself. Aesthetic experiences, 
through the attitude that they command us to acquire, train us to respond and attend to things in 
the morally ideal way. They teach us the morally ideal way of relating to the world. I have 
argued that moral training, in Murdoch’s view, may produce the successful moral pilgrim. This 
is the case because the practice of attention (that which all of these aesthetic experiences may 
train us to do) is that which leads to the defeat of the ego, a successful moral pilgrimage, and a 
moral transformation. That is to say that, since moral training brings about the transformation of 
a person that is the aim of the moral pilgrimage, moral training is the key to a successful moral 
pilgrimage, and aesthetic experience is the key to moral training. 
Plato, Kant, and Murdoch share the basic view that aesthetic experience may promote 
moral reformation. However, there are obvious problems that arise from the position that they 




II. OBJECTIONS TO THE VIEW THAT AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE MAY GIVE RISE TO 
MORAL PROGRESS 
One issue that arises concerning the connection between aesthetic experience and moral 
progress is the question as to how aesthetic value (beauty, sublimity) can be morally improving 
when there exists morally corrupting art. A work of art that is about something evil, or that 
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presents an evil or morally corrupting message, may lead its viewers to have a positive feeling 
about evil, or to even engage in evil activity. There are cases where a work of art may, in fact, 
have a detrimental effect on its viewers’ behavior, or where a work of art offers a morally 
reprehensible message. For example, D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation portrays black 
people as lust-driven drunkards, and as cruel. This film contributed to racism and racially 
motivated murders in the 1900s.
183
 Additionally, a Nazi song is something that presents an 
immoral message, while the aesthetic features of the artwork may be valued as good or beautiful. 
Simone Weil was acknowledging such an aspect of things when she said, “I know that if at this 
moment I had before me a group of twenty young Germans singing Nazi songs in chorus, a part 
of my soul would instantly become Nazi.”
184
 Also, since modern music (such as rock and hip 
hop) often involves controversial lyrics, many people hold the view that, due to its attractive 
aesthetic qualities, this sort of music has the capacity to draw people toward taking the morally 
reprehensible actions that are mentioned in the lyrics.
185
  
This issue raises the further question of just how close the tie really is between art and 
morality.
186
 A debate in recent literature involves the more specific question as to whether 
aesthetic value is a different kind of value than moral value. Some philosophers suggest that the 
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aesthetic and ethical evaluation of art sometimes “go their separate ways.”
187
 One view is that art 
just does not have any effect on people’s morality, for good or ill. Additionally, some thinkers 
maintain that just because a work of art gives rise to ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is not 
aesthetically defective, and just because a work of art gives rise to ethically commendable 
attitudes, that does not make it aesthetically meritorious.
188
 On the other hand, opponents of this 
sort of view argue that “wherever there is a moral flaw, the work is of lesser value as art and 
wherever it is morally virtuous the work’s value as art is enhanced.”
189
  
The central issue in this debate is whether ethical import should be taken into account 
when deciding upon aesthetic value. However, the additional, related question that more directly 
gets at the heart of the matter that I have been discussing in this dissertation is whether aesthetic 
value – our delight in aesthetic forms – is itself, by its very nature, morally positive. In other 
words, if we consider cases such as The Birth of A Nation, a Nazi song, or even works such as 
Gustave Courbet’s L'Origine Du Monde, which are all considered to be morally corrupting, yet 
aesthetically valuable art, is there a morally good aspect of these kinds of works? Is the beauty in 
these works good, as such, in itself? Can there still be an element of morally positive insight in 
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morally corrupting art? Thus, in what follows, my aim is to make relevant distinctions that will 
help clear up this difficulty. 
 
III. A DEFENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND THE GOOD 
Most of us can think of a work of art that we have found morally troubling. While, in 
some cases, we find works of art to be artistically inspired and morally virtuous, in other cases, 
we find works of art to be artistically inspired but morally problematic. In these latter cases, the 
art is aesthetically valuable; e.g., its form, the medium used, color, rhythm, and harmony are all 
qualities that are enjoyable to experience (they appeal to us). Additionally, the imagery may be 
coherent, the style may be vivid, and the themes may be complex. However, the art presents an 
immoral message (e.g., Nazism, racism, sexism, misogyny). What are we to say about these 
cases in art? As I explained above, the main issue that I want to focus on in this section involves 
the question as to whether aesthetic value – our delight in forms – is morally positive by itself, 
by its very nature. In other words, I want to focus on the question as to whether there can be an 
element of morally positive insight in aesthetically valuable, but morally corrupting, art. In what 
follows, I shall sketch a view that aims to address this issue. 
I shall begin by making some distinctions: First, there are certain things about a work of 
art that are aesthetically appealing (e.g., vivid style, complex themes, color, rhythm, harmony, 
and form). When I look, for instance, at Leonardo Da Vinci’s “The Last Supper,” I apprehend 
the qualities of the painting. I detect something about the form. I notice that the figures are 
arranged in a certain way, and that the lines and colors fit together in a kind of harmony that 
allows for the presentation of beauty. When I experience the painting, I apprehend its formal 
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qualities. These qualities should be distinguished from the qualities of the experience that I am 
having when I perceive the object. Those qualities, on the other hand, are present in me as an 
experiencing subject, not in the object of beauty. Second, most art represents something – e.g., 
an event, or a state of affairs – that can be described non-morally. For example, in Picasso’s 
“Guernica,” the content is the bombing of a village in Spain, and that which resulted, and the 
content of Michelangelo’s “Pieta” is Mary holding the crucified Christ. Third, some art presents 
a message – a moral judgment on that which it represents. Returning to the Guernica example, 
the message in that case is that bombing Guernica was wrong. For another example, some music 
lyrics present messages that rape and violence are morally permissible, some paintings present 
messages that women are inferior to men or vice versa. On the other hand, some art works 
present messages that virtues like courage and integrity are virtues that a person ought to possess. 
With these distinctions in mind, I am going to argue that there is a relation between aesthetic 
qualities and the messages – the moral judgments on that which art represents – and that those 
judgments can be false. 
If we think about any example of an aesthetic experience, we can see that aesthetic 
qualities recommend a moral judgment. This is because all general aesthetic experience, on the 
level of its formal, attractive, qualities, involves a presentation of something as if it were good. 
That is to say, aesthetic experience, on the level of its formal qualities, presents something that 
appears to be good, via attractiveness, and thus it evokes a certain response – a pro-attitude – in 
the experiencing subject.  
As I noted above, some aesthetic objects present messages via content. Let us suppose 
that, in the case of those objects, there is a two-dimensional message, as it were: On one level, 
we have the initial message presented by the formal qualities of the work – the presentation of an 
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alleged good. On another level, there is the message presented in the content of the work (e.g, 
‘violence is beneficial,’ ‘courage is a virtue,’ etc.). These content-level messages can be true or 
false. If we have a case where the (content-level) message in a work of art is false, some truth 
will still be presented in abstraction in the initial, formal-level message that is presented by the 
aesthetic qualities.  
I mean to suggest that there will be a morally positive element – some morally good 
aspect – of aesthetic experience, in its formal-level message. That is, the beauty in the formal 
qualities of the work is in itself morally improving because beauty itself is intrinsically 
connected to moral value. If the content-level message is false, the beauty in the formal qualities 
is being perverted to promote the false message; that which is exploited in art with immoral 
content, is the attractive formal qualities, and these can be used in art to draw a person to a moral 
message or an immoral one. 
With an eye to Plato, Kant, and Murdoch, I am suggesting that though there are two sorts 
of qualities – the aesthetic and the moral – and that the aesthetic is, in its nature, appropriate to 
the moral. I mentioned above that there is a certain relation between what I have called the 
messages of the works and the presentation of the works (the formal attractive qualities): The 
latter draw us to have a pro-attitude toward the former, even though the former may be false, and 
hence, give rise to a false moral judgment. 
It will be helpful to apply this theory to an example that I mentioned earlier, The Birth of 
A Nation: this film’s attractive aesthetic qualities involve the complexity of the story, the talented 
film-making, the style of the presentation, and perhaps the choice of background sound and 
scenery. Its content is the description of issues regarding black Americans during its time. One 
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dimension of its message, however, is negative towards black Americans – they are portrayed in 
the film as drunkards and so on. What we have, then, in accordance with the distinctions that I 
have made, is a work of art that is attractive in its formal presentation; it presents an aspect of 
goodness – the goodness that is part of beauty of the formal qualities, as such – on the level of its 
formal-message. However it conveys the false content-level message that black Americans are 
bad people. Furthermore, the people who were persuaded to kill black Americans after watching 
the film were people who took the presentation of goodness in the aesthetic qualities of the film 
and transferred it to the moral assessment of its message. That is, they were mistakenly 
persuaded to judge the message that black people are bad people as something true, in light of 
their attraction to the formal qualities of the film. I am suggesting that the reason this piece of art 
gave rise to immoral behavior is that its content-level message is false, and its formal qualities 
(and the element of positive moral insight that is intrinsically a part of beauty as such) in itself, 
were used to attract its viewers toward that false message. Thus, the moral judgment made by 
those who behaved immorally was also false. When art gives rise to immoral behavior, it is 
because it presents, in some sense, a false message, and the viewer mistakes that message to be 
true in light of the element of goodness that is presented by the aesthetic qualities of the object.  
Let us consider a different kind of example, which I referenced in an earlier chapter: 
Michelangelo’s David. In this case, the formal qualities involve, for example, the curves and 
shapes in the sculpture, the lines and perhaps even subtle shades of white and grey, the position 
of the figure, and the precision with which his features were created. The formal qualities of the 
work present a message of goodness in their beauty, as such. The content-level message 
presented in this work is one of fortitude and triumph. The moral judgment that follows from this 
message is that one ought to possess fortitude, and perhaps even, as Kant might argue, that 
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triumph over one’s natural inclinations is possible. The message presented here is not a false one. 
In this case, that which is presented as good in the art’s formal qualities and that which is 
presented as good in the art’s message have the ideal relationship for promoting moral 
transformation. However, I am also arguing that in cases where the aesthetic qualities of a work 
are used to incite a false moral message, those qualities, themselves, present at least an element 
of positive moral insight.  
I realize that there are cases in which a person may view an aesthetic object that presents 
a true moral message, such as the David, and either will not be morally affected or will even 
proceed to do immoral things. In connection with this, one may recall Plato’s point that there are 
people who will not make the ascent of the Symposium – they will remain stuck on the sensuous 
qualities of the beautiful person at the bottom, or there will be people who are unable to control 
their “black horses,” to speak in the terms that Plato uses in the Phaedrus. Murdoch also suggests 
that there will be people who remain at the stage before the moral pilgrimage, self-focused and 
absorbed in their egos. In her view, not everyone will make the pilgrimage, and not everyone 
who embarks on it will succeed. Certain people may experience beauty in art or nature, or 
sublimity, and although they are presented with a glimpse of positive moral insight, they may 
never be transformed into better people. What follows, then, is that some aesthetic objects, when 
experienced by some people, will give rise to moral transformation. The objects such as the 
David may give rise to moral progress because they present true messages and they involve a 
presentation of beauty, which is intrinsically connected with goodness. Objects such as the Nazi 
songs present false messages, and may be used to incite immorality if, in light of the beauty in 
the formal qualities of such art, a person mistakenly interprets the false messages as true. 
However, if a person does not mistake the false message as true, she may be affected in a 
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morally positive way by it; the work still presents a moral insight on the level of its formal 
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